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1	Executive Summary
Multi-drug-resistant (MDR) Gram-negative bacterial infections have become prevalent in some European countries. Moreover, increased use of broad-spectrum agents selects organisms with resistance and, by increasing their numbers, also increases their chance of spread. This Report describes measures that are clinically effective for preventing transmission when used by healthcare workers in acute and primary healthcare premises. Methods for systematic review 1946-2014 were in accordance with SIGN 50​[1]​ and the Cochrane Collaboration;​[2]​ critical appraisal was applied using AGREEII.​[3]​ Accepted guidelines were used as part of the evidence base and to support expert consensus. Questions for review were derived from the Working Party Group, which included patient representatives, in accordance with Patient Intervention Comparison Outcome. Recommendations are made in the following areas: screening, diagnosis, and infection control precautions including hand hygiene, single room accommodation, and environmental screening and cleaning. Recommendations for specific organisms are given where there are species differences. 
2	Lay Summary
Multi-drug resistant (MDR) Gram-negative bacteria are bacteria (or germs) that are resistant to at least three different antibiotics. These bacteria are commonly found in the gut, where they do no harm, but can cause infection at other body sites, mostly in patients who are made vulnerable by other underlying disease, injury or hospitalisation. Infection often happens when the bacteria enter the body through an open wound or via a medical device such as a catheter. Infections caused by MDR Gram-negative bacteria are difficult to treat and can cause additional pain to patients with slow wound healing and other complications such as pneumonia or infection in the blood. This can prolong the length of stay in hospital, and in some cases, can cause death.
Some types of resistant Gram-negative bacteria can be carried on the skin rather than the gut, again with no obvious signs or symptoms. ‘Colonization’ describes this carriage of bacteria in the gut on the skin or in the nose, throat or elsewhere on the body. Although the patients lack symptoms of infection, they may still need to be isolated/segregated and/or other contact precautions may be necessary in order to stop their resistant bacteria spreading to others. 

3	Introduction
This guidance has been prepared by the Working Party to provide advice on screening (testing), treatment and precautions needed to prevent the spread of MDR Gram-negative bacteria. The guidance describes appropriate infection prevention and control precautions, to include hand hygiene, equipment and environmental cleaning and guidance on screening for MDR Gram-negative bacteria. There is an accompanying guideline describing best-practice in antimicrobial prescribing which should be used in conjunction with this document.
The Working Party comprises a group of medical microbiologists and scientists, infectious disease physicians, infection control practitioners, epidemiologists, and patient representatives. The patient representatives are lay members and have direct experience of the treatment of healthcare-associated infections through personal experience and/or through membership of SURF (Healthcare-acquired Infection Service Users Research Forum), patient charities and/or through involvement in the development of NICE guidelines.
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5	The Working Party Report
Date of Publication: 
What is The Working Party report?
This Report is a set of recommendations covering prevention of transmission of MDR Gram-negative bacteria (i.e. resistant to at least three different antibiotics). 
. Antimicrobial chemotherapy is covered in a separate publication.
The Working Party recommendations have been developed systematically through a multi-professional group based on published evidence. They should be used in the development of local protocols for all acute and long-term healthcare settings.
Why do we need a Working Party Report for these infections?
Colonization and infection by multi-resistant Gram-negative bacteria have become prevalent in some European countries. Heavy use of broad-spectrum agents selects for organisms with resistance and increases their chance of spread. National antibiotic consumption is increasing in the UK (6% rise 2013 vs. 2010).​[4]​ The spread of these infections risks increasing the length of hospital stay and adversely affects the quality of care of patients. Public awareness of resistance and hospital-acquired infections is increasing, and the paucity of new antimicrobial agents to treat these infections has resulted in the formulation of the five-year Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy by the Department of Health for England to address the problem. When outbreaks of infection involving multi-resistant strains occur, there is a considerable financial, physical and psychological cost. Unless controlled, outbreaks are likely to become more common and multi-resistant strains will become endemic. Evidence-based infection prevention and associated quality improvement methods are effective in reducing the number of infections with these organisms. 
What is the purpose of the Report’s recommendations?
The Report describes measures that are clinically effective for preventing infections when used by healthcare workers in acute and long-term healthcare.
What is the scope of the guidelines?
Two sets of guidelines have been developed. This document includes appropriate infection prevention and control precautions. The other publication describes best-practice antimicrobial prescribing.​[5]​
What is the evidence for these guidelines?
In the preparation of these recommendations, systematic reviews were performed of peer-reviewed research. Expert opinion was also derived from published guidelines subjected to validated appraisal.3 Evidence was assessed for methodological quality and clinical applicability according to SIGN protocols. 
Who developed these guidelines?
A group of medical microbiologists, scientists, infectious disease physicians, infection control practitioners, epidemiologists, and patient representatives.
Who are these guidelines for?
Any healthcare practitioner can use these guidelines and adapt for local use. Users are anticipated to include clinical staff (i.e. medical, nursing and paramedical staff) as well as healthcare infection prevention and control teams. The guidelines should be used to improve practice of infection prevention and to help patients and their carers understand the methods available to prevent acquisition of antibiotic resistant bacteria. 
How are the guidelines structured?
Each section comprises an introduction, a summary of the evidence-base with levels, and a recommendation graded according to the available evidence. 
How frequently are the guidelines reviewed and updated?
The guidelines will be reviewed at least every 4 years and updated if change(s) in the evidence are sufficient to require a change in practice.
5.1	Aim
The primary aim of the review was to assess the current evidence for prevention and control of MDR Gram-negative infections. 
6	Summary of Guidelines
The Guidelines relate to MDR Gram-negative bacteria and have been derived from current best peer-reviewed publications and expert opinion. Table IV contains expert opinion. Each recommendation is associated with a class of supporting evidence, as follows: 
Surveillance
1,2 Susceptibility tests performed on significant Gram-negative isolates should include meropenem; plus cefpodoxime for Enterobacteriaceae and ceftazidime for Pseudomonas . 						Strong
3.	Travel history (i.e. countries or known endemic area visited within a year) should be collected for all patients with carbapenemase producing Gram negative bacteria. 						Strong

4.	Each healthcare organisation should have access to robust microbiological arrangements for detecting and reporting all multi-drug resistant Gram-negative organisms in routine clinical samples and for screening, using highly-sensitive tests with a diagnostic turnaround time of <48h.											Conditional

Screening
5.	Active screening rather than passive surveillance is recommended for high-risk specialties. 							Conditional

6.	Patients at high risk for carbapenem-resistant organisms include those admitted to ICU and from long-term care facilities e.g. care homes. 		Conditional

7.	Screening for rectal and wound carriage of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae should be undertaken in patients at risk 	Strong

8.	All patients transferred from, or with a history of admission to, healthcare facilities with known endemic carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae in the preceding year should be screened. 				Strong
9.	Screening for carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii and MDR P aeruginosa is required in management of outbreaks. 				Strong
10.	A rectal swab (with visible material) or stool sample (and urine if catheter present) should be used for screening for multiresistant Enterobacteriaceae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. For Acinetobacter, sample skin sites or if a catheter or endotracheal tube is present, urine or respiratory secretion. 				Conditional

11.	In the event of secondary cases of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, Standard Infection Control Precautions (SICP) and Contact Precautions should be monitored and reinforced among clinical staff. Screening of patients not identified as carriers should be repeated weekly and on discharge from affected units until no new cases are identified for more than seven days. 											Strong

12.	Those with previous samples with carbapenem-resistant or other MDR Gram-negative bacteria should be screened at the time of admission. 											Conditional
Prevention of transmission
13.	In addition to SICP, apply Contact Precautions for those patients who present an infection risk. 							Strong

14.	Where possible, single room isolation should be provided for patients with MDR Gram-negative bacterial infection/colonization and Contact Precautions continued for the duration of their stay. 				Conditional 


15.	Use disposable gloves and gowns or aprons to care for patients with MDR Gram-negative bacteria: A. baumannii, carbapenem-resistant and ESBL-Enterobacteriaceae, P. aeruginosa.				Strong	

16.	Identify and place infected and colonized patients in single rooms where available in this order of priority: carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii, ESBL Klebsiella sp, carbapenemase-producing P. aeruginosa, ESBL E. coli and other Enterobacteriaceae, AmpC Enterobacteriaceae.							Strong


17.	If there are insufficient rooms available, cohort patients following local risk assessment 								Conditional






19.	Environmental screening should be considered where there is unexplained transmission of MDR Gram-negative organisms or a possible common source for an outbreak. 							Strong
20.	Respiratory and other contaminated equipment should be decontaminated (or respiratory secretions discarded) away from the immediate bed area in designated cleaning sinks and not in hand wash sinks 	Strong

21.	For P. aeruginosa including multiresistant strains, at a minimum in accordance with the organization’s water safety plan, a risk assessment should be made when levels of patient colonization or infections rise to determine if point-of-use filters should be installed or if taps need to be changed. 				Strong	


22.	Terminal disinfection of vacated areas with hypochlorite should be used in the control of outbreaks of infection due to MDR Gram-negative bacteria								 		Conditional 

23.	 Hydrogen peroxide vapour should be considered as an adjunctive measure following cleaning of vacated isolation rooms/areas.													Conditional


24.	The routine use of selective decontamination of the mouth or digestive tract is not recommended for control of MDR Gram-negative bacteria. 											Conditional 
Miscellaneous
25.	Monitor hand hygiene of all staff when patient cohorting is being applied.										Strong 

7	Implementation of these Guidelines
7.1	How can the guidelines be used to improve clinical effectiveness?
The guidelines can be used to inform local infection prevention and control guidance and to direct clinical decision-making. They provide a framework for clinical audit tools aiming to achieve quality improvement.

7.2	How much will implementation of the guidelines cost? 
In most areas there are no anticipated additional costs unless existing practice falls well below currently-accepted best practice. Failure to implement the recommendations would result in greater costs both in terms of economics and quality of life. Screening and isolation where this is not currently practiced will result in significant cost pressures but these costs are set against reduced transmission and fewer cases needing antibiotic treatment. Prolonged isolation can have adverse effects on a patient’s psychological health so may have additional unexpected costs. 

7.3	 Summary of Audit Measures
The following are expressed as percentage compliance:
All Gram-negative isolates requiring antibiotic treatment are to be tested for susceptibility to meropenem (or all blood isolates are tested)
The microbiology laboratory reports all patients infected or colonized with carbapenemase producing Gram-negative bacteria to Public Health England or an equivalent body	
All patients colonized or infected with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae and A. baumannii  are placed under Contact Precautions within 6 hours of identification				 
All patients colonized or infected with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae and A. baumannii  are placed under Contact Precautions in a single room or cohort for the duration of their stay.						
Travel history obtained at time of admission for all acute hospital patients, and screened if from endemic area			
7.4	E-learning tools




Methods were in accordance with SIGN 501 and the Cochrane Collaboration2 and critical appraisal was applied using AGREEII.3 Accepted guidelines were used as part of the evidence base and to support expert consensus. Questions for review were derived from the Working Party Group, which included patient representatives in accordance with Patient Intervention Comparison Outcome (PICO).1
K Soares-Wiesner of Enhance Reviews Ltd and Dr P Wiffen of Pain Research and Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Oxford University used a systematic review process. Guidelines and research studies were identified for each search question. Systematic reviews, randomized controlled trials (RCT) and observational studies were included and assessed by two reviewers. In context, observational studies included non-randomised controlled studies, controlled before-and-after studies, and interrupted time series. 
All languages were searched. Search strategies for each area are given in the sections below. MeSH headings and free text terms were used in Cochrane Library (Issue 11 2012), Medline (1946-2012), Embase (1980-2012) and Cumulated Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL) (1984-2012). On 23/5/14 an update search was conducted on Medline only using the same strategy for references after 1/1/13. References lists of included studies were searched. Two review authors independently screened all citations and abstracts identified and screened full reports of potentially eligible studies (those that addressed review questions in primary or systematic secondary research or a clinical or in use study). Disagreements were resolved by discussion and rationales for exclusion of studies were documented. Pre-tested data extraction forms were used and study characteristics and results collected. Data were extracted from observational studies for multiple-effect estimates: the number of patients, adjusted and unadjusted effect estimates with standard error or 95% confidence interval, confounding variables and the methods used to adjust the analysis. If available, data were extracted from contingency tables. Risk of bias was assessed using SIGN critical appraisal checklists. Interrupted time series were assessed using the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Group.1,​[6]​ Quality was judged by report of details of protection against secular changes (intervention independent of other changes) and detection bias (blinded assessment of primary outcomes and completeness of data). For outbreak patterns associated with particular pathogens, the Working Party made additional searches of descriptive studies to extract effective interventions. 
Clinical outcomes were mortality, treatment effectiveness, length of hospital stay; microbial outcome measures were decreases in the prevalence of multi-drug-resistance among Gram-negative bacteria; or decreases in colonization or infection by specific Gram-negative pathogens. For dichotomous variables, risk ratios were used and, for continuous outcomes, mean differences with 95% confidence intervals.​[7]​ Analyses were performed in Revman 5.2.​[8]​ SIGN summary tables were used.
Evidence tables and judgement reports were presented and discussed by the Working Party and guidelines prepared according to the nature and applicability of the evidence, patient preference and acceptability and likely costs. The strength of evidence was defined by SIGN (Table I) and the strength of recommendation was adopted from GRADE (Table II). The grading relates to the strength of the supporting evidence and predictive power of the study designs, not the importance of the recommendation. Any disagreements between members were resolved by discussion. For some areas only expert opinion is available such that a Good practice recommendation is made.
8.2	Consultation process
On completion, these guidelines were opened to consultation with the stakeholders listed in Appendix 1. The draft report was placed on the HIS website for one month. Views were invited on format, content, local applicability, patient acceptability and recommendations. The Working Party considered and collated comments and agreed revisions.
9	Rationale for Recommendations
9.1	Epidemiology
9.1.1	What is the definition of MDR Gram-negative bacteria? 
For the purposes of this guideline, multi-drug resistant Gram-negative bacteria were defined as having three or more antimicrobial resistance mechanisms affecting different antibiotic classes. For a full discussion of the definitions in use, please refer to the companion paper.5
9.1.2	Which Gram-negative bacteria cause infection control problems?
Opportunistic Gram-negative bacteria that present increasing resistance issues include Enterobacteriaceae (Escherichia coli, Klebsiella spp., Enterobacter spp., Serratia spp., Citrobacter spp., Proteeae), and the non-fermenters: Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and Acinetobacter baumannii. Stenotrophomonas maltophilia is inherently multi-resistant in most cases but a less common cause of cross infection. Gonococci are Gram-negative and are increasingly resistant but were excluded because relevant public health control actions are substantially different. 
Emphasis here is placed on of strains resistant to -lactams, including carbapenems, cephalosporins and β-lactamase inhibitor combinations, and on those resistant to fluoroquinolones insofar as these are the core components of most therapies for severe infections. Aminoglycosides are most often used as adjuncts to -lactam therapy in severe infection whereas polymyxins are mostly used in cases where -lactams cannot be used owing to resistance. Resistance to these latter groups of agents should nevertheless prompt concern, especially where it is coupled to resistance to multiple -lactams, as is often the case. Means of infection control remain the same remain the same irrespective of the specific resistance.

9.1.3	What are the relative contributions of community and hospital acquisition? 
The mechanisms and time-course of resistance accumulation by Gram-negative opportunists, both internationally and in the UK, are reviewed in a companion paper.5 This introduction, rather, is concerned with the distribution of these resistance types in hospitals, long-term care facilities and the community. The distinction between these sectors is increasingly blurred, with many elderly patients moving back and forth between hospital and care homes,​[9]​ and with hospital stays becoming shorter, so that hospital-acquired infections often become apparent after hospital discharge,​[10]​ or on readmission. Consequently, MDR Gram-negative bacteria – including those producing carbapenemases – are increasingly seen in General Practice specimens, principally urine samples. Careful enquiry often reveals that the patient recently received secondary care. The period of time that may elapse from acquisition in hospital, often in colonization sites, to the development of an obvious infection in the community is variable and different papers utilise different intervals when classifying infection diagnosed in the community as ‘hospital-acquired’. Intervals of 1 to 3 months are commonly used to distinguish community acquisition from that acquired during hospital admission, but the literature shows that carriage, and the potential for infection, can persist for much longer periods (commonly a year), and we recommend that this longer period be used.​[11]​

9.1.4	What is the evidence for reservoir and spread of MDR Gram-negative bacteria in care homes and secondary care?
Enterobacteriaceae, P. aeruginosa and Acinetobacter, whether resistant or not, can all be transferred among vulnerable patients by staff vectors and contaminated equipment, leading to well-defined local clonal outbreaks.​[12]​ Both A. baumannii and K. pneumoniae (by virtue of their capsules) can survive on dry surfaces, including hands.​[13]​,​[14]​ MDR Enterobacteriaceae can colonize the gut, providing – without any symptoms – a reservoir for transfer to other body sites, where infection may ensue, or to other patients, with the transmission risk increased if the carrier experiences diarrhoea or incontinence.
In general, and excluding particular high-risk clones discussed below, there is no evidence that multi-resistant strains are more likely to be associated with cross-infection than other strains. Enterobacteriaceae that owe carbapenem resistance to combinations of extended spectrum beta lactamases (ESBL) or AmpC β-lactamase activity together with porin loss are often thought to have impaired fitness and to be less likely to spread among patients than those with carbapenemases, but cross-infection by porin-deficient Enterobacteriaceae has been reported from Italy, Korea and Portugal.​[15]​,​[16]​,​[17]​ In a nested case-control study in USA, mechanical ventilation, pulmonary disease, days of antibiotic treatment and colonization pressure were associated with acquisition of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.​[18]​ Typing of Klebsiella pneumoniae in this study suggested clonal transmission within and between hospitals. 
9.1.4.1	High-risk clones 
Bacterial typing has revealed the role of ‘high-risk clones’ in the international spread of resistance.​[19]​ For example:
	The majority of fluoroquinolone-resistant ESBL-producing E. coli causing infection both in hospitals and the community belong to sequence type (ST) 131-B2-O25b.​[20]​,​[21]​ 
	The growing prevalence of KPC carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae in hospitals (e.g. in Israel, Italy and the USA) substantially reflects the clonal expansion of ST258 variants with KPC-2 or -3 enzymes.​[22]​ 
	In Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, there is extensive nosocomial spread of ST235 P. aeruginosa with VIM-2 carbapenemase susceptible only to colistin.​[23]​ 

Except in the case of ST131 E. coli (where infection, may be preceded by a long period of innocuous gut carriage), UK hospitals are minimally affected by these lineages, though both ST258 K. pneumoniae and ST235 P. aeruginosa have been recorded.22,​[24]​ National clones that have achieved considerable traction in the UK include A. baumannii OXA-23 clone 1, recorded at >60 hospitals.19,​[25]​ It remains uncertain whether this prevalence reflects site-to-site transfer via colonized patients or the selection, at multiple sites, of a pre-existing but previously rare subtype of this very clonal species. Focussing infection control on specific types rather than resistances has not been explored for ESBL-producing E.coli.
Escherichia coli sequence type ST131 has spread globally, and is transmitted within hospitals, families, through pets and long-term care facilities whilst being very rare in food animals. It is often resistant to fluoroquinolones and multiple other antimicrobials as well as producing CTX-M ESBLs.​[26]​ The lineage can be distinguished by serotyping and PCR.​[27]​ Among faeces sent for culture from international travellers returning to UK, many from the Indian sub-continent, 18% contained ESBL E. coli, mostly with CTX-M-15 enzymes and 2.1% had ST131 strains with ESBL.​[28]​ 
9.1.4.2	Plasmid outbreaks 
In this situation a plasmid or family of related plasmids disseminate(s) among strains of one or more species in a locale.​[29]​,​[30]​ This is the case, for example in the current spread of pKpQIL plasmids encoding KPC carbapenemases in and around Manchester.​[31]​ Unlike in a clonal outbreak, the isolates are diverse in terms of species, strain, and in their antibiograms, which also reflect the host strain and any other plasmid(s) carried. Single-strain clusters occur within this overall diversity, but do not come to dominate the picture as in a classical single-strain outbreak. It is inferred (though rarely proven), that frequent plasmid transfer among gut bacteria leads to the diversity of strains involved.​[32]​ Since there is no single ‘outbreak’ organism to target this scenario, it is more challenging for infection control teams than a classical outbreak. Moreover it presents a greater recognition challenge to the microbiology laboratory; consequently reliable and consistent application of SICP is extremely important. 
9.1.4.3	Outbreaks due to P. aeruginosa contamination of water systems 
Classical clonal outbreaks of hospital infection have a clear train of transmission if carriage is taken into account and, assuming consistent application of Contact Precautions, can be controlled in a relatively short time if the strain(s) are not re-introduced.12 However a different epidemiology is sometimes seen, particularly with P. aeruginosa (multi-resistant or not), when a single clone or small number of clones, causes infections in multiple patients in a unit or hospital, often without obvious links, over a prolonged period, sometimes extending over several years and with gaps of months between cases.​[33]​,​[34]​ Such instances often reflect contamination of the hospital plumbing system by the Pseudomonas clone(s), and control may require modification/assessment, including e.g. replacing sinks and toilets with easier-to-clean models less prone to splashback, educating staff to reduce blockages and inappropriate storage, reviewing cleaning protocols, and reducing shower flow rates to minimise flooding.​[35]​,​[36]​
9.1.4.4	Long term care facilities and the spread of MDR Enterobacteriaceae
Long-term care facilities (LTCF) are increasingly identified as reservoirs of antibiotic resistance, in particular with colonization rather than infection. The data to support this view are considerable but are not based on systematic surveillance, except in France, where the incidence of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae infection per 1000 days in LTCFs increased from 0.07 in 1996 to 0.28 in 2005. This largely reflected the proliferation of E. coli with CTX-M enzymes, which were later recognised as representatives of the international ST131 clone.​[37]​,​[38]​ 
Long-term care facilities range from establishments offering assisted-living to largely independent residents through to those providing complex medical support.​[39]​,​[40]​ This spectrum of care varies among countries, reflecting healthcare organisation and cultural factors.​[41]​,​[42]​,​[43]​ 
The distribution of incontinent and catheterised residents is likely to influence the transmission of Gram-negative bacteria, including those with multi-resistance. Variation may be very local: thus March et al. found that gut carriage of resistant bacteria varied across five sub-units in one long-term care facility in Bolzano, Italy.​[44]​ Overall, carriage was higher than in the hospital’s geriatric unit, which perhaps had more knowledge and reliable application of infection prevention and control precautions (75% of 111 in LTCF vs. 22% of 45 in geriatric unit). In contrast, Gruber et al. in Germany found higher carriage rates of multi-resistant bacteria in geriatric units (32.6%) than in nursing homes (18.5%) or ambulatory care (15.6%).​[45]​ 
Whilst most resistance studies on LTCFs relate to those catering for the elderly, spread of carbapenemase producers as gut colonizers has also been recorded in a care home for children and young adults with neurodevelopmental problems.​[46]​
The literature supporting the view that LTCFs constitute a reservoir of multi-resistance comprises, firstly, numerous analyses showing that previous stay in a LTCF is a risk factor for later infections with MDR Gram-negative bacteria, including those with ESBLs and carbapenemases and, secondly, of multiple snapshot surveys showing frequent (though very variable) gut carriage of ESBL-producing E. coli and Klebsiella spp. among LTCF residents, including in Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, the UK, Italy and the USA where these enzymes have already proliferated in hospitals.44,​[47]​,​[48]​,​[49]​,​[50]​,​[51]​ Accumulation of MDR Gram-negative bacteria in LTCFs probably reflects a combination of 
(i)	the frequent transfer into LTCFs of patients/residents who were initially colonized or infected in hospitals, 
(ii)	oro-faecal transfer within LTCFs, reflecting breakdowns of personal hygiene in populations with high rates of dementia and incontinence and 
(iii)	frequent antibiotic use and its contingent selection pressure on the gut flora. 
(iv)	High rates of urinary tract catheterisation
Only one sizeable UK study of the carriage of MDR Gram-negative bacteria by nursing home residents has been published.9 This was conducted in Belfast from 2004-6, early in the national dissemination of E. coli with CTX-M ESBLs. This study included 16 LTCFs and found E. coli that were both ciprofloxacin-resistant and produced ESBLs in faeces from 119/294 residents (40.5%). This was a 40-fold higher carriage rate than for diarrhoeal samples from community patients. Virtually all (99%) of these multi-resistant isolates belonged to the ST131: half belonged to the CTX-M-15-positive ‘strain A’ variant frequent elsewhere in the UK.​[52]​,​[53]​ Two small (6 and 12 bed) LTCFs had no colonized residents; others had up to 75% (18/24) colonized, with considerable diversity among the ST131 variants at many sites. Fluoroquinolone use and a history of urinary tract infection were independently associated with carriage in a multivariate model.9 Duration of the nursing home residency did not correlate with an increased likelihood of carriage; although it seems likely that carriers commonly have acquired their organism within their LTCFs. 

9.1.5	Multi-resistance in the community
Multi-resistance remains uncommon among true community-acquired infections in the UK, and few studies have correlated resistance in clinical infections and faecal carriage in these cases. Nevertheless, stool carriage of ESBL-producing faecal E. coli was found in 11.3% of patients in Birmingham, UK, rising to 22.8% of those with surnames suggesting a Middle Eastern or South Asian patrimony vs. 8.1% among those names suggesting European patrimony. This differential perhaps reflects frequent travel to parts of the world where ESBLs are common outside the hospital.​[54]​ A few references specifically indicated travel to South or East Asia as a risk factor for acquisition of ESBL-producing E. coli in faeces. Carriage is often persistent and, in Canada, prior travel to a country with a high prevalence of ESBL-producing E. coli was identified as a risk factor for subsequent urinary infection by these organisms, typically with the particular ESBL type prevalent in the country visited.​[55]​ 
Most cases of infection or colonization by carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae and non-fermenters occur in hospital and healthcare settings, at least in Europe and North America.22, ​[56]​,​[57]​,​[58]​  However, in areas of high-prevalence, particularly parts of the Indian sub-continent, it seems that a large reservoir of community carriers of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae has been established, which likely eclipses the hospital-based reservoir in terms of numbers, but not risk.​[59]​,​[60]​ 
MDR P. aeruginosa and other non-fermenters are an important problem in patients with cystic fibrosis, who also span the hospital/community divide. There is a growing prevalence of high-risk clones, such as the Liverpool Epidemic P. aeruginosa Strain.​[61]​ Cross infection occurs​[62]​ and can be interrupted by segregation of colonized and non-colonized cystic fibrosis patients.​[63]​ Resistance is often extensive but evolves very variably in the individual patient and there is no specific resistance pattern associated with any of the successful cystic fibrosis lineages.​[64]​
 
9.1.6	What is the role of agricultural use of sewage and antibiotic treatment in veterinary practice in spreading ESBLs?
Gut E. coli are ubiquitous in mammals, and multi-resistant strains are repeatedly reported in both food and companion animals.​[65]​ Johnson et al. demonstrated that the same ESBL-producing E. coli strains can be shared among household members and their pet dog, though the direction of transmission is uncertain.​[66]​ Transmission of resistant E. coli down the food chain can occur. At a population level, fluoroquinolone-resistant E. coli from chickens and humans were reportedly more similar than fluoroquinolone-resistant and-susceptible E. coli from humans.​[67]​ However sequence typing needs to be examined. In the Netherlands, the same E. coli strains, plasmids and ESBL genes (blaCTX-M-1 and blaTEM-52) were found in humans, broilers and retail chicken meat.​[68]​ However, the ESBLs in retail chicken in the UK are predominantly CTX-2 or -14-like​[69]​,​[70]​ and their host strains are non-clonal, whereas clonal ST131 E. coli with CTX-M-15 enzyme predominates among human ESBL isolates and are very rare in chicken meat. 
Recently, a large UK, German and Dutch study found that only 1.2% of ESBL-producing E. coli from food animals resembled human ESBL-producing isolates. The authors concluded that human-to-human faecal-oral or plasmid transmission was considerably more important than food chain transmission, but noted that food animals represent a reservoir (and evolution site) for resistant strains that may pose future challenges in humans.​[71]​ 
 
9.1.7	What insights has national E. coli bacteraemia surveillance provided? 
Bacteraemias caused by E. coli result from a variety of aetiologies including pre-existing urinary tract infection, indwelling urinary catheters and biliary-related infection. In sentinel surveillance undertaken by Public Health England, most cases arose in elderly patients in the community who had visited their GP (general practitioner) at least once in the preceding weeks with urinary tract infection, suggesting that co-morbidity or treatment failure may be a significant factor.​[72]​ A third of patients with bacteraemia had received antibiotics for genitourinary infection in the past 4 weeks but the adequacy of treatment was not known. There is a notable rise in incidence in the summer for all Gram-negative bacteraemias,​[73]​,​[74]​,​[75]​,​[76]​ and a number of hypotheses are possible, including the role that hydration status in the elderly has to play in predisposition to infection. Reporting of resistance data in E. coli bacteraemia helps in making local risk assessments on patients transferred from other hospitals.​[77]​ 

9.1.8	Is there evidence for high/low risk areas within a healthcare facility?
Sharing a room with a colonized patient and admission to ICU are risk factors for acquisition of carbapenem-resistant organisms.​[78]​,​[79]​,​[80]​ A German point prevalence study in 2011 of 56 hospitals showed that, overall, prevalence of resistance was highest on intensive care wards (ESBL E. coli 2.5% on ICU) and higher on medical wards compared with surgical wards​[81]​ as also seen in a UK study.​[82]​ A European survey of 19,888 patients, mainly in Belgium and France, showed the highest prevalence of hospital-acquired infection in intensive care units (28.1%).​[83]​ 

Long-term care facilities report high prevalence of colonization with MDR Gram-negative bacteria in residents compared with acute hospitals, associated with prolonged stay, antimicrobial treatment and faecal incontinence.​[84]​,​[85]​ In one series of carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter and Klebsiella isolates over half were obtained from patients admitted from long-term acute care facilities.​[86]​

Evidence
The intensive care unit in acute hospitals and any long-term care facility have higher prevalence of MDR Gram-negative bacteria than general wards. 		2+

Recommendation 
Patients at high risk for carbapenem-resistant organisms include those admitted to ICU and from long-term care facilities e.g. care homes. 		Conditional

9.2	Is there evidence of differences between organisms in respect of transmission, morbidity and mortality? 
9.2.1	Resistant Enterobacteriaceae
Enterobacteriaceae are part of the gastrointestinal flora of humans and animals and some are readily transmitted, particularly in the healthcare setting (Table III). However other ESBL Enterobacteriaceae appear less likely to spread. It remains unclear why the E. coli ST131 lineage has been so successful compared with many other ESBL-producing strains.​[87]​ Transmission from patient to patient is believed to be mainly via hands of staff, although common environmental sources have occasionally been described and should be sought where no other plausible vectors can be found (e.g., ventilator equipment or water supply).12,35,​[88]​,​[89]​ Infection prevention and control relies on the consistent application of SICPs e.g. hand hygiene, appropriate use of personal protective equipment (PPE), and ensuring a clean and well-maintained care environment. Patient screening, used as part of a bundle of infection prevention and control measures, is effective in identifying carriage of ESBLs by E. coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae and Enterobacter spp.​[90]​,​[91]​,​[92]​ 

For colonization or infection with ESBL-producing bacteria, the presence of a gastrostomy, urinary catheter or a nasogastric tube were risk factors.​[93]​,​[94]​,​[95]​ Antibiotic treatment has been shown to select for ESBL-producing E. coli in a variety of healthcare setting.​[96]​ For some strains, piperacillin-tazobactam can select for quinolone-resistant bacteria that produce CTX-M​[97]​ and carbapenem use is associated with acquisition of carbapenem resistant E. coli.​[98]​ 
Screening for carriers with subsequent isolation of those identified is effective in preventing transmission and is important for early recognition.​[99]​ Awareness of carriage is important and, therefore, communications regarding those identified to be infected or colonized with multi-resistant strains is essential when transferring patients within and between institutions. 

9.2.2	Acinetobacter baumannii
Infection control precautions against A. baumannii have been adapted following experience with outbreaks and generally address the organism’s major epidemic modes of transmission and the excessive use of broad-spectrum antibiotics (Table III). Control can sometimes be achieved when a common source is identified and eliminated.12,​[100]​ A review of 51 hospital outbreaks showed that 25 had common sources. Of these, 13 outbreaks were predominantly respiratory tract infections, and 12 were predominantly bloodstream or other infections. They were controlled by removal or disinfection and sterilization of contaminated ventilator (or related) equipment or contaminated moist fomites.12 
When neither common sources nor environmental reservoirs are identified, control has depended on surveillance and isolation of colonized and infected patients, along with promoting improvements in the hand hygiene practices of healthcare workers​[101]​ and ensuring the aseptic care of vascular catheters and endotracheal tubes.12 Increased cleaning of the general care environment has been the next-most-frequent outbreak intervention,12 reflecting the concern that Acinetobacter spp. can survive for months on wet or dry surfaces, thereby facilitating nosocomial transmission.​[102]​ Disinfection regimens used on surfaces include 0.1% hypochlorite,​[103]​,​[104]​ and, increasingly, hydrogen peroxide vapour.​[105]​,​[106]​,​[107]​,​[108]​,​[109]​ 
Screening of the patient is suggested in a number of studies.104,​[110]​,​[111]​ Several also advocate reduced prescribing of broad-spectrum antibiotics, such as fluoroquinolones or carbapenems.12,​[112]​ Antibiotic exposure is often a risk factor for an outbreak; however, the use of multiple interventions and historical controls complicates interpretation of these studies. Patient decolonization, by skin cleansing with chlorhexidine or the use of polymyxin on wounds, orally, or by inhaled aerosol has been an occasional adjunctive control measure but may be a risk for development of resistance.​[113]​,​[114]​,​[115]​ Often, the use of a multifactorial or ‘bundle’ approach is the most effective way of controlling this organism.​[116]​
9.2.3	Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Sources and mechanisms of transmission vary, and surveillance is complicated by the close association of patient and environmental isolates. Association with moist environmental sources is well documented, though significant persistence on dry surfaces including hospital linen and floors with a range of 6 hours to 16 months is reported.​[117]​ Water systems act as a source of infection, or indicate environmental contamination from other sources e.g. staff hands or reusable care equipment being cleaned in hand-wash sinks.34 Levels of sink colonization are higher in critical care areas than general wards.​[118]​ 
Transmission occurs via the hands of healthcare workers, contaminated either from patients or from the environment and has been reviewed systematically by Loveday.34,​[119]​,​[120]​,​[121]​,​[122]​,​[123]​,​[124]​ Pseudomonal carriage on hands may be less persistent than with other Gram-negative bacteria, but other factors such as glove usage and artificial nails contribute.13,​[125]​,​[126]​,​[127]​ Patient to patient transmission can occur via the air among cystic fibrosis patients, with evidence of infectious droplet nuclei​[128]​ or via patient hand and environmental contamination.​[129]​,​[130]​ 
Sporadic and epidemic strains tend to co-exist and may be difficult to track without molecular typing.124,​[131]​ There is no evidence for the effect of routine surveillance on the control of MDR Pseudomonas, but reports of outbreak interventions support the utility of screening.​[132]​,​[133]​ 
There is little evidence that isolating patients in single rooms reduces endemic multi-resistant Pseudomonas levels. In outbreak settings, use of isolation measures as part of a multi-facetted infection control regime is usual, but direct evidence for the impact of isolation alone is lacking.132,​[134]​,​[135]​,​[136]​,​[137]​,​[138]​ There is a risk of bias in outbreak reports, and balance between desirable and undesirable effects of physical isolation should be considered. There is a poor level of specific evidence as to the effect of hand hygiene but expert opinion extrapolated from other situations supports the use of this measure as part of a wider infection prevention strategy.33,132,133,138,​[139]​ Care should be exercised with production, storage and turnover of cleaning products, since the organism has a degree of disinfectant tolerance and there is evidence for pseudomonal contamination of detergent-type cleaning products.​[140]​,​[141]​

9.3	Surveillance
9.3.1	Selection of samples and antimicrobials to test
In order to support surveillance and infection control, national uniformity is needed in the testing of clinically significant isolates and in the detection of MDR strains. This may involve widespread testing of organisms with antibiotics that would not ordinarily be used in the individual patient. 
In particular, testing of parenteral agents against urinary Gram-negative isolates from community patients is necessary. This may impose costs on diagnostic laboratories without matching benefits beyond permitting spread of such infections being detected earlier. At present the major requirement is detection of carbapenem-resistant organisms, although detection of quinolone-resistant and ESBL-producing organisms is important. Plasmid transmission of carbapenemases to a wide variety of Gram-negative species makes it difficult to be proscriptive. Validated, sensitive, algorithms for testing need to be developed, if universal testing is not applied. Testing only cephalosporin-resistant isolates for carbapenem resistance may miss strains with OXA-48 carbepenemases but this is a useful minimum standard for detection of other carbapenemases. Wider testing of temocillin may detect more OXA-48 producing strains.​[142]​ 

The basic phenotypic strategy to detect carbapenemase producers is to use a carbapenem as an indicator and then to undertake supplementary tests to distinguish carbapenemase producers from those that have other carbapenem resistance mechanisms.​[143]​ Some carbapenemases may not be associated with clinical resistance to carbapenems, and tests that detect hydrolytic capacity, e.g. the modified Hodge/clover leaf test, or synergy tests between carbapenems and boronates (to inhibit KPC enzymes) or EDTA (to inhibit metallo carbapenemases), are more useful in identifying these strains. European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) advice is that Enterobacteriaceae with a meropenem MIC >0.12 mg/L should be treated with suspicion, not just those with MICs above the clinical breakpoint of 2 mg/L; the screening MIC of >0.12 mg/L equates to a zone <25 mm diameter on Mueller-Hinton agar.​[144]​ Ertapenem is a more sensitive indicator of carbapenemase production than meropenem or imipenem but is less specific as it is more-affected than other carbapenems by porin-mediated mechanisms. It is also less used and tested. Meropenem or imipenem have better specificity and are to be recommended for screening for national surveillance. EUCAST screening breakpoints should be used.143 

Many laboratories do not test meropenem susceptibility routinely for all Gram-negative blood isolates. For national surveillance of carbapenem resistance to be effective, phenotypic meropenem resistance must be tested for all blood isolates, and resistance reported to central authorities. However, provision for reporting meropenem-resistant Gram-negative isolates from all body sites is important and should not burden laboratories excessively: electronic and paper reporting systems should be made available. All secondary and tertiary care hospitals, as well as private hospitals, should be included. Monitoring by identifying specific carbapenemases would require reference laboratory reports; therefore local confirmatory tests are encouraged. Automated PCR methods are being developed or available for specific carbapenemase gene detection, but are not yet widely used. Most meropenem resistance in Pseudomonas aeruginosa is due to loss of OprD porin and not carbapenemase. Sensitivity to ceftazidime, piptazobactam and carbenicillin despite meropenem resistance suggests this mechanism and that neither high level infection control action nor submission to a reference laboratory is needed. 
 
To detect ESBLs, E. coli, Klebsiella spp. and P. mirabilis should be screened for clavulanate-reversed resistance to ceftazidime and cefotaxime143 or cefpodoxime. AmpC producers are resistant to cefotaxime (reversed by cloxacillin) but susceptible (or intermediate) to cefepime. For AmpC-inducible genera, such as Enterobacter and C. freundii, comparison of cefepime and cefepime plus clavulanate discs can be used to detect additional presence of ESBLs. Confirmation of ESBL production is most easily accomplished by comparing inhibition zones for discs with the cephalosporin alone and those discs containing clavulanic acid. A zone expansion of >5 mm indicates ESBL production. Alternatively, an Etest strip is used to demonstrate at least 8-fold reduction in MIC. 

Faster diagnostic methods may be considered, particularly during outbreaks, to allow more rapid isolation. Selective media or combinations of non-selective media and a chromogenic or genetic test achieve a result within 24 hours. Detection within a few hours is possible if molecular tests are applied directly to the clinical specimen, though this approach is still new.

Various selective commercial media are available, to seek ESBL, CTX-M ESBL or carbapenemase producers directly from clinical specimens or early growth in blood culture bottles. Those media seeking ESBL producers often have good sensitivity but poor specificity in distinguishing these organisms from strains that hyperproduce AmpC enzyme.​[145]​,​[146]​,​[147]​ The sensitivity of media seeking carbapenemases varies with the particular enzyme,​[148]​ with OXA-48 the hardest to detect owing to the low levels of resistance often conferred. The alternative approach is to seek ESBL or carbapenemase activity in colonies growing on non-selective agars. Colorimetric and biochemical approaches include: 

(i) The chromogenic oxyimino-cephalosporin HMRZ-86 turns from yellow to red on hydrolysis.​[149]​ If used in combination with inhibitors, it can be used to distinguish strains with AmpC, ESBLs or metallo-carbapenemases, though KPC enzymes may be confused with AmpC and it is unclear whether OXA-48 is detected. 

(ii) Acidimetric -lactamase tests can be adapted to detect carbapenemase producers, as in the ‘Carba-NP’ test where, again, some authors report problems in detecting OXA-48.​[150]​,​[151]​,​[152]​

 (iii) MALDI-ToF assays for carbapenemase activity, exploiting the molecular mass change that occurs when the -lactam molecules are hydrolysed.​[153]​

Molecular tests can be used to seek -lactamase genes in overnight cultures. One PCR/array system (Check-MDR CT03) can rapidly detect a wide range of relevant acquired AmpC, ESBL and carbapenemase genes, distinguishing between those encoding classical and extended-spectrum TEM and SHV types.​[154]​ 

PCR may be used directly on rectal swabs, without culture and can give results within 1h from the specimen being taken.​[155]​ Sensitivity and specificity are good, though positive results are often obtained for patients from whom the laboratory fails to grow a carbapenemase-producing pathogen.​[156]​ This is a wider issue with molecular diagnostics, when used directly on specimen and may either indicate a poor positive predictive value or that culture is not the ‘gold standard’.​[157]​ 

Recommendation
The minimum susceptibility tests performed on Gram-negative bacteria from any site should include meropenem; in addition for Enterobacteriaceae, cefpodoxime, and, for Pseudomonas aeruginosa, ceftazidime. 					Strong
9.3.1.1 When to seek reference laboratory typing of isolates
	To inform cross-infection and outbreak investigation
	To seek a particular type associated with specific clinical characteristic(s) e.g. K1 capsular type of CC 23 of K. pneumoniae associated with hypermucoviscosity and liver abscesses
	To provide national/international context, e.g. in tracking the spread of ‘High risk clones’ such as ST258 K. pneumoniae with KPC carbapenemases

Typing results can never stand alone, and need to be interpreted in the context of all available epidemiological, clinical and demographical data.​[158]​ Typing of isolates is helpful to inform cross-infection and outbreak investigations among groups of patients with potential links. Comparison of isolates without epidemiological linkage information may result in patients falsely being linked, simply because they share the same international high risk clone, or both have representatives of a widespread cluster. Typing of environmental isolates may be helpful, especially where a piece of equipment common to all the affected patients is implicated. However, it may also be confusing and needs to be focused. All environmental samples should have a clear link to an affected patient; there is no point in typing environmental isolates on their own. Isolates from sink plug holes/drains may well match patient isolates, but this provides little information as to a source, since the isolate is likely to have come from the patient rather than the patient having acquired it from drain. Large-scale environmental sampling is rarely helpful, and there should be a clear hypothesis as to a likely source and the link between that source and the patient(s).

9.3.2	What national surveillance is performed and how should it be developed?
National surveillance of antimicrobial resistance is essential in detecting the emergence of new strains and resistance mechanisms, providing information for formularies and assessing the effect of control strategies. Outputs must be timely and tailored to the needs of medical and nursing staff, healthcare organisations and commissioners of healthcare. The World Health Organisation (WHO) provides WHONET database software, which is used for collecting data in some areas, while the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-NET) provides resistance information on blood and CSF isolates across Europe.​[159]​ EARS-NET identified the early accumulation of carbapenemases in K. pneumoniae in Greece,​[160]​ though they are now also proliferating in other countries such as Italy. Hence travel history on admission can be a useful indicator of risk of carriage of multi-resistant organisms.

In the UK (except Scotland), Public Health England collects susceptibility data in a voluntary scheme for bloodstream isolates of all species. A web-based database application, AmWeb, will facilitate electronic submission of antimicrobial susceptibility data for all bacterial isolates, regardless of whether these are from blood,159 but there is wide variation in participation, mostly due to the range of different laboratory information systems in use. AmWeb will integrate with the Second-Generation Surveillance System to be introduced in 2015 to provide data linkage to other PHE databases. Electronic Reporting System for meropenem resistance is being introduced. In addition, the BSAC Resistance Surveillance Project (http://www.bsacsurv.org (​http:​/​​/​www.bsacsurv.org​)) tracks prevalence of antibiotic resistance for a range of species and antibiotics in bacteraemia and lower respiratory tract infection, based on collection and central testing of isolates from a panel of 40 laboratories across the UK and Ireland. 

Evidence
There is a significant increasing trend of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae and other Gram-negative bacteria in most European countries, with major proliferation in Greece and Italy, suggesting a risk of occurrence in UK		2+

Recommendation
Laboratories should test meropenem susceptibility in all clinically significant Gram-negative isolates.								Strong
Travel history (i.e. countries or known endemic area visited within a year) should be collected for all patients with carbapenemase producing Gram-negative bacteria. 											Strong

9.3.3	How should we undertake local screening, why is it important and how should it be interpreted?
Screening at hospital level is useful for infection control, and to track resistance types (e.g. carbapenemase producers) by rectal swab or stool on admission, weekly during hospital stay and at discharge (Table III). Rectal swabs have maximum sensitivity for multi-resistant pathogens (other than Acinetobacter), but it is critical to ensure the compliance of staff with guidance on how and when to take samples by means of audit and feedback as well the specific actions arising from a positive result.​[161]​ When a carbapenem-resistant organism is identified (or an isolate with any other index resistance sought), any epidemiologically-linked patients should be screened. Screening of other patients depends on an assessment of risk of shedding of the organism and duration of exposure and is less likely to be required if the patient has been isolated from admission.​[162]​ 

The primary purpose of local screening is the detection of outbreaks of resistant colonizing or infecting organisms with minimum delay. Few hospitals have sufficient single rooms to allow segregation of all patients at risk when they are admitted. Therefore, local identification of carriers allows prioritisation of single rooms, potentially limiting spread. Hospital level surveillance provides faster notification of an emergent problem than awaiting results from the reference laboratory, particularly if a single clone and species is responsible. Passive surveillance of clinical infections alone will be too delayed to help to limiting spread. In an outbreak, isolation and infection control precautions are only effective if combined with active surveillance.161 A plasmid-based outbreak (e.g. carbapenemase producers) can be more difficult to recognise because multiple bacterial species may be involved. 


9.3.4	At what point should passive surveillance switch to active surveillance (screening)?
Examination of routine diagnostic tests or discharge summaries requires little resource, compared with screening an entire ‘at risk’ group. However screening quickly identifies patients colonized with MDR Gram-negative pathogens who require source isolation but who otherwise might be placed in a shared bay. Choosing to screen depends on available resources, outbreak progression and clinical characteristics. Current national advice to screen patients at risk for carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae is made despite a low prevalence of these organisms in most UK centres because the clinical risk of spread is thought to be high.162 

Passive surveillance of routine cultures did not distinguish 12 (86%) of 14 patients later found to have faecal carriage of carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae.​[163]​ MIC was highly dependent on the inoculum. Routine cultures identify patient carriage of ESBL Enterobacteriaceae on average 3 days later than active screening.​[164]​ The virulence of the strain and the host susceptibility as well as the sensitivity of the diagnostic method will affect the efficiency of passive identification of patients.161 Hence no single recommendation can be made.

Evidence
Passive surveillance is less sensitive and slower in identifying outbreaks of MDR Gram-negative infections than active screening.		3

Recommendation
Active screening rather than passive surveillance is recommended for high-risk specialties. 								Conditional

9.4	What is the evidence that infection prevention and control precautions prevent transmission?
Trials of infection control strategies are difficult to mount with sufficient power to determine efficacy, and most trials use a package of measures, so the effect of single interventions cannot be extracted. A systematic review of infection control precautions in cancer patients and stem cell recipient care settings showed a combination of prophylactic antibiotics, control of air quality and isolation in a room was associated with a lower rate of mortality (0.60 95% CI 0.50-0.72) at 30 days.​[165]​ Gram-negative bacteraemia was reduced by the package of measures. Gram-negative infections also were significantly less common in patients who were isolated but there were insufficient data to assess the specific effect on multi-resistant strains. Environmental cleaning and screening are discussed in other sections. 

9.4.1	Are standard infection control precautions sufficient to stop transmission? 
Existing national guidelines are unequivocal that Standard Infection Control Precautions (SICPs) should be used by all staff, in all care settings, at all times, for all patients – adults, children and infants, whether infection is known to be present or not, to ensure the safety of those being cared for, staff and visitors in any environment where care is given. SICPs are the basic infection prevention and control measures necessary to reduce the risk of transmission of infectious agent from both recognised and unrecognised sources of infection.

Sources of (potential) infection include blood and other body fluids secretions or excretions (excluding sweat), non-intact skin or mucous membranes and any equipment or items in the care environment that could have become contaminated. 
To be effective in protecting against infection risks, SICPs must be used continuously by all staff. Patients who move frequently between the hospital, the community and long term care facilities may render location-based screening inadequate as a means to identify outbreaks. 
However, as underscored by recent systematic reviews,​[166]​,​[167]​ there is a paucity of evidence directly testing infection prevention and control advice as related to Gram-negative organisms, particularly multi-resistant strains. A similar lack of evidence was noted in the ESCMID guidelines on preventing transmission of MDR Gram-negative bacteria.161 Nevertheless, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) risk assessment on carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae showed that there was agreement across Europe that SICPs are an essential integral part of any strategy to control multi-drug resistant Gram-negative organisms.​[168]​ The supporting European survey of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae emphasised the importance of diagnosis, early containment through patient screening, and SICP.​[169]​ 
A number of authoritative bodies have produced detailed guidance on carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae in particular based on expert consensus; these emphasise the importance of continuous implementation of SICPs, with a particular emphasis on hand hygiene.143,162,​[170]​,​[171]​ Public Health England, Centers for Disease Control and ESCMID all recommend Contact Precautions (patient isolation) in addition to SCIPs for all colonized or infected patients with MDR Gram-negative bacteria, as well as those previously colonized and not known to be free of these bacteria.161,162,170 All patients should be assessed for transmission risk on or before arrival at the care area and reviewed for any changes in the risk during their stay.

In an endemic setting (with constant challenge from admissions of colonized or infected patients), ESCMID does not recommend isolation for ESBL-E. coli. Other guidance emphasizes basing isolation on a risk assessment while maintaining high levels of hand-hygiene compliance and environmental cleaning.143 The ST131 clone of E. coli appears more readily transmissible and further study is needed. 
Other guidelines use general principles based on a range of pathogens. Both National Evidence-Based Guidelines (EPIC 3) and Health Protection Scotland’s National Infection Prevention and Control Manual specify good-practice standards based predominantly on expert consensus or Health and Safety legislation rather than evidence from controlled trials.166,​[172]​
Standard Infection Control Precautions (SICPs) include166,​[173]​ the following elements: 
	Hand hygiene;
	Environmental cleanliness, including the decontamination of patient care equipment, the safe management of linen and disposal of healthcare (clinical) waste;
	Safe use and disposal of sharps;
	Aseptic practice. 
	Respiratory hygiene 
	Assessment of infection risk, use of personal protective equipment and patient placement
Contact Precautions entail donning personal protective equipment on room entry and discarding before exiting the patient room. A single room is preferred.173 Hand hygiene is performed before touching patient and prior to wearing gloves for touching the patient and the patient’s environment. 
Strategies to minimise the transmission of pathogens, including MDR Gram-negative bacteria, will only be successful if there is a reliable high level of compliance to SICP and Contact Precautions by all healthcare workers.​[174]​,​[175]​ Training, education, audit and feedback are therefore important. Low levels of compliance to hand hygiene and inappropriate glove usage are commonly described.174,​[176]​ Invasive medical devices breach the body’s natural defence mechanisms and increase the likelihood of infection and colonization, therefore device avoidance and minimisation are important.

Evidence
Consistent application of SICP with Contact Precautions for patients colonized or infected with MDR Gram-negative pathogens reduces transmission 		3
 Recommendations 
In addition to Standard Infection Control Precautions, apply Contact Precautions for those patients who present an infection risk				Strong

Good Practice Recommendations166
Apply and maintain Standard Infection Control Precautions (SICP) in all care settings, at all times, for all patients.												
9.4.2	Screening
9.4.2.1	What is the role of screening in patients and staff?
Early detection of patients colonized or infected with MDR Gram-negative organisms is important for managing their status effectively and for implementing timely interventions to prevent subsequent spread. Screening of potential colonization sites of patients, e.g. faeces, is essential in limiting the spread of carbapenemase-producers in hospitals. Identification of other MDR Enterobacteriaceae is useful to identify those patients whoC e.g. may need carbapenems if treated empirically. Although ESBL E. coli are often resistant to ciprofloxacin, the proportion varies widely by country.26,​[177]​,​[178]​ 
In a multicentre German study of screening of patients with haematological malignancies, colonization rates with ESBL Enterobacteriaceae varied between 5.3 and 21.8% of patients.​[179]​ In a Korean study of ICU patients, 28% of 347 were found to have ESBL Enterobacteriaceae faecal carriage on admission and another 12% acquired these organisms during follow-up in ITU. As assessed by PFGE, none of the acquisitions were nosocomial transmissions, but the methods used would not have readily identified plasmid outbreaks.​[180]​ Routine screening of urine for ESBL E. coli and Klebsiella spp. followed by single-room isolation of carriers did not result in any significant reduction in numbers of ESBL producers isolated from non-urinary sites in hospital.​[181]​ Against the background high prevalence of ESBL Enterobacteriaceae in Korea, routine screening of carriage sites was not cost-effective in intensive care units.180 The risk of dissemination in the local community was high. In Europe ST131 CTX-M-15 strains are common but specific screening for that strain has not been studied. 

A nationwide intervention in Israel against a clonal outbreak of carbapenem-resistant ST258 K. pneumoniae with a KPC carbapenemase was successful because it depended on mandatory patient screening and isolation, and patient and staff cohorting.77 Short- and long- term care facilities were involved, as the latter were a reservoir for reintroduction to acute units. Compliance with national guidelines was reinforced by visits to facilities, reporting of carrier and isolation status and contact tracing. In high-intensity units such as intensive care, rectal swabs from the all the patients on the ward were screened. Two rectal swabs negative by culture and one by PCR were required before screening was discontinued for an individual patient in any ward. The programme successfully reduced acquisition of carbapenem-resistant organisms from 55.5 to 4.8 instances per 100,000 patient days. Screening for non-fermenters such as Pseudomonas or Acinetobacter is not supported by high quality evidence, but may be performed in outbreaks (Tables III and IV). 

There is usually no indication for screening faecal cultures from healthcare workers or family members, though good personal hygiene should be emphasised. Outbreak investigations that do not identify a single environmental source suggest transmission is occurring via the hands of hospital staff, but hand cultures are usually negative, presumably because contamination is transient.​[182]​ Gram-negative organisms isolated from nurses’ hands are in most cases different from those causing significant infections in patients.13,​[183]​ However outbreak reports are selective and open to bias.
Evidence
Mandatory screening and full implementation of SICP combined with Contact Precautions throughout the area of care is effective in controlling clonal outbreaks of carbapenemase-producing pathogens 				2++

Routine screening of carriage sites for ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae for infection control purposes may not be cost effective if community transmission and carriage is frequent. Screening and isolation of carriers of ESBL Klebsiella, is more likely to be useful than that for ESBL Enterobacter, Serratia or E. coli. However, specific screening for specific clones has not been studied. 				3

Recommendation
Screening for rectal and wound carriage of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae should be undertaken in patients at risk 		Strong
Good Practice recommendation 
Routine screening of family contacts and staff is not recommended
9.4.2.2	What organisms should screening include?
Enterobacteriaceae and non-fermenters (i.e. A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa) constitute the majority of MDR Gram-negative pathogens causing healthcare-acquired infections. Carbapenem-resistant organisms should have priority, as meropenem is currently the most widely used broad-spectrum antibiotic of last resort. Some multi-resistant strains are readily transmissible and require patient isolation. Most carbapenem resistance seen in Enterobacteriaceae, at least among reference laboratory submissions, is now associated with production of KPC, OXA-48, NDM and VIM carbapenemases; almost all carbapenem resistance in A. baumannii is associated with OXA-23, 40, 51 and 58-related carbapenemases. Carbapenem resistance in P. aeruginosa may involve carbapenemase production but is more commonly related to porin loss, which confers a narrow spectrum carbapenem-specific resistance profile. 
ESBL producers and plasmid or chromosomal AmpC Enterobacteriaceae are resistant to a number of antibiotics and infection control precautions are used to prevent transmission. A major driver for the use of carbapenems is the suspicion of the presence of ESBL. Screening for ESBL producers thus may be useful in guiding and thereby limiting empirical carbapenem use, although there are no confirmatory reports available. Where isolation facilities are limited, cephalosporin-resistant Enterobacteriaceae cases and carriers should have a lower priority than patients carrying a carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae. Subject to local risk assessment, colonized patients with diarrhoea or discharging wounds would usually take precedence for single rooms over patients without those characteristics but the same multi-resistant organism. 
Recommendation
Screening for carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii and MDR P aeruginosa is required in management of outbreaks. 					Strong
9.4.2.3	Who, how and when to screen patients for MDR Gram-negative bacilli?
9.4.2.3.1	Whom to screen
The potential risk factors identified for colonization or infection with MDR Gram-negative organisms are similar and wide ranging and include recent antimicrobial treatment, presence of indwelling devices, severity of illness, admission to an ICU, transfer between hospital units, residence in long-term care facilities; previous surgery, hospital inpatient stay within the preceding year (particularly overseas in an endemic area), recent solid organ or stem cell transplantation, presence of wounds, presence of biliary catheter and mechanical ventilation.38,161 

Although there are only limited data available from studies on inter-healthcare transmission of carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative bacteria within countries, a number of descriptive studies indicate that cross-border transfer of patients is associated with a risk of transmission of carbapenem-resistant organisms, particularly in respect of patients coming from Middle East, India, Pakistan, Italy and Greece.168 This applies to patients transferred from endemic areas to healthcare facilities in another country and where patients had received medical care abroad in areas with high rates of carbapenem-resistant organisms. Based on this, a recent ECDC report recommended that all countries should develop guidance for active screening of faeces of all patients transferred from any healthcare facility in an endemic area.161 Among the first 250 patients in the UK with an isolate producing the NDM carbapenemase, 100 had a travel history, with half of these having travelled to the Indian subcontinent.​[184]​

All patients with epidemiologic links (same hospital unit or care home) to an index and secondary cases should be screened to determine the extent of secondary transmission. However carriage may be prolonged in the community (especially in patients with urinary catheters) and the chronology can be difficult to determine. Hence isolation is started on readmission. Admission screening by rectal swab (or axilla/groin swab for Acinetobacter) is required for patients transferred from countries or institutions (including those in the UK) with a prevalence of epidemic or endemic carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative pathogens, as well as those patients with previous colonization or infection. However that assumes the receiving area (infection control practitioner) has been informed appropriately of prior hospitalisation and carriage data and where endemic or epidemic problems are present.

Given reported prolonged gastrointestinal carriage of MDR Gram-negative organisms, clearance samples are not recommended. Patient isolation should continue for the duration of the inpatient stay unless there is extensive spread and large numbers of colonized or infected patients. Cohorting affected patients together may then be needed. Colonized or infected patients should be isolated if re-admitted as emergency cases and should then be screened. Previously colonized or infected patients should be screened as outpatients if admission is planned and isolated on admission if screening yields the relevant organism. A method of flagging records is needed.​[185]​ 

9.4.2.3.2	How to screen 

As the intestinal flora is the main source of MDR Gram-negative bacilli (except Acinetobacter), a rectal swab (or stool ) is preferred for ease of collection handling and processing,162,​[186]​ but faecal material must be visible on the swab before putting into transport medium. A stool sample may be used if there is a risk of mucosal trauma. Rectal or perirectal swabs or stool samples have higher yield than testing of other body sites.116 In patients with indwelling devices, specimens from the related site should be screened. Skin swabs, urine and sputum should be checked in those with chronic wounds, indwelling urinary catheters, or endotracheal intubation. Acinetobacter is best detected in axilla, groin or wound swabs.​[187]​ 

Screening tests should have a turnaround time of less than 48 hours. Confirming the specific carbapenemases is important, but requires molecular methods which often limit availability to reference laboratories. Nevertheless, locally performed phenotypic tests can be extremely helpful as the report is available without delay. These tests are easy to implement for most laboratories provided that the resources are available and laboratory staff have been trained.162,168 If carbapenemase confirmation is not possible, isolates should be sent to reference laboratories, though infection control precautions should not be delayed. These tests can prove even more useful if they are interpreted in conjunction with data on the background prevalence of carbapenem-resistant organisms in a specific region. Fast diagnostic turnaround time and timely communication of laboratory results to physicians, nurses and the infection control team are extremely important for infection prevention and control and clinical therapy 

Commercial media for detection of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae are increasingly available. In a comparison of four chromogenic media used to detect carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae, chromID Carba had the best sensitivity and specificity though this may not be adequate for OXA-48.148 Disk or tablet diffusion synergy tests use meropenem combined with boronic acid to inhibit KPC carbapenemases or EDTA to inhibit metallo (IMP, NDM, and VIM) carbapenemases). Cloxacillin inhibits AmpC but not KPC, facilitating discrimination between isolates with these types of enzyme in an Etest.143 High-level temocillin and piperacillin/tazobactam resistance without potentiation of meropenem by EDTA is a marker of OXA-48. Molecular confirmation tests show high sensitivity and specificity and are used in reference laboratories but are expensive and will not detect novel genes. Although several pseudomonas-selective media are marketed, there are no specific data on screening methodology, frequency or duration with respect to P. aeruginosa.161 P. aeruginosa resistant to carbapenems but susceptible to other -lactams can be assumed not to have carbapenemases and do not warrant reference investigation.
The accuracy of carbapenemase detection may be affected by the species and origin of the pathogen, type of carbapenemase and other resistance properties, such as porin loss or ESBL production. Phenotypic confirmatory tests such as the Modified Hodge test are within the capability of most local laboratories but derepressed AmpC enzymes (and sometimes ESBLs) are associated with weak false positive Modified Hodge tests, especially with ertapenem. The test can be difficult to interpret. Colorimetric and MALDI-ToF methods can be used.​[188]​ Some organisms with OXA-48-like carbapenemases exhibit only low-level carbapenem resistance without cephalosporin resistance so escaping the standard identification methods.188

High sensitivity and specificity in detecting ESBLs can be achieved using chromogenic selective media, despite mixed flora in catheter urine or faeces. However, competitive bacterial flora resistant to multiple antibiotics, especially cephalosporins, can reduce the specificity of selective media. The use of CTX-M Chromagar (CHROMagar, Paris, France) is superior to ESBL chromogenic agars if seeking cases with a CTX-M ESBL in an outbreak, but the medium is less suitable where, for example, TEM 10 ceftazidime-ase is present. 
Screening for carriage of MDR A. baumannii has been described using a variety of media with samples from various body sites including the axilla, groin, wounds, rectum or pharynx.104,116,​[189]​,​[190]​,​[191]​,​[192]​ There is no consensus on site or method for screening for Acinetobacter, and sensitivity is poor.​[193]​ Most carbapenem resistance involves OXA-23/40/51/58/143-like carbapenemases whilst a few isolates have metallo-carbapenemase.​[194]​,​[195]​ 
9.4.2.3.3	When to screen
There is insufficient evidence to mandate routine screening of all patients for colonization by all MDR Gram-negative organisms. However screening of high-risk patients is used in control efforts for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, e.g. patient transfers from hospitals where these organisms are prevalent. The contribution of this practice to decreasing transmission is unknown. Nevertheless identifying patients who are at high risk of colonization or infection with MDR organisms (including carbapenem-resistant organisms) and performing screening by rectal swab (or skin for Acinetobacter) on admission to healthcare facilities is recommended, and is now becoming more widespread in healthcare setting.169 Patients at high risk include patients admitted to ICU and from long-term care facilities e.g. care homes or endemic areas. 
Screening for carriage of ESBL Enterobacteriaceae can identify patients in whom empirical treatment with meropenem is justified, thus supporting antimicrobial stewardship. Discharge screening for ESBL or carbapenem-resistant organisms is appropriate when admission screening is practiced or if a colonized patient is likely to be readmitted for further procedures or is going to a long-term care facility. Patients with carbapenem-resistant organisms should have notes flagged pending readmission or if they transfer to long-term care facilities, where there is a risk of further spread. Long-term care facilities should be informed of positive results of discharge screening on their transferees and may need to consider if their routine i.e. standard infection control precautions are robust enough in caring for these patients. 
Good Practice Recommendations: 
Effective communications between healthcare settings will help facilitate efficient patient transfers and are crucial in reducing spread.
Local screening policies should be developed to define those patients at high risk of carriage of, for example, carbapenemase-producers. 
9.4.2.4	What can be done in the case of patients unable or unwilling to consent to a rectal swab?
On being admitted to hospital, a patient consents to receive those diagnostic and screening tests that are deemed necessary to the management of their presenting problem. In situations where a patient is incapacitated, those giving care may proceed with any interventions deemed necessary to provide medical treatment for the patient's well-being. This follows the principles of ‘implied consent’, i.e. it is reasonable to assume the person would consent if they were not incapacitated and able to do so. Implied consent is already used for MRSA screening even for patients who have capacity to consent for themselves. 
Screening as part of the ward/hospital policy to guide antimicrobial therapy and/or prevent disease transmission does not require specific written consent but verbal agreement from the patient, wherever possible, before sampling is conducted is required. Individual, religious and societal concerns have to be respected. Patients should be informed, whenever possible, of the need and reason for screening i.e. that it is for their benefit and that of other patients, and what it involves. They should be given the option of who carries it out, including self-screening but only after assessment of patient’s ability and willingness to comply and safety of the procedure. The option of a same sex healthcare practitioner should be provided. Some patients may be unwilling to accept a rectal swab but will provide a stool sample, though this may result in delay or absence of a sample. Ideally, patients should be placed pre-emptively in an isolation room while the screening results are awaited but this is unlikely to be practicable in many high turnover wards. Patients having chemotherapy or with an underlying bowel condition (stoma, colon cancer, recent anal or rectal surgery) may be more easily screened using stool. Nevertheless, rectal swabs can be safely collected in haematology patients.​[196]​ 
9.4.2.5	How frequently does screening need to be performed? 
Extensive active screening during outbreaks due to carbapenem-resistant organism is recommended168 (e.g. follow-up screening of negative cases at weekly intervals and/or for all in-patient contacts with confirmed cases). Although such accounts must be interpreted with caution, experience from outbreaks of MDR Gram-negative organisms, including carbapenemase- and ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae, in acute healthcare settings suggests that the implementation of screening for early detection and isolation of colonized patients coupled with Contact Precautions can help control transmission.77,169,​[197]​ Screening of those not known to be carriers for carbapenem-resistant organisms in an endemic situation is advisable at least weekly and on discharge. 
9.4.2.6	Is there evidence for effective interventions on positive patients i.e. can carriage be cleared? 
A number of studies have evaluated the duration of colonization with MDR Gram-negative bacteria. Studies of hospital inpatients suggest they tend to remain colonized for the duration of their stay.104,​[198]​,​[199]​,​[200]​ Most studies evaluating the duration of colonization outside of acute settings for a range of MDR Gram-negative bacteria have identified mean durations of colonization of months rather than days.11,​[201]​,​[202]​,​[203]​,​[204]​ This duration is anyway likely to reflect the particular strain, not its resistance. 

Several studies have investigated the duration of colonization with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae following discharge from acute care facilities. Risk factors for prolonged carriage of MDR Gram-negative bacteria tend to be associated with healthcare-contact, underlying medical conditions and the presence of invasive devices.11,47,199,​[205]​ For example, Lubbert et al. evaluated prolonged colonization following an outbreak of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae following discharge from an acute hospital.205 Although 26 (31%) of the 84 patients included tested negative for carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae at one month post discharge, 45% remained colonized at 6 months and one patient remained positive for almost 40 months. Two other studies found that around half of patients colonized at the time of hospital discharge were spontaneously free by 6 months.11,47 However, a number of studies identified patients who retested positive after negative screens, suggesting the gastrointestinal colonization is suppressed rather than eliminated in many cases.47,205 For this reason, the authors of these studies recommend at least 3 consecutive negative screens separated by at least 24 hours before a patient could be considered ‘decolonized’.47,200,205 In practice, colonized inpatients should be considered carriers during the rest of their hospital admission. The risk period from previous hospitalization exceeds one year. 

There is no effective equivalent of the topical suppression used to reduce shedding of MRSA in the healthcare environment. Attempts at eradication of MDR Gram-negative organisms from the gastrointestinal tract have not been successful.​[206]​,​[207]​,​[208]​,​[209]​ Selective decontamination of the digestive tract can produce some temporary reduction in the number of organisms in faeces (see section 9.4.6). 

Evidence-based criteria for discontinuing Contact Precautions for carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative organisms in acute care settings have not been developed. Given the likelihood for prolonged gastrointestinal carriage by these organisms and risk of spread, organizations should be cautious in discontinuing Contact Precautions (patient isolation). In most cases, Contact Precautions should continue for the duration of the hospitalization during which the organism was first found on culture. Patients readmitted within 12 months of that hospitalization should be considered probably colonized and managed with Contact Precautions until at least one negative screen is available.
 
Evidence
Early recognition of patients infected with multi-drug resistant Gram-negative organisms and implementation of rigorous infection control interventions is usually associated with reduced secondary transmission.	3

Screening (except Acinetobacter) is most sensitive when performed on rectal (or perirectal) swabs, or stool specimens.			3

Patients transferred from, or who have received medical care in a healthcare facility in an endemic area in the UK or abroad, are at high risk of carriage of carbapenemase-resistant organisms.			 2++ 

Recommendations
A rectal swab (with visible material) or stool sample (and urine if catheter present) should be used for screening for multiresistant Enterobacteriaceae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. For Acinetobacter, sample skin sites or if a catheter or endotracheal tube is present, urine or respiratory secretion. 		Conditional
Each healthcare organisation should have access to robust microbiological arrangements for detecting and reporting multi-drug resistant Gram-negative organisms in routine clinical samples and for screening using highly-sensitive tests with a rapid diagnostic turnaround time of <48h.			Conditional

All patients transferred from, or with a history in the preceding year of admission to, healthcare facilities with known endemic carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae should be screened. 				Strong

In the event of secondary cases of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, SICP and Contact Precautions should be monitored and reinforced with clinical staff. Screening of patients not identified as carriers should be repeated weekly and on discharge from affected units until no new cases are identified for more than seven days. 											Strong

Where possible, single room isolation should be provided for patients with MDR Gram-negative bacterial infection/colonization and Contact Precautions continued for the duration of their stay. 							Conditional 

Those with previous samples with carbapenem-resistant or other MDR Gram-negative bacteria should be screened at the time of admission. 													Conditional

9.4.3	Isolation and segregation
A long-standing principle of infection prevention and control is to physically segregate those known to be infected or colonized with a pathogen of epidemiological importance from those who are not infected or colonized. However critical appraisal is difficult as segregation is usually assessed as part of a package of measures. This physical separation can be achieved through: placing patients with known/suspected infection in single rooms, and/or identifying and isolating patients with the same, confirmed pathogen in a cohort room/area. An additional cohort measure (nursing staff numbers permitting) is to identify staff to care for those patients placed in cohorts. The implementation of screening cultures at the time of admission or during a patient’s stay on a particular ward is a way to improve the impact of physical segregation by identifying those who are colonized with the pathogen of concern. 

Placing patients known to be infected or colonized with MDR Gram-negative bacteria in single rooms reduces transmission. Several studies have reported the impact of converting a unit from multi-occupancy to single rooms on rates of MDR Gram-negative infection/colonization.​[210]​,​[211]​,​[212]​,​[213]​,​[214]​ A Canadian study reported the acquisition rate ratio of various Gram-negative bacteria, comparing an intervention unit, which was converted to single rooms, with a control unit in a sister hospital, which was not converted to single rooms.210 The number of Acinetobacter species, Klebsiella species, and Enterobacter species fell significantly but Pseudomonas species and Escherichia species did not. A 20 year before-after study from a US burns ICU that was converted to single rooms reported a significant reduction in Gram-negative bacteraemia, the time to a first positive Gram-negative culture and mortality.212 Significant reductions were also reported in bloodstream infections due to P. aeruginosa, K. pneumoniae, E. cloacae, E. coli and Providencia stuartii. However, there was no control unit and improvements in burn care during the study may have contributed to these reductions. A separate study from the same renovation reported an overall reduction in infection rates and mortality and in non-enteric Gram-negative species.213 One study from a US ICU reported no significant reduction in overall infection rates, or in rates of E. coli, Pseudomonas species, Acinetobacter species, Klebsiella species or Serratia species.211 Again, this study did not include a control ward. Hand hygiene compliance was low and did not increase when the unit was converted to single rooms, in contrast to other studies.​[215]​,​[216]​ 

The impact of enhancing patient isolation aside from other interventions has been evaluated. A French study in 2001 found that introducing patient isolation to care for ESBL carriers resulted in a sequential reduction in ESBL incidence and hospital acquisition.​[217]​ However this preceded emergence of CTX-M and Escherichia coli as dominant factors. A study in a Vietnamese ICU found that improving patient isolation by reinforcing hand hygiene, and limiting exchange of equipment, materials and staff between patients did not reduce exogenous transmission of various Gram-negative bacteria (gentamicin-resistant K. pneumoniae, ESBL-Enterobacteriaceae, amikacin-resistant Acinetobacter species and P. aeruginosa), whereas rates of MRSA fell significantly. However, this study did not include physical segregation of patients or the use of gowns or aprons.​[218]​ 

Various studies have evaluated switching from a multi-occupancy ward to a single occupancy ward. An Israeli study showed that there were significantly fewer acquisitions of resistant organisms when an ICU was converted from a multi-occupancy bay to single rooms.215 The study included a control ward, which was not converted. Patients in the single-room plan ICU had a significantly lower acquisition rate of resistant organisms when compared with the control multi-occupancy ICU during the same period (3/62 (5%) versus 7/39 (18%), respectively, P = 0.043). SICP were applied throughout, but hand hygiene compliance was better in the single rooms. Although MDR Gram-negative organisms were included, the significant changes related to Gram-positive pathogens. Another study found that the mean number of nosocomial infections and length of stay were reduced significantly when multi-occupancy PICU was converted to single occupancy.​[219]​ However, no control ward was used and no specific data on MDR Gram-negative pathogens were reported. 

Although these studies suggest that converting multi-occupancy wards to single rooms reduces the spread of MDR Gram-negative pathogens, there are several limitations. First, most studies do not include a control ward (although the two studies that include a control ward both show a significant reduction in transmission).210,215 Second, hand hygiene compliance is higher in a single room format compared with a multi-occupancy setting.215,216 Thus, it could be that improved hand hygiene rather than improved physical segregation is the critical factor for reducing transmission. All of the studies have been performed in an ICU setting, limiting their applicability to settings outside of critical care. Converting wards to single rooms often include other changes, such as the size of each bedspace and the location and number of hand hygiene facilities, which could influence transmission rates.215 Single rooms are associated with a number of drawbacks, particularly an increased risk of adverse events due to reduced observation and psychological effects, so the requirement for patient observation is a key consideration when deciding on the optimal configuration of wards.​[220]​ Finally, patients are increasingly moved around the hospital for procedures and investigations, challenging their segregation.

9.4.3.1	Cohorting staff
No studies have evaluated the impact of cohorting staff aside from other interventions, but several have reported cohorting staff as an element of a successful multifaceted strategy.77,104,​[221]​,​[222]​ 

9.4.3.2	Disposable aprons and gloves 
Data are limited in terms of the most appropriate personal protective equipment to use when caring for patients with MDR Gram-negative bacteria
Studies have evaluated interventions that have included the use of gloves and gowns or aprons as an element of contact precautions.137,217,​[223]​,​[224]​ Hands and uniforms (or gloves and gowns or aprons if worn) can become contaminated with MDR organisms.126,127,​[225]​,​[226]​,​[227]​,​[228]​,​[229]​,​[230]​ 

The use of gloves is an essential part of prevention of transmission of infection and the evidence has been reviewed elsewhere.176 While they protect hands from contamination with biological fluids and microorganisms, they are not a substitute for hand hygiene and unnecessary use can result in increased cross contamination. Loveday et al. recommended they should be removed immediately after the activity has been completed and the hands then decontaminated to prevent transmission as they may be contaminated during glove use or during removal.176 

Evidence
Units composed of single rooms have less transmission of MDR-GNR: A. baumannii, ESBL-producing (and, by inference carbapenemase-producing) Enterobacteriaceae, P. aeruginosa					3

Recommendation
Use disposable gloves and gowns or aprons to care for patients with MDR Gram-negative bacteria: A. baumannii, carbapenem-resistant and ESBL-Enterobacteriaceae, P. aeruginosa				Strong

9.4.3.3	What is the role of isolation in the care home/hospital settings?
Current practices for the identification and isolation of patients with MDR Gram-negative bacteria (in either single rooms or cohorts) vary widely among healthcare facilities.​[231]​,​[232]​ A survey of 66 hospitals in 26 US states and 15 other countries found that 74.2% isolated those with ESBLs, 93.9% carbapenem-resistant organisms, 81.8% MDR Pseudomonas species, and 84.9% MDR Acinetobacter species. There was considerable variation in the duration of isolation and few facilities performed screening. Isolation of patients in long term care facility rooms may not be practicable for psychological reasons.

A number of studies have evaluated the impact of isolating patients with ESBL Enterobacteriaceae aside from other interventions.217,​[233]​,​[234]​,​[235]​,​[236]​ A 6-year Canadian study evaluated the impact of placing patients with ESBL Enterobacteriaceae in single rooms for the duration of their stay, and applying contact precautions for symptomatic patients.233 There was an overall increase in ESBL Enterobacteriaceae colonizations/infections, but a relative decrease in cases attributable to the hospital, suggesting that local transmission was reduced. A 2-year before-after study in France before the proliferation of CTX-M -lactamases found that the introduction of admission and weekly surveillance combined with isolation of carriers resulted in a significant reduction in the percentage of patients infected or colonized with ESBL Enterobacteriaceae.234 There was a significant reduction in ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae but not MDR E. aerogenes. The study has a number of important confounders, including an intervention to reduce imipenem use, encouraging prompt discharge, and chlorhexidine bathing for isolated patients. A study in a French paediatric hospital evaluated a sequential change in isolation policy from placing patients in a single room to placing them in a cohort block, applying modelling to test the impact on transmission of ESBL producers.235 No significant difference was identified between the two isolation protocols, but the model suggested that single room or cohort isolation reduced transmission of ESBL producers. Finally, a 12-month cluster randomised study in 13 European ICUs evaluated chromogenic agar screening for ESBL Enterobacteriaceae on admission and isolation of carriers vs. no admission screening.236 A hand hygiene improvement programme for staff and chlorhexidine body washing for patients preceded the trial. Of the 2129 Enterobacteriaceae resistant to third and fourth generation cephalosporins found on screening, 29% were resistant to carbapenems. Screening and source isolation was not associated with any trend (during the intervention period) or step-change (compared with a baseline period) in rate of ESBL transmission. However individual species were not analysed separately. 

Two studies have evaluated the impact of isolation on the transmission of A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa.137,223 A 7-year before-after study in France evaluated across the whole hospital the introduction of contact precautions, which included placing the patient in a single room or cohort with other patients, and the use of gloves and gowns or aprons on A. baumannii transmission.223 Isolation precautions were implemented for 2 years, then stopped for three years, then re-implemented for 2 years; the incidence of A. baumannii was significantly lower during the two periods when isolation precautions were in use. The implementation of isolation precautions was the only variable associated with lower A. baumannii incidence in multivariate analysis. A follow-up study from the same group reported similar findings.​[237]​ A study from an ICU in Brazil evaluated the introduction of contact isolation, including the use of gloves and gowns or aprons, cohorting of medical items (stethoscopes etc), daily surface cleaning and disinfection on the rates of MDR A. baumannii and P. aeruginosa.137 Bloodstream infections reduced significantly during the intervention but species were not analysed separately. The study compared rates of infections at two points during the intervention, with no baseline period.

A number of other studies have implemented complex interventions that included increased isolation of patients.116,221,222,224,​[238]​ One study in a US ICU implemented a multifaceted intervention centred on improved isolation of patients, including admission screening for carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae but not for A. baumannii or P. aeruginosa.221 There was a significant reduction in the rate of carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae but no change in the rate of A. baumannii or P. aeruginosa. A study of various interventions in six US hospitals found the only consistent predictor of successful control of K. pneumoniae with KPC carbapenemases was a shorter length of stay.238 Three studies have evaluated the impact of a multifaceted intervention to control the spread of A. baumannii. An intervention at US field hospitals in Iraq including improved hand hygiene, contact precautions, cohorting patients and staff resulted in a significant reduction in A. baumannii ventilator-associated pneumonia.222 A bundle of interventions including Contact Precautions, screening (on occasion), and regular staff briefings significantly reduced the rate of MDR A. baumannii infections overall, and in particular bloodstream infections due to the organisms in a Spanish hospital.116 Finally, a study in a Thai ICU reported a significant reduction in MDR A. baumannii associated with the introduction of contact precautions, cohorting colonized patients, screening and environmental disinfection using bleach.224 However Acinetobacter infections are more common in Thailand than in UK.

Studies that have evaluated the impact of isolating patients in either single rooms or cohorts generally lack a concurrent control unit, making it difficult to be certain that changes in rate are attributable to isolation alone. The one study that included a concurrent control ward demonstrated no significant decrease in transmission of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae.236 

Evidence
Transmission of MDR Gram-negative bacteria is reduced by identifying patients who are infected or colonized and placing them in single rooms or cohorts.								3

Recommendations
	Identify and place infected and colonized patients in single rooms where available in this order of priority: carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii, ESBL Klebsiella sp, carbapenemase-producing P. aeruginosa, ESBL E. coli and other Enterobacteriaceae, AmpC Enterobacteriaceae.							Strong
	If there are insufficient rooms available, cohort isolate following local risk assessment 								Conditional

Good Practice recommendation
Establish a flagging system for patient notes			Conditional

9.4.4	Hand hygiene 
Hand hygiene is an essential part of prevention of transmission of infection in healthcare and has already been reviewed in Loveday et al.176 Transient flora, including MDR Gram-negative bacteria, is acquired from touching the patient or environment and is easily transferred to the next patient or surface. In turn, this causes colonization and later (potentially) infection. Use of alcohol hand rub (or liquid soap and water if hands visibly soiled) has been shown to reduce the carriage of potential pathogens on the hands and therefore is likely to reduce the number and likelihood of healthcare acquired infections.174,176 Hand decontamination is considered to have a high impact on outcomes that are important to patients.​[239]​ Training of all care workers, combined with audit and feedback of compliance rates, is central to current guidance on prevention of infection. The WHO Five Moments for Hand Hygiene has been widely used and supported by National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) and describes the points at which hand hygiene is required.239 Hand hygiene is often missed as the worker enters or leaves the patient environment and on contact with potentially contaminated surfaces​[240]​,​[241]​,​[242]​ 

Despite many activities around hand hygiene product improvement, introduction of alcohol based hand rubs/gel, improving environmental factors, extensive marketing and education campaigns evidence of sustained compliance improvement is lacking. Hand hygiene compliance globally is variable with Creedon​[243]​ and Larson et al.​[244]​ suggesting it is approximately 50%. Improving hand hygiene compliance is reliant upon an understanding of the interactions within healthcare between the individuals, the practices and procedures they perform, the environment that they work in, and the culture and safety awareness of the organisation. These human factors should be applied to the infection prevention agenda to ensure that meaningful, sustainable interventions are adopted reliably to produce the greatest impact.​[245]​
 
Evidence
Hand hygiene is associated with reduction of carriage of potential pathogens on the hands 							2+

Recommendation




9.4.5.1	When should the environment be sampled?
The role of the environment in the transmission of healthcare acquired infection remains controversial and difficult to study. In recent years much of the research around this has focused on high-profile Gram-positive pathogens such as MRSA, Clostridium difficile and glycopeptide-resistant enterococci, where a significant body of evidence for the importance of environmental sources has started to accumulate.​[246]​,​[247]​ Reservoirs can be identified when infection control has failed to control an outbreak.161 The general view has been that Gram-negative bacteria, particularly members of the Enterobacteriaceae, are not as successful at surviving in the environment for prolonged periods, and generally are relatively easily removed by appropriate conventional cleaning and drying.13 Nevertheless, Enterobacteriaceae, including carbapenem-resistant strains, are able to survive on dry surfaces for extended periods, sometimes measured in weeks and months.​[248]​,​[249]​ Some strains of Escherichia coli carrying ESBLs for example can survive for a median of 10 days in the environment.​[250]​ In favourable conditions, E. coli, Klebsiella spp. and Pseudomonas spp. can survive for even longer.161 Acinetobacter has the capacity for long-term survival on dry surfaces.14,​[251]​,​[252]​,​[253]​ Pseudomonas is more traditionally associated with moist environments and will be found around hand wash basins and respiratory equipment.35,​[254]​ There is considerable evidence that P. aeruginosa can contaminate waste water systems and spread from them, with these sometimes acting as reservoirs for carbapenemase-producing strains causing prolonged outbreaks.​[255]​ Endoscopes if not adequately decontaminated including the hand piece have been responsible for outbreaks.​[256]​ 
MDR Gram-negative bacteria, including carbapenem-resistant organisms, Enterobacteriaceae and A. baumannii, can be cultured from sites surrounding infected and or colonized patients.106,​[257]​ Several studies have found that environmental contamination with resistant K. pneumoniae is more common than contamination with resistant E. coli.​[258]​,​[259]​,​[260]​ No controlled studies have shown that an environmental intervention reduces the transmission of multi-drug-resistant Gram-negative rods. However, contamination with MDR Gram-negative bacteria can persist despite cleaning and disinfection.106,​[261]​,​[262]​ Epidemiological data suggest that admission to an ICU room previously occupied by patients infected or colonized with A. baumannii or P. aeruginosa presents an increased risk for acquiring these organisms.252 A significant correlation was noted between the number of environmental swabs in monthly screening and number of patients with colonization/infection in the same month (P=0.004).103 However, this association was not seen for resistant Enterobacteriaceae, suggesting that the environment is less important in their transmission,252,​[263]​ albeit with the caveat that these studies did not stratify by species of Enterobacteriaceae, which may be important given the increased capacity for K. pneumoniae, in particular, to contaminate and survive on hospital surfaces. 
The evidence for the benefit of environmental screening is limited and, in itself environmental sampling will not limit transmission of MDR Gram-negative bacteria.​[264]​ The purpose of screening may be to draw attention to failure of clearance of an outbreak strain by cleaning, or to point to a possible common source for a cluster or outbreak. Most of the evidence surrounding environmental screening is within reports of management of outbreaks, and there is often very little detail on sites sampled, sampling technique, or method of culture.​[265]​ When looking for small numbers of organisms or bacteria living in biofilms the yield can be improved by using enriched culture but this precludes quantitation. An alternative to specifically seeking the multi-resistant outbreak strain(s) itself is to assess the degree of microbiological contamination by using surface contact plates and undertaking quantitative bacterial culture.​[266]​ Surface contact plates using selective media for specific pathogens can suffer from low sensitivity but use with non-selective media may be helpful. Choosing sites for sampling remains problematic as any sampling can only reflect a very small fraction of the relevant environment.​[267]​ The general approach should be to choose sites that are likely to be relevant for cross transmission such as work surfaces close to the patient and equipment/surfaces which are likely to be touched frequently, (e.g. computer keyboards, bed rails and door handles).264,​[268]​
Given the difficulties with microbiological sampling of the environment, there has been considerable interest in the availability of technologies that can indirectly assess microbial contamination. Adenosine triphosphate (ATP) bioluminescence has been used for many years in the food industry, where visual assessment is considered insufficient to assess the risk of infection from contaminated surfaces. It has a number of potential benefits, including simplicity and immediacy of feedback; however, it can give only indirect information on the likelihood of bacterial contamination and bacteria themselves are not isolated for investigation and comparison to those causing outbreaks. Its use in hospitals can be problematic, as values can be variable, and there is little consensus on an appropriate benchmark value to indicate inadequate cleanliness.166,​[269]​,​[270]​ Results are prone to interference by different disinfectants.​[271]​ Where ATP bioluminescence has been used most successfully has been on a continuous basis to improve compliance through feedback and improved cleaning.​[272]​,​[273]​ Other methods of controlling the process of cleaning, such as the use of fluorescent gel markers, can be useful in auditing the cleaning process and feedback to cleaning staff.​[274]​

Evidence
Transmission of multiply resistant Gram-negative bacteria, particularly non-fermenters has been associated with contamination of the environment, water systems or equipment 								2-
Sampling of the environment can be useful in identifying sources of ongoing transmission or a single common source for an outbreak 	 		2- 
Recommendation
Environmental screening should be considered where there is any unexplained transmission of MDR Gram-negative organisms or a possible common source for an outbreak. 									Strong


9.4.5.2	What is the evidence that respiratory equipment contributes to transmission?
The respiratory tract of ventilated patients in critical care units is a frequent site of carriage of MDR Gram-negative bacteria. In one study in India, 87% of samples from ventilators, humidifiers, nebulizers and other respiratory equipment showed bacterial colonization and 17/42 Gram-negative isolates were multi-drug resistant.​[275]​ Endotracheal suctioning is a potential cause of cross infection, as disconnection of the system may allow airborne spread to the patient’s skin, staff hands and the immediate environment. In a cross-over study in the Netherlands, there was no significant difference in acquisition of Gram-negative bacteria during periods of using closed suction vs. open suction in ventilated patients.​[276]​ However antibiotic resistance rates were low and similar in each group. Comparing ventilated with non-ventilated patients in the ICU, non-fermenting and enteric Gram-negative bacilli were more frequently reported in ventilator-associated pneumonia, but this reflected the number of samples cultured per patient. The overall proportions of different pathogenic species were similar.​[277]​ 

Inappropriate washing of ventilator or endotracheal tubing in hand-wash sinks risks the spread of Gram-negative pathogens. Environmental sampling in two outbreaks of MDR P. aeruginosa showed it to have colonized the waste water system, with blockages, splashback and spillage from showers being possible modes of spread.35 Direction of water directly into the outlet caused spread of organisms from the sink drain trap. Sinks were fitted with a horizontal drain outlet at the back of the basin, resolving the problem. Sterile fluids (not tap water) must be used to clear suction equipment, as the latter may be contaminated with pseudomonads or Enterobacteriaceae and these can be disseminated when the equipment is next used, including when catheters are changed. 

Evidence
Gram-negative bacteria colonize respiratory equipment and may be washed into sink traps 										2+

Recommendation
Respiratory and other contaminated equipment should be decontaminated (or respiratory secretions discarded) away from the immediate bed area in designated cleaning sinks and not in hand wash sinks 				Strong
Good practice recommendation
Do not discard patient wash water, body fluids, secretions or exudates into hand wash basins. 								

9.4.5.3	What is the evidence that sensor taps contribute to transmission?
P. aeruginosa, including multi-resistant strains, in water sources in intensive care units has long been recognised as being associated with the development of bacteraemia and pneumonia in patients.​[278]​ A recent systematic review demonstrated evidence of transmission of P. aeruginosa from water systems to patients and vice versa.34 Point-of-use filters and increasing chlorine disinfection were effective interventions. Non-touch taps were identified as probable risk factors for biofilm formation and subsequent transmission to patients. Sinks and a nurse’s hands have been identified as possible vectors. In a neonatal unit, four neonates were infected and 44 colonized by cross infection with one clone.124 In another neonatal unit in Germany, P. aeruginosa was isolated from the nasal prongs of 22 babies and from 9 respiratory water reservoirs.​[279]​ The hands of staff were the likely means of transmission. Other outbreaks have been due to contaminated detergent-disinfectant solution used in cleaning surfaces.​[280]​ Studies confirm the effectiveness of point-of-use filters on water outlets in reducing infection in critical care units, but were descriptive cohort studies, and so are subject to temporal variation.​[281]​,​[282]​,​[283]​ Filters have to be replaced regularly, are expensive and can themselves be the source of contamination. P. aeruginosa is found in biofilm in flow straighteners, metal support collars and the adjacent parts of the tap bodies. The level of contamination with Pseudomonas is highest on complex flow straighteners, integrated mixers and solenoids.278 
Sensor taps have been implicated in some outbreaks of Pseudomonas bacteraemia and other infections in augmented care units as the flow is slow and controlled and the internal mechanism complex. Decontamination of sensor taps can be performed​[284]​ and, in one major outbreak, all taps, mixer valves, flexible hoses and flow straighteners were replaced with simpler designs.278 
Where there are vulnerable patients (i.e. augmented care), the Department of Health in England recommends a regular water-testing regimen but clinical surveillance is sufficient elsewhere. The frequency of testing depends on previous isolation of the organism and proximity to patients at risk e.g. neonates. The purpose is to prevent colonization before patient infection develops. A risk assessment to mitigate risks and a Water Safety Plan are advised including consideration of removal of thermostatic mixer valves and flow straighteners and the design of the sink.36 Infrequently-used taps should be flushed at full flow for one minute daily or removed altogether. In the event of contaminated supplies, sterile water should be used for neonates and single-use wipes for other patient hygiene together with additional hand hygiene using alcohol gel after washing.

Evidence
The presence of infections with P. aeruginosa in patients is commonly associated with isolation of these bacteria from unit taps. 					2-
The installation of point-of-use filters is associated with a reduction in pseudomonal infections.										3
Recommendation 
For P. aeruginosa including multiresistant strains, at a minimum in accordance with the organization’s water safety plan, a risk assessment should be made when levels of patient colonization or infections rise to determine if point-of-use filters should be installed or taps changed. 								Strong	 
9.4.5.4	Is there any cleaning method more effective than others at removing the MDR Gram-negative bacilli from the environment?
The importance of persistence in the environment in transmission of MDR Gram-negative bacteria remains uncertain.246,​[285]​ However, maintaining a clean environment and appropriately decontaminating all relevant equipment is an essential component of any infection prevention and control programme. The cleanliness of healthcare premises is an important component in the provision of clean safe care.​[286]​ In England, the NHS Constitution pledges ‘The NHS commits to ensure that services are provided in a clean and safe environment that is fit for purpose, based on national best practice’.​[287]​ Whilst there have been significant improvements in the cleanliness of English healthcare premises, there is still room for improvement.286

The optimal methods for cleaning have been poorly studied with respect to MDR Gram-negative bacteria. Poor cleaning practice, such as inappropriate dilution of cleaning agent or inactivation of disinfectant by organic matter, is more likely to reduce cleaning efficacy than theoretical cross-resistance between disinfectant and antibiotic.​[288]​ In extreme cases, agents used for cleaning can even become contaminated with Gram-negative bacteria, especially pseudomonads.141,​[289]​,​[290]​,​[291]​

Conventional decontamination is carried out by a human operator, and the reliance on the operator to select the correct product, dilution, distribution and surface contact time has the potential for decontamination failure. Debate around the use of chemical disinfectants versus detergents for routine cleaning is gathering momentum with concerns regarding chemical resistance, optimum disinfectant contact times, allergies amongst users and patients and costs. In short, practice varies widely and monitoring is traditionally by a visual inspection, which can be subjective. Efficacy is rarely measured. 

Although persistence of Gram-negative organisms on reuseable bedpans is a potential mode of spread, there are no recent reviews of performance with respect to Gram-negative bacteria. In automated washer disinfectors, a combination of alkaline detergent and temperature over 85ºC for one minute is sufficient to eliminate C difficile spores.​[292]​ However visible faecal soil can remain on 7-33% of bedpans, so appropriate education is importance to ensure good practice.​[293]​ Early studies showed failure to attain 80C was associated with persistence of Escherichia coli and Pseudomonas aeruginosa.​[294]​ Transmission of pathogens via contaminated endoscopes is usually due to failure to comply with appropriate reprocessing practice guidelines.​[295]​ Although some cases of transmission have been known, relatively few are reported in peer reviewed journals. 

Assessment of the activity of disinfectants against MDR Gram-negative bacteria is hampered by the differences between testing against organisms in suspension and on a surface. Acinetobacter and Pseudomonas may survive in the ward environment even after bleach disinfection and increase the risk of acquisition by patients.106,252 In a prospective cohort study, cleaning the environment with sodium hypochlorite instead of detergent-disinfectant plus chlorhexidine bathing of patients reduced the risk of colonization with MDR A. baumannii becoming established beyond that achieved by improved contact precautions, cohorting, screening and antimicrobial stewardship.​[296]​ Termination of Acinetobacter outbreaks has been associated with closure and cleaning of units, and removal of a reservoir has been associated with termination of outbreaks for a variety of organisms.161 
Most interventions to improve cleaning have been accompanied by a package of infection control precautions. Education campaigns and use of audit tools such as marking surfaces with fluorescent dye reduce contamination, but their effect may be transient. 
There has recently been significant interest in the role of ‘no touch’ automated disinfection systems as an additional measure for terminal cleaning of single rooms or hospital areas affected by clusters or outbreaks.​[297]​ There are a number of types of these systems currently marketed, including aerosolised or vapourised hydrogen peroxide, and ultraviolet radiation. Each has distinct microbiological and practical characteristics. A number of studies have shown improved efficacy of killing of various pathogens compared with cleaning alone, particularly in outbreaks, but there are limited data on whether this reduces rates of acquisition of pathogens.​[298]​,​[299]​,​[300]​ Hydrogen peroxide vapour from 30% H2O2 and in one case, aerosolized hydrogen peroxide from 5% H2O2 have been used successfully as part of a bundle of interventions to prevent transmission of MDR Acinetobacter in outbreaks105,107,108,109 and hydrogen peroxide vapour has been used to help control outbreaks of resistant Enterobacteriaceae, including CRE.262,​[301]​,​[302]​
Patients admitted to rooms exposed to hydrogen peroxide vapour were significantly less likely to acquire any multi-drug-resistant organisms than in hydrogen peroxide vapour untreated rooms in a cohort intervention study.299 K. pneumoniae, P. aeruginosa and A. baumannii in suspension are all susceptible to low concentrations of hydrogen peroxide but efficacy is significantly reduced when the organisms were in biofilm; some P. aeruginosa in biofilm had prolonged survival following hydrogen peroxides exposure in the laboratory.​[303]​ Hydrogen peroxide vapour (from 30% H2O2) is more effective in eradicating surface A. baumannii than aerosolised hydrogen peroxide (from 5% H2O2) (>6 log vs. 1-4 log reduction).​[304]​ It is essential to ensure that the area has been thoroughly cleaned first, because efficacy is affected by the presence of organic soiling. 

Evidence
Cleaning is important in the control of outbreaks due to MDR Acinetobacter and failure to clean specific areas or pieces of equipment has been associated with transmission of other MDR Gram-negative bacteria. However evidence derived from before and after studies and outbreak reports and is open to bias.			2-

Hydrogen peroxide vapour is effective in reducing environmental reservoirs of Acinetobacter and other Gram-negative bacteria on surfaces (but not sink traps), if used in addition to standard cleaning 	 						 2+

Recommendation
Terminal disinfection of vacated areas with hypochlorite should be used in the control of outbreaks of MDR Gram-negative infection 			Conditional
 Hydrogen peroxide vapour should be considered as an adjunctive measure to following cleaning of vacated isolation rooms/areas.			Conditional
Good Practice Recommendation
Increase cleaning frequency to at least twice daily and every 4 hours for high contact surfaces in the presence of resistant Enterobacteriaece and Acinetobacter sp


9.4.6	Selective decontamination: Why is it not used? Is there a role?
Selective decontamination of the digestive tract (SDD) is an intervention that aims to reduce mortality and morbidity due to hospital-acquired infection in intensive care units. It comprises application of non-absorbable antibiotics to the mouth and stomach together with a course of broad-spectrum intravenous antibiotic. A modification uses only the topical element of decontamination (SOD). The practice has been extensively investigated, largely in the Netherlands, and at least 12 meta-analyses of published papers have been produced.​[305]​ Almost one third of the trials suggest a significant reduction in the incidence of Gram-negative pneumonia and one large randomised study demonstrated a small but significant reduction in mortality in a country with low levels of antibiotic resistance.​[306]​ Despite issues with blinding, heterogeneity and compliance, both SDD and SOD appear to be associated with a reduction in pneumonia (OR 0.32 95% CI 0.26-0.38) and mortality (0.75 95% CI 0.65-0.87).​[307]​ 
Nevertheless only 5% of UK ICUs use SDD, largely because universal use of prophylactic antibiotics is counter to the tenets of antibiotic stewardship.​[308]​,​[309]​ In some studies with long-term surveillance, both SDD and SOD were associated with an increase in resistance to ceftazidime in Gram-negative flora of the respiratory tract although in many cases systemic antibiotics were also given.​[310]​,​[311]​,​[312]​ In the short term, however, a systematic review found a significant reduction in resistance of Gram-negative bacilli to third- generation cephalosporins during the use of selective decontamination.208 The relevance of findings from one country to another is unclear when patterns and prevalence rates of resistant Gram-negative bacteria vary so widely. Preparation requires suitable manufacturing units, and administration can be labour intensive. 
Recent high-quality studies have provided evidence that daily bathing using chlorhexidine gluconate in ICU helps to reduce bacteremia but there is limited evidence of its specific effect on MDR Gram negative bacterial infection.​[313]​,​[314]​,​[315]​,​[316]​ It has formed part of successful bundles of interventions but has not tested as an isolated measure.236,296,​[317]​,​[318]​,​[319]​ Some studies that have evaluated chlorhexidine as a single intervention including randomization have failed to demonstrate a reduction on Gram-negative bacteremia.314,316,​[320]​ There is no strong evidence that chlorhexidine daily bathing reduces Gram-negative infection or colonization. There is a risk of development of resistance.114 The routine use of oropharyngeal chlorhexidine has been associated with an increase in mortality in one systematic review.​[321]​ 
Selective decontamination can temporarily suppress excretion of carbapenem-resistant organisms from the gastrointestinal tract and possibly supplement SICP.207 In a retrospective analysis of a German outbreak, selective digestive decontamination with colistin and gentamicin as oral solution and gel was used in 14 patients with proven carriage of carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae KPC-s-KP ST258.311 Loss of carriage, as defined by three PCR screens 48 hours apart, was found at a mean of 21 days in 6 treated patients (43%) but also in 30% of controls. Resistance to colistin and gentamicin in post treatment isolates of K. pneumoniae rose 19% and 45% respectively, compared to controls. In a randomised placebo-controlled trial of a regimen based on colistin and neomycin plus treatment of bacteriuria with nitrofurantoin, the detection of ESBL Enterobacteriaceae in rectal swabs was not affected significantly.​[322]​ A randomised trial against placebo used oral gentamicin and topical oropharyngeal gentamicin and colistin for a week and was directed against carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae carriage. It produced a significant reduction in carriage at 2 weeks but not at 6 weeks.207 Mortality was not affected significantly, but throat carriage was reduced from 30% to zero in the intervention versus 35% to 30% with placebo (p<0.0001). Isolates did not develop resistance. A lower-quality controlled study reported reductions in faecal and pharyngeal carriage of Acinetobacter during colistin/tobramycin selective decontamination.​[323]​ Against, colistin/neomycin/nalidixic acid did not reduce infections or mortality due to MDR Enterobacteriaceae compared with no prophylaxis, but carriage was reduced (n=86, RR0.28 95%CI 0.03-2.28).​[324]​

Evidence
The use of SDD or SOD is associated with a reduction in the incidence of pneumonia due to Gram-negative bacteria. 					1+
The use of SDD or SOD is associated with a reduction in the mortality rate. 1+
SOD can be used to reduce excretion of MDR Gram-negative bacteria during an outbreak, but no effect on transmission of infection has been demonstrated and application can be logistically difficult. 						3
Recommendation 
The routine use of selective decontamination of the mouth or digestive tract is not recommended for control of MDR Gram-negative bacteria. 													Conditional 
9.5	What are the minimum standards to stop spread in public areas, primary care or care homes? 
Care homes are recognised as potential reservoirs of multi-resistant pathogens, which can spread among residents, generally as colonizers, and can be reintroduced into hospital.​[325]​ Publicity may alarm residents, their relatives and carers. Clear information on the standards of infection prevention and control should be available to promote confidence in the quality of care provided. Despite the relatively poor evidence base, guidelines are available for managers and carers.239,​[326]​ In England, the Code of Practice326 defines what is required to ensure compliance with Care Quality Commission (CQC) registration requirements for cleanliness and infection control. Following general principles, owners are encouraged to contact the local health protection team in the event of outbreaks of infection, increase cleaning and hand hygiene compliance by patients and staff, conduct root cause analyses and train staff in infection prevention and control. The prevalence of ESBL Enterobacteriaceae in the care home is usually unknown and sporadic. The need for a urinary catheter if present should be reviewed regularly and it should be removed as soon as it is not needed. The appropriate use of such devices to prevent healthcare-acquired infection has been reviewed elsewhere.166 Residents with diarrhoea should be isolated in their room with a dedicated commode if no en suite facilities are available. This isolation may require additional psychological support for the resident. Colonization with multi-resistant organisms should not be construed as a reason to isolate or screen other residents. Standard Infection Control Precautions must continue to be applied. 

Evidence 
Institutionalized patients/residents are more likely to carry multi-resistant organisms and present a risk on readmission to hospital 					2+

Good Practice recommendation
Care homes should adopt national recommendations for environmental and equipment cleanliness and infection prevention and control	

Clear patient information on MDR Gram-negative infection must be provided in accessible formats to encourage good hand hygiene by patients and staff 							
9.6	Are there organisational structures within a healthcare facility that play a role in the successful control of MDR Gram-negative bacilli?
In Israel, with prevalent ST258/KPC K. pneumoniae, a self-contained nursing unit with dedicated staff for patients carrying carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae was effective as part of a package of measures including mandatory reporting and a centralised national monitoring system.77 In the same way, a centralised national system was effective in the control of MRSA in UK. Outbreaks of carbapenemase-producing K. pneumoniae appear to have been controlled by a package of measures including nursing infected patients in separate units with different staff until discharge or cohorting.197,262,​[327]​,​[328]​,​[329]​ The nursing units could be single rooms, cohorts or wards but the nurse did not cross between units during the shift. A sequential intervention study found control was effective when patients were nursed in separated locations with dedicated nursing personnel. The shared medical staff had contact precautions vetted by the dedicated nurse before entering the area.328 However, the intervention also included education, training, cleaning and screening. 

Evidence
A separate unit with dedicated nursing staff rather than in a part of the ward with shared staff is effective in control packages 					3

Recommendation
Monitor hand hygiene of all staff when patient cohorting is being applied.	Strong 

10	Further research
1.	PCR-based tests for swift detection of MDR Gram-negative pathogens require further testing and development to allow cost effective and rapid screening and detection of carriers.
2.	Consideration should be given to further investigation of screening of long-term care facility patients as a means of tracking movement and defining reservoirs of organisms. Longitudinal assessment of patients carrying ESBL-producing organisms, particularly E.coli ST131, should be made on admission and discharge to hospitals and nursing homes to detect infection and spontaneous clearance of carriage. 
3.	The risk factors for development of infection such as urinary catheterisation should be separated from the risk factors for carriage including hospitalisation. Household contacts of cases of infection with E. coli ST131 or carbapenem- resistant K. pneumoniae should be examined for evidence of spread or subsequent infection. 
4.	Given the recent changes in the prevalence of e.g. ESBL-producing E. coli ST131 and K. pneumoniae ST258 with KPC carbapenemases the potential for screening patients for particular clones as means of controlling transmission in hospitals should be assessed. MALDI-ToF, serological and DNA-based detection methods should be developed together with selective or indicator media for quinolone-resistant Enterobacteriacae. 
5.	Bacteraemia surveillance including sequence typing for strains resistant to cephalosporins, quinolones and carbapenems should be expanded and open to public and commissioning groups. This is essential for accurate risk assessment of patients transferred between healthcare facilities. In localities with outbreaks, typing and infection control should be extended to isolates from other anatomical sites.
6.	Randomised intervention studies of the efffectiveness measures including single-room isolation in prevention of transmission or Gram-negative bacterial infection.




Levels of evidence for intervention studies1,6 

1++	High-quality meta-analyses, systematic reviews of RCTs or RCTs with a very low risk of bias
1 +	Well-conducted meta-analyses, systematic reviews or RCTs with a low risk of bias
1 -	Meta-analyses, systematic reviews or RCTs with a high risk of bias*
2++	High-quality systematic reviews of case–control or cohort studies.High-quality case–control or cohort studies with a very low risk of confounding or bias and a high probability that the relationship is causal. Interrupted time series with a control group: (i) there is a clearly defined point in time when the intervention occurred; and (ii) at least three data points before andthree data points after the intervention
2+ 	Well-conducted case–control or cohort studies with a low risk of confounding or bias and a moderate probability that the relationship is causal.Controlled before–after studies with two or more intervention and control sites
2-	Case–control or cohort studies with a high risk of confounding or bias and a significant risk that the relationship is not causal.Interrupted time series without a parallel control group:(i) There is a clearly defined point in time when the intervention occurred; and (ii) at least three data points before and three data points after the intervention. Controlled before–after studies with one intervention and one control site
3	Non-analytic studies (e.g. uncontrolled before–after studies, case reports, case series)
4	Expert opinion. Legislation
*Studies with an evidence level of ‘1-‘ and ‘2-‘ should not be used as a basis for making a recommendation.








Undesirable consequences clearly outweighdesirable consequences	Strong recommendation against
Undesirable consequences probably outweighdesirable consequences	Conditional recommendation against
Balance between desirable and undesirableconsequences is closely balanced or uncertain.	Recommendation for research and possiblyconditional recommendation for use restricted totrials
Desirable consequences probably outweighundesirable consequences	Conditional recommendation for






Dissecting the epidemiology of multi-drug-resistant Gram-negative rods 

	Resistant Enterobacteriaceae	Multi-drug-resistant non-fermenters
	AmpC, ESBLa	CPEb	A. baumanniic	P. aeruginosa	Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Microbiology	Fermentative, oxidase-negative, motile or non-motile, facultatively anaerobic, rods.	Non-fermentative, oxidase-negative, non-motile, obligate aerobic, coccobacilli.​[330]​	Non-fermentative, oxidase-positive, motile, aerobic, rods.​[331]​	Non-fermentative,d,​[332]​ motile, oxidase +/-, obligate aerobic, rods.​[333]​
Reservoirs	Human and animal gastrointestinal tract, water.	Respiratory and gastrointestinal tract, and dry surfaces.330,​[334]​	Ubiquitous: plants, animals, and moist environments. 331	Ubiquitous: plants, animals, humans and moist environments.333,​[335]​
Sites of colonization	Gastrointestinal tract.22	Skin, respiratory and gastrointestinal tract.187,334,​[336]​	Gastrointestinal tract and moist body sites (throat, nasal mucosa, axillary skin perineum).​[337]​	Respiratory and gastrointestinal tract.333,335,​[338]​
Duration of colonization	Months to >1 year.​[339]​,​[340]​,​[341]​	Days to weeks.334	-	-
Clinical manifestation	Urinary tract (e.g. E. coli), pneumonia (e.g. K. pneumoniae and Enterobacter spp.), intra-abdominal infection.337,​[342]​	Ventilator-associated pneumonia, catheter-related bloodstreamand urinary tract infections, wound infections.330,334	Pneumonia, urinary tract, surgical site, bloodstream infections cystic fibrosis lung, burns.331 	Pneumonia and bloodstream infection; less commonly urinary tract and wound infections.333,335
Environmental survival	Hours to weeks on dry surfaces;117 contaminated environment likely to play a minor role in transmission.252,263	Weeks to months on dry surfaces;117,251 difficult to remove from surfaces by cleaning and disinfection.103,106	Contaminates moist hospital environments: tap aerators, respiratory therapy equipment.337	Contaminates moist hospital environments; can form biofilms on surfaces; low biocide susceptibility.333,335
Transmission routes	Hands (++), contaminated surfaces (+/-).319	Contaminated surfaces (++), hands (+), air (+/-).31,252,334 	Hands (+), contaminated moist surfaces (+), air (+/-). Water systems.337,​[343]​	Hands (+), contaminated moist surfaces (+), air (+/-).333,343
Antimicrobial resistance - intrinsic	Ampicillin, first- and second-generation cephalosporins.​[344]​ Serratia and Proteeae are intrinsically resistant to polymyxins.	Ampicillin, amoxicillin-clavulanate, cefazolin, cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, ertapenem, trimethoprim, and fosfomycin.330	Some β-lactams and fluoroquinolones, macrolides, tetracyclines, trimethoprim/ sulfamethoxazole.​[345]​	Most agents except cotrimoxazole.333,335
Antimicrobial resistance - acquired	Penicillins (except temocillin), extended-spectrum β-lactams, carbapenems (through mechanisms other than commoner acquired carbapenemases), aminoglycosides, sulphonamides, quinolones.344,​[346]​ 	Most or all beta-lactams, carbapenems, polymyxins (rarely) (exact profile depends on particular carbapenemase and any co-produced ESBL).31,​[347]​	Quinolones, aminoglycosides, β-lactams (including carbapenems), polymyxins, tigecycline.330,​[348]​	Aminoglycosides, β-lactams (including carbapenems), monobactams, fluoroquinolones, polymyxins.345	Trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole (TMP/SMX).
Common acquired resistance enzymes	AmpC (intrinsic in Enterobacter), ESBLs (TEM, SHV, CTX-M). Various aminoglycoside-modifying enzymes (AMEs).	Carbapenemases (KPC, VIM, IMP, NDM).22 	Various aminoglycoside-modifying enzymes (AMEs) or ribosomal methyltransferase, class-D OXA type carbapenemases.330,​[349]​	 Metallo-β-lactamases (VIM and IMP).345 	sul genes (resistance to sulphonamide).
Mortality (bacteraemia)	Moderate/substantial increase in attributable mortality.342,​[350]​	Stark increase in attributable mortality.22,262,​[351]​	Minimal increase in attributable mortality.350	Moderate/substantial increase in attributable mortality depending on type of infection.350,​[352]​	Minimal increase in attributable mortality.​[353]​
Risk factors	Hospital: prolonged hospital stay, prior hospitalization, previous use of antibiotics, presence of indwelling catheters and mechanical ventilation.Community: older age, recurrent UTIs/prior invasive procedures (e.g. catheterisation), known faecal carriage, contact with healthcare facilities antimicrobial treatment.143	Prior antimicrobial use, length of stay, severity of illness, mechanical ventilation, admission to the ICU, high procedure score, presence of wounds, positive culture from a blood isolate, transfer between hospital units within the same hospital, prior surgery, prior hospital stay, proximity to other colonized infected patients, presence of a biliary catheter and recent transplantation.168 For NDM, prior hospitalisation on Indian subcontinent; for OXA-48 prior hospitalisation in Middle East.	(i) Major trauma, particularly burns, surgery, and battlefield injury (ii) previous antimicrobial therapy (iii) prolonged hospital and ICU stay (iv) mechanical ventilation, drainage tubes, and indwelling catheters (v) high prevalence of MDR Acinetobacter on the unit (vi) proximity to other colonized infected patients.330,349	(i) Prior use of antibiotics (ii) mechanical ventilation (iii) prolonged hospital and ICU stay (iv) co-morbidities e.g. cystic fibrosis, burns units.352,​[354]​	Severely compromised health status, malignancy, indwelling devices (such as intravascular catheters and ventilation tubes), exposure to broad-spectrum antimicrobials, long hospital stays, ICU stay.333,335
At-risk population	Patients in acute, long-term and community settings; patients travelling to areas of high-prevalence.56	Patients in acute settings, particularly those with recent travel to areas of high prevalence.22,​[355]​ 	Immunocompromised patients in the ICU and burns units;330 rare cause of community-acquired infection.334,​[356]​	Immunocompromised patients in the ICU and burns units, patients with cystic fibrosis;345 rare cause of community-acquired infection.337	Immunocompromised patients in the ICU; patients with cancer and cystic fibrosis; rare cause of community-acquired infection.333,​[357]​ 
Common international clones	E. coli ST131.with CTX-M ESBLs.19 	K. pneumoniae ST258 with KPC enzymes.19,22	International clones I–III.19,330	Clonal diversity.19 A few international high risk clones, e.g. ST111 (serotype O12) acquire multi-resistance. Spread of ST235 with VIM carbapenemase in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.	Clonal diversity.333,335
aExtended-spectrum β-lactamase.
bCarbapenem-producing Enterobacteriaceae.
cFrom a taxonomic viewpoint, three four species are virtually indistinguishable (A. baumannii, A. calcoaceticus, genomic species 3 and genomic species 13TU) so are grouped together as ‘A. calcoaceticus-A. baumannii (Acb) complex’; however, A. baumannii is by far the most important human pathogen in this group. However, since methods commonly used to speciate acinetobacters in the clinical laboratory are unable to distinguish these species, the relative contribution of each to the burden of human disease is difficult to establish. 





Infection prevention and surveillance by organism: recommendations by organism/resistance
Recommendation	Application in respect of
	Resistant Enterobacteriaceae (AmpC, ESBL & carbapenem-resistant organisms)	Multi-drug-resistant non-fermenters
		A. baumannii	P. aeruginosa
1,2. Laboratory test for susceptibility to meropenem for all significant Gram-negative isolates 	Test susceptibility to Meropenem + cefpodoxime	Test susceptibility to meropenem. Usually confined to ICU.	Test susceptibility to meropenem + ceftazidimeMost carbapenem resistance is via loss of OprD and is less important for infection control than carbapenemases. Carbenicillin and ceftazidime sensitivity indicates OprD loss. 
3. Request international travel history for patients with carbapenemase producing Gram negative bacteria	Find and record	Not usually required – local acquisition	Find and record
4. Diagnostics: detect and report all MDR Gram-negative organisms (≥3 resistance mechanisms) in clinical samples and screens in <48h	Early recognition and infection control intervention to reduce transmission	Early recognition and infection control intervention to reduce transmission	Early recognition and infection control intervention to reduce transmission
5. Active screening rather than monitoring of laboratory reports for high-risk specialities	Case finding/screening for carbapenemase for ICU and other high risk patients but not routinely recommended for ESBL/AmpC. 	In outbreaks, case finding/screening for ICU and other high risk patients. Otherwise monitor laboratory reports.	Poor evidence for screening– may be appropriate in high-risk units e.g. cystic fibrosis units, burns haematology units, or in context of outbreak.Sporadic and epidemic strains co-exist, so tracking of outbreaks may be problematic without typing unless there is a clear phenotype e.g. metallo-β-lactamase.
6. Risk assessment on admission to ICU and from long-term care facility 	Risk assess on admission for carriage of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae.ESBLs – not recommended but may be considered on admission from long stay units	Not recommended on admission except when outbreak in referring ward or hospital	Not recommended on admission except when outbreak in referring ward or hospital
7.8. Screen patients at risk for carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae	Screen patients assessed as at risk/coming from endemic settingsScreening not recommended for family contacts or staff 	Screen in outbreaksScreening not recommended for family contacts or staff 	Screen in outbreaksScreening not recommended for family contacts or staff 
9. Type of sample for screening	Rectal/stool 	Skin sites or if a catheter or endotracheal tube is present, urine, rectal or respiratory secretion. 	Rectal/stool 
10. Screen patients with stay in healthcare facility with endemic carbapenemase producing organisms in last year	Carbapenem-resistant -targeted screening of patients with history of healthcare in high-risk areas i.e endemic not just sporadic cases e.g. India, Manchester in UK. 	Carbapenem-resistant -targeted screening of patients with history of healthcare in high-risk areas i.e. based on local knowledge of referring centres. 	Carbapenem-resistant -targeted screening of patients with history of healthcare in high-risk areas i.e. based on local knowledge of referring centres. 
11. Monitor SICP and Contact Precautions during outbreaks; repeat screening of negative patients weekly and on discharge until no new cases for 7 days.	Carbapenem-resistant – during outbreak screen all patient contacts in ward of a new case	Carbapenem-resistant – during outbreak consider screening all patient contacts in bay/ward of non- isolated case. No evidence for regular admission, ongoing or discharge screening except in outbreaks	No high quality evidence for patient contact screening, but consider screening of all patient contacts in bay/ward in outbreak. No evidence for regular admission, ongoing or discharge screening except in outbreaks
12. Screen at admission those with previous carbapenem-resistant or other MDR Gram-negative bacteria 	Screen all with known previous carriage or infection	Screen all with known previous carriage or infection	Screen all with known previous carriage or infection
13. Contact precautions for patients who present an infection risk	Carbapenem resistant - pre-emptive isolation of previous positive patients pending screeningRestrict unnecessary patient movements where possible.	Carbapenem resistant organisms pre-emptive isolation of high risk patients pending screeningRestrict unnecessary patient movements where possible.	No evidence for pre-emptive isolation. Extrapolation from evidence for other multi-resistant organisms suggests that isolation or cohorting of known cases with contact precautions and restrictions on unnecessary movement are appropriate
14. Patients colonized with MDR Gram-negative organisms in single room for duration of stay	No recommendations for tests of clearance – assume long -term carriage during the same inpatient stay 	No recommendation for test of clearance 	No recommendation for test of clearance 
15. Personal protective equipment: Use disposable gloves and gown/apron in caring for patients.	Apron/gown and gloves for all patient interactions. No requirement for facemasks or respirators.	Use apron/gown and gloves for all patient interactions, No requirement for facemasks or respirators.	Apron/gown and gloves for all patient interactions. No evidence for the effectiveness of respiratory precautions except for patient to patient spread by droplet nuclei in cystic fibrosis patients
16. Prioritise single room accommodation. (Local risk assessment to determine priority against other pathogens but carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae usually higher than C difficile or MRSA)	First priority: Carbapenem-resistant EnterobacteriaceaeCarbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacae: single room, preferably with en-suite facilities, throughout admission. All other patients with mulitresistant Enterobacteriaceae should be isolated where possible according to assessment of risk of spread, otherwise contact precautions.	Second priority: Carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter spThese are usually confined to ICU. Carbapenem-resistant: single room, preferably with en-suite facilities, throughout admissionOther MDR Acinetobacter: room if available.	Third priority: Carbapenemase- producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Other MDR Pseudomonas (e.g. permeability variant) use single room if available. 
17. Cohort isolate if insufficient single rooms	Consider cohorting patients whose isolates have the same phenotypic resistance pattern. Consider staff cohorting where feasible and education of staff in infection control	Consider cohorting patients whose isolates have the same phenotypic resistance mechanism. Level of evidence for staff cohorting low. 	Extrapolation from other infections suggests their staff cohorting may be useful in controlling outbreaks 
18. Hand hygiene before and after direct patient contact	Contact precautions; ensure high awareness of need for attention to hand hygiene, especially with soap and water. 	Contact precautions and high awareness of hand hygiene, especially with soap and water.	Low level evidence. Ensure high awareness of need for attention to hand hygiene, especially with soap and water.
19. Environmental screening when unexplained transmission	Persistence in environment in wet areas and respiratory equipment.	Environmental persistence, particularly in dust and dry surfaces. Bed rails, bed side tables, hygroscopic bandages, HEPA filters and extract vents implicated.	Association with persistently colonized water systems e.g. taps, filters, aerators, sink traps. Screening of tap outlets in augmented care areas according to local risk assessment.Outbreaks associated with contamination of ventilator equipment 
20. Decontaminate equipment in designated cleaning sinks	Indirect evidence for transmission via equipment	Some evidence for transmission through equipment	Evidence for transmission through equipment contamination e.g. ventilators, demonstrates importance of dedicated & single use equipment and decontamination of reusable equipment by appropriate agents. 
21. Risk assess point of use filters for taps if rising P aeruginosa colonization/infection 	Not applicable	Not applicable	Effective in reducing infection but need monthly replacement
22. Terminal disinfection with hypochlorite in outbreak control	Increase cleaning frequency to at least twice daily and every 4 hours for high contact surfaces 	Increase cleaning frequency to at least twice daily and every 4 hours for high contact surfaces 	Some evidence that cleaning protocols have role for controlling spread in outbreak settings 
23. Consider hydrogen peroxide vapour as adjunct to cleaning	Effective in reducing reservoirs	Effective in reducing reservoirs	Effective in reducing reservoirs on surfaces but not taps or sink traps
24. Routine use of selective digestive decontamination not recommended	Not normally recommended as contrary to antibiotic stewardship.	Not recommended	Not normally recommended as contrary to antibiotic stewardship. 





11	Appendix 1 - Glossary
Active surveillance: admission regimen that involves testing of patients to detect the presence of multi-resistant organisms
AmpC β--lactamases: clinically important cephalosporinases encoded by the chromosomes of many Enterobacteriaceae or (less often) by plasmids. High-level expression confers resistance to penicillins (except temocillin), cephalosporins (except cefepime), aztreonam and penicillin- β-lactamase inhibitor combinations.
Antimicrobial: A substance that kills or inhibits the growth of microorganisms
Augmented care area: units where medical/nursing procedures render the patients susceptible to invasive disease from environmental and opportunistic pathogens e.g. critical care, neonatal, burns, and haematological wards. 
Bacteraemia: The presence of micro-organisms in the blood stream
Beta-lactamases: Enzymes (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Enzyme" \o "Enzyme​) produced by some bacteria that confer resistance (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Antibiotic_resistance" \o "Antibiotic resistance​) to β-lactam antibiotics (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​%CE%92-Lactam_antibiotic" \o "Β-Lactam antibiotic​) such as penicillins (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Penicillin" \o "Penicillin​) and cephalosporins (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Cephamycin" \o "Cephamycin​), by breaking down the central structure of the antibiotic.
Carbapenemases: These are β-lactamases that inactivate carbapenems such as meropenem; most also attack and confer resistance to penicillins and cephalosporins 
Care area: any portion of a healthcare facility where patients are intended to be examined or treated.
Cleaning: Methods that physically remove soil, dust and dirt from surfaces or equipment. 
Cohorting: imposed grouping within an area of a hospital ward of patients or staff potentially exposed to designated diseases. 
Colonization: Situation whereby microorganisms establish themselves in a particular environment, such as a body surface, without producing disease
Community-acquired: infection or colonization that is acquired outside of hospitals. 
Community-associated: usually defined as infection or colonization detected in an outpatient or within 48 hours of hospital admission.
Contact precautions: hand hygiene is performed before touching patient and prior to wearing gloves and wear gloves when touching the patient and the patient’s environment. A single room is preferred or otherwise discussion with infection control personnel to consider cohort or not moving the patient. An apron/gown is worn for all patient interactions that may involve contact with the patient or potentially contaminated areas in the patient’s environment. Donning personal protective equipment on room entry and discarding before exiting the patient room is required to contain pathogens, especially those that have been implicated in transmission through environmental contamination.173

ESBL extended-spectrum β--lactamase: β-Lactamases that attack cephalosporins with an oxyimino side chain, for example, cefotaxime (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Cefotaxime" \o "Cefotaxime​), ceftriaxone (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Ceftriaxone" \o "Ceftriaxone​), and ceftazidime (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Ceftazidime" \o "Ceftazidime​), as well as the oxyimino-monobactam aztreonam (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Aztreonam" \o "Aztreonam​). Unlike AmpC -lactamases (q.v.) they are inhibited by clavulanic acid and tazobactam and unlike carbapenemases (q.v.) they do not attack carbapenems
Healthcare (hospital) -acquired: infection or colonization detected in an inpatient more than 48 hours after hospital admission.
Healthcare (hospital) –associated: usually defined as infection or colonization detected in an inpatient more than 48 hours after hospital admission.
High-risk – used to describe those patients or facilities where the risk of acquiring infection is in the upper 10% of the total patient population 
Infection: Invasion by and multiplication of pathogenic microorganisms in the body, producing tissue injury and disease, requiring treatment.

Long-term care facility (care home/nursing home) provides accommodation and meets the needs of patients with chronic illness or disability who cannot care for themselves. 
Multi-drug resistant (MDR) Gram-negative bacteria are bacteria resistant to at least three different antibiotics. 
Outbreak: at least two similar (i.e. not distinct) cases related in time and place 
Passive surveillance: Review of routine clinical samples of all patients by microbiologists on reporting results from the laboratory.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) refers to the equipment a person wears to protect themselves from risks to their health or safety, including exposure to infections. PPE includes, for example; disposable gloves and disposable aprons. 
Porins: These are proteins (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Proteins" \o "Proteins​) that span the outer membrane of Gram-negative bacteria and mycobacteria forming pores that allow the entry of small water-soluble molecules (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Molecules" \o "Molecules​), including antibiotics.
Screening of patients: sampling potential colonization sites for MDR Gram-negative pathogens.
Selective decontamination: The prophylactic use of topical and systemic antibiotics to remove pathogenic organisms from the gastrointestinal tract to reduce the incidence of respiratory tract infections.






The subject was identified by the Scientific Development Committee of the Healthcare Infection Society in February 2011 and approved by HIS in May 2011. The BSAC Council agreed a similar proposal at the same time. BIA Council agreed to join in September 2011. The members were chosen to reflect the range of stakeholders and not limited to members of the three Societies. The questions were decided at the first meeting of the Group in November 2011 from issues presented to the members and patient representatives by staff and patients in the preceding months. Each was debated by the Group before adoption. Enhance Reviews was paid for the serach and data extraction. Working Party members were not paid except for travel expenses.
12.2	Conflict of Interests
Conflicts of interest were registered at the outset and renewed during the process. They are stated in the Report. In the event of a potential conflict being identified, the Working Party agreed that the member should not contribute to the section affected. 
12.3	Infection Control -Systematic Review Process
12.3.1	PICO: 
Patients: All patient groups were included. The guideline is careful not to make recommendations which may prejudice clinical care based on gender, age, ethnicity or socio-economic status. 
Interventions: interventions were identified in the literature to generate intervention specific recommendations
Comparisons: comparisons between intervention and standard management were used; 




1.	What is the definition of MDR Gram-negative bacilli? 
2.	What Gram-negative bacilli cause infection control problems?
3.	What are the relative contributions of community and hospital acquisition?
4.	What is the evidence for reservoir and spread of mulitresistant Gram-negatives in Care Homes and secondary care?
5.	What is the role of agricultural use of sewage and antibiotic treatment in veterinary practice in spreading ESBL?
6.	What insights has national E. coli bacteraemia surveillance provided?
7.	What is the role for screening in patients and staff?
8.	What organisms should screening include?
9.	Who, how and when to screen patients for MDR Gram-negative bacilli?
10.	What can be done concerning patients unable to consent to a rectal swab?
11.	How frequently does screening need to be performed?
12.	Is there evidence for effective interventions on positive patients i.e. can carriage be cleared? 
13.	Selective decontamination: Why is it not used? Is there a role?
14.	When should the environment be sampled?
15.	What is the evidence that respiratory equipment contributes to transmission?
16.	What national surveillance is performed and how should it be developed?
17.	What is the evidence that sensor taps contribute to transmission?
18.	Is there any cleaning method more effective than others at removing the MDR Gram-negative bacilli from the environment?
19.	What is the evidence that infection control precautions prevent transmission?
20.	 Are standard infection control measures sufficient to stop transmission? 
21.	What are the minimum standards to stop spread in public areas, primary care or care homes? 
22.	Is there evidence for high/low risk areas within a healthcare facility?
23.	Are there any organisational structures within a healthcare facility that play a role in the successful control of multi-resistant Gram-negative bacilli?
24.	How should we undertake local screening, why is it important and how should it be interpreted?
25.	At what point should passive surveillance switch to active surveillance i.e. screening?
26.	What is the role of isolation in the care home/hospital settings?
27.	Is there evidence of differences between organisms in respect of transmission, morbidity and mortality: 
12.4	Antimicrobial Chemotherapy -Systematic Review Process
12.4.1	Systematic Review Questions
1.	What is the clinical importance of carbapenemases versus Amp C and CTX-M strains? 
2.	What impact have returning travellers made on UK epidemiology?
3.	What is the global epidemiology of MDR-GNR?
4.	How do MDR Enterobacteriaceae differ from the non-fermenters in terms of their prevalence and associated resistance genes?
5.	What is the efficacy of carbapenems, mecillinam, temocillin, fosfomycin and colistin against specific pathogens?
6.	What are the recommended antibiotics for community/secondary/tertiary care?
7.	What is the threshold level of resistance for changing choice of empirical treatment for urinary infection? 

12.5	Databases and Search terms Used 23/5/14​[358]​
Databases
The Cochrane Library; MEDLINE; EMBASE; CINAHL
MeSH Terms see Appendix 1
Free text terms. See Appendix 1
Search Date: Medline 1946-2014; Embase 1980-2012; CINAHL (1984-2012)
Search Results (Fig 1)
Total number of articles located after duplicates removed = 2523
Sift 1 Criteria
Abstract screening: Systematic review, primary research, infection relates to MDR Gram-negative infection, informs one or more review question
Articles Retrieved
Total number of studies selected = 597
Sift 2 Criteria
Full text confirms that the article is primary research (randomised controlled trial, non-randomised controlled trials, controlled before and after studies, interrupted time series, case control study, case series, prospective cohort, systematic review; informs one or more of the review questions.

Articles selected for appraisal (10 full text publications could not be retrieved)
Total number of studies selected = 49
Critical appraisal
Articles presenting primary research or a systematic review and meeting the sift criteria were critically appraised by two reviewers using SIGN and EPOC criteria. Consensus was achieved through discussion
Accepted and Rejected Evidence
No meta analyses were available
Accepted after critical appraisal 49




13	Appendix 3: Consultation stakeholders
Antimicrobial Resistance and Hospital Acquired Infection 
Advisory Committee (ARHAI) 
British Medical Association
British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 
British Infection Society 
C Diff Support
European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases
Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine
Foundation Trust Network
Hand Hygiene Alliance
Healthcare Infection Society 





NHS Trust Development Authority
Patient’s Association
Public Health England/ Wales/ Scotland/ Northern Ireland 
Royal College of Pathologists 
Royal College of General Practitioners
Royal College of Nursing 
Royal College of Physicians 
Royal College of Surgeons 
Service User Research Forum Healthcare acquired Infections 




14	Appendix 4: CPD material
1.	In deciding which patients to screen for carbapenem resistant organisms which two groups should take priority:
a)	Admitted to Intensive Care
b)	Admitted to Surgical ward
c)	Admitted from Long term care facility














3.	To prevent spread of MDR Gram-negative pathogens:
a.	Assess all patients for risk of infection on arrival 
b.	Maintain standard infection control precautions in only those patients at high risk 
c.	Do not discard body fluids into hand basins
d.	Minimise invasive medical device use
e.	Audit and feedback staff compliance 

A C D E


15	Appendix 5: Working Party Scope
Joint BSAC/HIS Working Party on Multi-resistant Gram-negative bacteria








To examine and make recommendations both for treatment and prevention of transmission of multi-resistant-Gram-negative infections, resulting in the publication of guidelines on:
A	Current epidemiology and infection control issues.
B	Therapeutic issues and antibiotic guidance for treating infections caused by multi-resistant Gram-negatives.
3.	Clinical need for the guideline
3.1	Epidemiology
	There are a rising number of MDR Gram-negative infections in critical care units and the dual problems of finding an appropriate antibiotic and preventing spread. 
	ARHAI has recently produced brief guidelines on infection control and treatment options for these infections. 
	There was a significant interest attracted by the May 2010 BSAC conference examining the lack of development of new antibiotics effective against Gram-negative bacteria.
	The recent outbreaks of Gram-negative infections related to infrared taps in neonatal units causing cross infections and deaths led to the Department of Health’s decision to review advice on tap design. 
	The Department of Health’s recognised that whilst control of MRSA and C difficile has been relatively successful, Gram-negative infections have continued to increase. Consequent to this is the surveillance subcommittee of ARHAI recommendation that E. coli bacteraemia be included in mandatory reporting from April 2011, a recommendation that has received ministerial approval. 
	Outbreaks of multi-resistant Acinetobacter spp. have been very troublesome in critical care units from time to time but control measures appear poorly effective. 

3.2	Current practice
Members of BSAC and HIS, with the knowledge of the Councils of each, have been discussing the issues surrounding the recent increase in infections with multi-resistant Gram-negative bacteria in UK hospitals. 

Following discussions and consideration of the forthcoming ARHAI report we now believe it an appropriate time to set up a Joint Working Party to look at making authoritative recommendations both for treatment and prevention of transmission of these infections.
4.	The guideline
The guideline development process is described on the NICE website. The scope defines what the guideline will and will not examine and what the guideline developers will consider. The scope is based on the referral from the three Societies.
4.1	Population
4.1.1	Groups that will be covered
a)	Adults
b)	Children over 1 month old
c)	Particular consideration given to patients of 65 years and older, people at high risk of acquiring multi-resistant bacteria such as those requiring care in hospital settings




a)	All settings in which NHS care is received
4.3	Clinical management
4.3.1	Key clinical issues that will be covered
a)	Consideration will be given to laboratory testing and susceptibility testing, although only screening and confirmatory tests available in a general microbiology laboratory and not those limited to reference laboratories. 
b)	The use of antibiotic combinations in the therapy of infections will be considered, particularly oral combinations that can be used in the outpatient setting. 
c)	Mainly infections in critical and non-critical care patients in secondary care. However the same general principles would apply in community settings, particularly in areas where inappropriate treatment is encouraging selection.
4.3.2	Clinical issues that will not be covered
A)	Children younger than 1 month (neonates). This group has physiologically different needs and care is very specialised. 
B)	people with cystic fibrosis, who need specialised care
C)	people , who receive community health care in nursing homes
4.4	Main outcomes
Outputs will be the production of guidelines, which will be approved via a process of national consultation. The intention is to inform and guide practice but also to highlight areas where more research is needed. The following will be produced and published as indicated:
a)	Current epidemiology and infection control issues – Journal of Hospital Infection
b)	Therapeutic issues and antibiotic guidance for treating infections caused by multi-resistant Gram-negatives – Journal of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy
c)	In addition, it is expected that each Journal will carry a leading article or review article on the guidance that is published by the joint society.
d)	The Working Party will follow the SIGN process when developing guidance including the hosting of a national stakeholder meeting as part of the national stakeholder consultation process. 

4.5	Economic aspects






The work will start in October 2011.

5.	Patient Representation And Equality 





16	Appendix 6. Search Strategy
CINAHL (January 1984-December 2012)

# 	Query 	Results 
S83 	S48 AND S82 	275
S82 	S55 OR S56 OR S81 	515,966
S81 	S57 or S58 or S59 or S60 or S61 or S62 or S63 or S64 or S65 or S66 or S67 or S68 or S69 or S70 or S71 or S72 or S73 or S74 or S75 or S76 or S77 or S78 or S79 or S80 	471,263
S80 	TI ( (time points n3 over) or (time points n3 multiple) or (time points n3 three) or (time points n3 four) or (time points n3 five) or (time points n3 six) or (time points n3 seven) or (time points n3 eight) or (time points n3 nine) or (time points n3 ten) or (time points n3 eleven) or (time points n3 twelve) or (time points n3 month*) or (time points n3 hour*) or (time points n3 day*) or (time points n3 ‘more than’) ) or AB ( (time points n3 over) or (time points n3 multiple) or (time points n3 three) or (time points n3 four) or (time points n3 five) or (time points n3 six) or (time points n3 seven) or (time points n3 eight) or (time points n3 nine) or (time points n3 ten) or (time points n3 eleven) or (time points n3 twelve) or (time points n3 month*) or (time points n3 hour*) or (time points n3 day*) or (time points n3 ‘more than’) ) 	1,527
S79 	TI ( (control w3 area) or (control w3 cohort*) or (control w3 compar*) or (control w3 condition) or (control w3 group*) or (control w3 intervention*) or (control w3 participant*) or (control w3 study) ) or AB ( (control w3 area) or (control w3 cohort*) or (control w3 compar*) or (control w3 condition) or (control w3 group*) or (control w3 intervention*) or (control w3 participant*) or (control w3 study) ) 	45,564
S78 	TI ( multicentre or multicenter or multi-centre or multi-center ) or AB random* 	101,899
S77 	TI random* OR controlled 	94,669
S76 	TI ( trial or (study n3 aim) or ‘our study’ ) or AB ( (study n3 aim) or ‘our study’ ) 	87,121
S75 	TI ( pre-workshop or preworkshop or post-workshop or postworkshop or (before n3 workshop) or (after n3 workshop) ) or AB ( pre-workshop or preworkshop or post-workshop or postworkshop or (before n3 workshop) or (after n3 workshop) ) 	283
S74 	TI ( demonstration project OR demonstration projects OR preimplement* or pre-implement* or post-implement* or postimplement* ) or AB ( demonstration project OR demonstration projects OR preimplement* or pre-implement* or post-implement* or postimplement* ) 	1,290
S73 	(intervention n6 clinician*) or (intervention n6 community) or (intervention n6 complex) or (intervention n6 design*) or (intervention n6 doctor*) or (intervention n6 educational) or (intervention n6 family doctor*) or (intervention n6 family physician*) or (intervention n6 family practitioner*) or (intervention n6 financial) or (intervention n6 GP) or (intervention n6 general practice*) Or (intervention n6 hospital*) or (intervention n6 impact*) Or (intervention n6 improv*) or (intervention n6 individualize*) Or (intervention n6 individualise*) or (intervention n6 individualizing) or (intervention n6 individualising) or (intervention n6 interdisciplin*) or (intervention n6 multicomponent) or (intervention n6 multi-component) or (intervention n6 multidisciplin*) or (intervention n6 multi-disciplin*) or (intervention n6 multifacet*) or (intervention n6 multi-facet*) or (intervention n6 multimodal*) or (intervention n6 multi-modal*) or (intervention n6 personalize*) or(intervention n6 personalise*) or (intervention n6 personalizing) or (intervention n6 personalising) or (intervention n6 pharmaci*) or (intervention n6 pharmacist*) or (intervention n6 pharmacy) or (intervention n6 physician*) or (intervention n6 practitioner*) Or (intervention n6 prescrib*) or (intervention n6 prescription*) or (intervention n6 primary care) or (intervention n6 professional*) or (intervention* n6 provider*) or (intervention* n6 regulatory) or (intervention n6 regulatory) or (intervention n6 tailor*) or (intervention n6 target*) or (intervention n6 team*) or (intervention n6 usual care) 	23,198
S72 	TI ( collaborativ* or collaboration* or tailored or personalised or personalized ) or AB ( collaborativ* or collaboration* or tailored or personalised or personalized ) 	38,021
S71 	TI pilot 	13,958
S70 	(MH ‘Pilot Studies’) 	36,433
S69 	AB ‘before-and-after’ 	17,437
S68 	AB time series 	1,670
S67 	TI time series 	359
S66 	AB ( before* n10 during or before n10 after ) or AU ( before* n10 during or before n10 after ) 	32,982
S65 	TI ( (time point*) or (period* n4 interrupted) or (period* n4 multiple) or (period* n4 time) or (period* n4 various) or (period* n4 varying) or (period* n4 week*) or (period* n4 month*) or (period* n4 year*) ) or AB ( (time point*) or (period* n4 interrupted) or (period* n4 multiple) or (period* n4 time) or (period* n4 various) or (period* n4 varying) or (period* n4 week*) or (period* n4 month*) or (period* n4 year*) ) 	51,050
S64 	TI ( ( quasi-experiment* or quasiexperiment* or quasi-random* or quasirandom* or quasi control* or quasicontrol* or quasi* W3 method* or quasi* W3 study or quasi* W3 studies or quasi* W3 trial or quasi* W3 design* or experimental W3 method* or experimental W3 study or experimental W3 studies or experimental W3 trial or experimental W3 design* ) ) or AB ( ( quasi-experiment* or quasiexperiment* or quasi-random* or quasirandom* or quasi control* or quasicontrol* or quasi* W3 method* or quasi* W3 study or quasi* W3 studies or quasi* W3 trial or quasi* W3 design* or experimental W3 method* or experimental W3 study or experimental W3 studies or experimental W3 trial or experimental W3 design* ) ) 	12,758
S63 	TI pre w7 post or AB pre w7 post 	9,367
S62 	MH ‘Multiple Time Series’ or MH ‘Time Series’ 	1,312
S61 	TI ( (comparative N2 study) or (comparative N2 studies) or evaluation study or evaluation studies ) or AB ( (comparative N2 study) or (comparative N2 studies) or evaluation study or evaluation studies ) 	11,680
S60 	MH Experimental Studies or Community Trials or Community Trials or Pretest-Posttest Design + or Quasi-Experimental Studies + Pilot Studies or Policy Studies + Multicenter Studies 	34,567
S59 	TI ( pre-test* or pretest* or posttest* or post-test* ) or AB ( pre-test* or pretest* or posttest* or ‘post test* ) OR TI ( preimplement*’ or pre-implement* ) or AB ( pre-implement* or preimplement* ) 	6,868
S58 	TI ( intervention* or multiintervention* or multi-intervention* or postintervention* or post-intervention* or preintervention* or pre-intervention* ) or AB ( intervention* or multiintervention* or multi-intervention* or postintervention* or post-intervention* or preintervention* or pre-intervention* ) 	151,748
S57 	(MH ‘Quasi-Experimental Studies’) 	5,747
S56 	(TI (systematic* n3 review*)) or (AB (systematic* n3 review*)) or (TI (systematic* n3 bibliographic*)) or (AB (systematic* n3 bibliographic*)) or (TI (systematic* n3 literature)) or (AB (systematic* n3 literature)) or (TI (systematic* n3 review*)) or (AB (systematic* n3 review*)) or (TI (comprehensive* n3 literature)) or (AB (comprehensive* n3 literature)) or (TI (comprehensive* n3 bibliographic*)) or (AB (comprehensive* n3 bibliographic*)) or (JN ‘Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews’) or (TI (information n2 synthesis)) or (TI (data n2 synthesis)) or (AB (information n2 synthesis)) or (AB (data n2 synthesis)) or (TI (data n2 extract*)) or (AB (data n2 extract*)) or (TI (medline or pubmed or psyclit or cinahl or (psycinfo not ‘psycinfo database’) or ‘web of science’ or scopus or embase)) or (AB (medline or pubmed or psyclit or cinahl or (psycinfo not ‘psycinfo database’) or ‘web of science’ or scopus or embase)) or (MH ‘Systematic Review’) or (MH ‘Meta Analysis’) or (TI (meta-analy* or metaanaly*)) or (AB (meta-analy* or metaanaly*)) 	59,817
S55 	S49 OR S50 OR S51 OR S52 OR S53 OR S54 	158,596
S54 	TI ( ‘control* N1 clinical’ or ‘control* N1 group*’ or ‘control* N1 trial*’ or ‘control* N1 study’ or ‘control* N1 studies’ or ‘control* N1 design*’ or ‘control* N1 method*’ ) or AB ( ‘control* N1 clinical’ or ‘control* N1 group*’ or ‘control* N1 trial*’ or ‘control* N1 study’ or ‘control* N1 studies’ or ‘control* N1 design*’ or ‘control* N1 method*’ ) 	1
S53 	TI controlled or AB controlled 	68,638
S52 	TI random* or AB random* 	117,418
S51 	TI ( ‘clinical study’ or ‘clinical studies’ ) or AB ( ‘clinical study’ or ‘clinical studies’ ) 	7,969
S50 	(MM ‘Clinical Trials+’) 	10,670
S49 	TI ( (multicent* n2 design*) or (multicent* n2 study) or (multicent* n2 studies) or (multicent* n2 trial*) ) or AB ( (multicent* n2 design*) or (multicent* n2 study) or (multicent* n2 studies) or (multicent* n2 trial*) ) 	8,917
S48 	S18 AND S21 AND S47 	917
S47 	S22 OR S23 OR S24 OR S25 OR S26 OR S27 OR S28 OR S29 OR S30 OR S31 OR S32 OR S33 OR S34 OR S35 OR S36 OR S37 OR S38 OR S39 OR S40 OR S41 OR S42 OR S43 OR S44 OR S45 OR S46 	16,726
S46 	TI ( (belcomycin or colicort or colimycin* or colisitin or colisticin or Colistin or colistine or colomycin or (coly n1 mycin) or colymicin or colymycin or coly-mycin or multimycin or (Polymyxin n1 E) or totazina) ) OR AB ( (belcomycin or colicort or colimycin* or colisitin or colisticin or Colistin or colistine or colomycin or (coly n1 mycin) or colymicin or colymycin or coly-mycin or multimycin or (Polymyxin n1 E) or totazina) ) 	171
S45 	(MH ‘Colistin’) 	134
S44 	TI ( ((amdinocillin n1 pivoxil) or (FL n1 ‘1039’) or FL1039 or fl1039 or FL-1039 or pivamdinocillin or Pivmecillinam or Selexid or coactabs or (ro n1 ‘109071’) or (ro10 n1 ‘9071’) or ro109071) ) OR AB ( ((amdinocillin n1 pivoxil) or (FL n1 ‘1039’) or FL1039 or fl1039 or FL-1039 or pivamdinocillin or Pivmecillinam or Selexid or coactabs or (ro n1 ‘109071’) or (ro10 n1 ‘9071’) or ro109071) ) 	13
S43 	TI ( ((Cephalosporanic n1 Acid*) or Cephalosporin* or Cefamandole or Cefoperazone or Cefazolin or Cefonicid or Cefsulodin or Cephacetrile or Cefotaxime or Cephalothin or Cephapirin or Cephalexin or Cefaclor or Cefadroxil or Cephaloglycin or Cephradine or Cephaloridine or Ceftazidime or Cephamycins or Cefmetazole or Cefotetan or Cefoxitin) ) OR AB ( ((Cephalosporanic n1 Acid*) or Cephalosporin* or Cefamandole or Cefoperazone or Cefazolin or Cefonicid or Cefsulodin or Cephacetrile or Cefotaxime or Cephalothin or Cephapirin or Cephalexin or Cefaclor or Cefadroxil or Cephaloglycin or Cephradine or Cephaloridine or Ceftazidime or Cephamycins or Cefmetazole or Cefotetan or Cefoxitin) ) 	1,569
S42 	TI ( (Axepim* or bmy 28142 or bmy28142 or BMY-28142 or Cefepim* or cefepitax or ceficad or cepimax or forzyn beta or maxcef or maxfrom or maxipime or Quadrocef) ) OR AB ( (Axepim* or bmy 28142 or bmy28142 or BMY-28142 or Cefepim* or cefepitax or ceficad or cepimax or forzyn beta or maxcef or maxfrom or maxipime or Quadrocef) ) 	171
S41 	(MH ‘Cephalosporins+’) 	2,105
S40 	TI ( (berkfurin or biofurin or chemiofuran or dantafur or f 30 or f30 or fua-med or furaben or furadantin* or furadantoin or furadina or furadoine or furadonin or furadonine or furalan or furanpur or furantocompren or furantoin* or furobactina or furofen or furophen or infurin or ituran or ivadantin or macrobid or macrodantin* or macrofuran or macrofurin or micofurantin* or mitrofuratoin or nephronex or nierofu or nifurantin or nifuryl or (nitro n1 macro) or nitrofuracin or nitrofuradantoin or nitrofurantine or nitrofurantoin* or nitrofurin or novofuran or nsc 2107 or nsc2107 or orafuran or parfuran or phenurin or (potassium n1 furagin) or ralodantin or trocurine or urantin or (uro n1 tablinen) or urodil or urodin or urofuran or urolong or urotablinen or uro-tablinen or urotoina or uvamin) ) OR AB ( (berkfurin or biofurin or chemiofuran or dantafur or f 30 or f30 or fua-med or furaben or furadantin* or furadantoin or furadina or furadoine or furadonin or furadonine or furalan or furanpur or furantocompren or furantoin* or furobactina or furofen or furophen or infurin or ituran or ivadantin or macrobid or macrodantin* or macrofuran or macrofurin or micofurantin* or mitrofuratoin or nephronex or nierofu or nifurantin or nifuryl or (nitro n1 macro) or nitrofuracin or nitrofuradantoin or nitrofurantine or nitrofurantoin* or nitrofurin or novofuran or nsc 2107 or nsc2107 or orafuran or parfuran or phenurin or (potassium n1 furagin) or ralodantin or trocurine or urantin or (uro n1 tablinen) or urodil or urodin or urofuran or urolong or urotablinen or uro-tablinen or urotoina or uvamin) ) 	325
S39 	TI ( ((az n1 threonam) or azactam or azenam or azthreonam or aztreonam or (corus n1 ‘1020’) or dynabiotic or primbactam or SQ 26,776 or sq 26,776 or sq 26776 or SQ-26,776 or sq26776 or sq-26776 or urobactam) ) OR AB ( ((az n1 threonam) or azactam or azenam or azthreonam or aztreonam or (corus n1 ‘1020’) or dynabiotic or primbactam or SQ 26,776 or sq 26,776 or sq 26776 or SQ-26,776 or sq26776 or sq-26776 or urobactam) ) 	96
S38 	(MH ‘Aztreonam’) 	54
S37 	TI ( (fosfocil or fosfocin or fosfocina or fosfomicin or fosfomycin or fosfonomycin or ‘mk 0955’ or mk 955 or mk0955 or mk955 or monuril or phosphomycin or phosphonomycin) ) OR AB ( (fosfocil or fosfocin or fosfocina or fosfomicin or fosfomycin or fosfonomycin or ‘mk 0955’ or mk 955 or mk0955 or mk955 or monuril or phosphomycin or phosphonomycin) ) 	57
S36 	TI ( (akacin or akicin or amicacina or amicasil or amicin or amiglymide v or amikacin* or amikafur or amikalem or amikan or amikayect or amikin or amiklin or amikozit or amiktam or amitracin or amixin or amukin or apalin or bb k 8 or bb k8 or bbk 8 or bb-k 8 or bbk8 or bbk-8 or bb-k8 or biclin or biklin or biokacin or briclin or briklin or chemacin or cinmik or fabianol or gamikal or glukamin or kacinth-a or kanbine or kormakin or likacin or lukadin or miacin or mikasome or onikin or oprad or orlobin or pediakin or pierami or riklinak or savox or selaxa or selemycin or sulfate amikacin or tybikin or vs 107 or vs107 or yectamid) ) OR AB ( (akacin or akicin or amicacina or amicasil or amicin or amiglymide v or amikacin* or amikafur or amikalem or amikan or amikayect or amikin or amiklin or amikozit or amiktam or amitracin or amixin or amukin or apalin or bb k 8 or bb k8 or bbk 8 or bb-k 8 or bbk8 or bbk-8 or bb-k8 or biclin or biklin or biokacin or briclin or briklin or chemacin or cinmik or fabianol or gamikal or glukamin or kacinth-a or kanbine or kormakin or likacin or lukadin or miacin or mikasome or onikin or oprad or orlobin or pediakin or pierami or riklinak or savox or selaxa or selemycin or sulfate amikacin or tybikin or vs 107 or vs107 or yectamid) ) 	342
S35 	(MH ‘Amikacin’) 	140
S34 	TI ( (adelanin or alcomicin or apigent or apogen or apoten or azupel or bactiderm or biogaracin or bristagen or cidomycin or danigen or dermogen or dianfarma or dispagent or duragentam* or epigent or (frieso n1 gent) or garabiotic or garalone or garamicin* or garamycin or garbilocin or gencin or gendril or genoptic or genrex or gensumycin or gentabiotic or gentabiox or gentac or gentacidin or gentacin or gentacor or gentacycol or gentacyl or gentafair or gentagram or gentak or gental or gentaline or gentalline or gentalol or gentalyn or gentamax or gentame* or gentamicin* or gentamina or gentamycin* or gentamyl or gentamytrex or gentaplus or gentarad or gentasil or gentasol or gentasone or gentasporin or gentatrim or gentavet or genticin* or genticyn or gentiderm or gentimycin or gentocin or gentogram or gentomycin or genum or geomycine or gevramycin or g-mycin or gmyticin or g-myticin or grammicin or hexamycin or jenamicin or konigen or lacromycin or lisagent or martigenta or migenta or miragenta or miramycin or nichogencin or nsc 82261 or nsc82261 or obogen or ocugenta or ocu-mycin or oftagen or ophtagram or opthagen or optigen or opti-genta or ottogenta or pyogenta or refobacin or ribomicin or rigaminol or rocy gen or rovixida or rupegen or sagestam or sch 9724 or sch9724 or sedanazin or servigenta or skinfect or sulmycin or tangyn or u-gencin or versigen or yectamicina) ) OR AB ( (adelanin or alcomicin or apigent or apogen or apoten or azupel or bactiderm or biogaracin or bristagen or cidomycin or danigen or dermogen or dianfarma or dispagent or duragentam* or epigent or (frieso n1 gent) or garabiotic or garalone or garamicin* or garamycin or garbilocin or gencin or gendril or genoptic or genrex or gensumycin or gentabiotic or gentabiox or gentac or gentacidin or gentacin or gentacor or gentacycol or gentacyl or gentafair or gentagram or gentak or gental or gentaline or gentalline or gentalol or gentalyn or gentamax or gentame* or gentamicin* or gentamina or gentamycin* or gentamyl or gentamytrex or gentaplus or gentarad or gentasil or gentasol or gentasone or gentasporin or gentatrim or gentavet or genticin* or genticyn or gentiderm or gentimycin or gentocin or gentogram or gentomycin or genum or geomycine or gevramycin or g-mycin or gmyticin or g-myticin or grammicin or hexamycin or jenamicin or konigen or lacromycin or lisagent or martigenta or migenta or miragenta or miramycin or nichogencin or nsc 82261 or nsc82261 or obogen or ocugenta or ocu-mycin or oftagen or ophtagram or opthagen or optigen or opti-genta or ottogenta or pyogenta or refobacin or ribomicin or rigaminol or rocy gen or rovixida or rupegen or sagestam or sch 9724 or sch9724 or sedanazin or servigenta or skinfect or sulmycin or tangyn or u-gencin or versigen or yectamicina) ) 	993
S33 	(MH ‘Gentamicins’) 	808
S32 	TI ( (Aminoglycosides or Anthracyclines or Aclarubicin or Daunorubicin or Plicamycin or Butirosin Sulfate or Sisomicin or Hygromycin B or Kanamycin or Dibekacin or Nebramycin or Metrizamide or Neomycin or Framycetin or Paromomycin or Ribostamycin or Puromycin or Spectinomycin or Streptomycin or Dihydrostreptomycin Sulfate or Streptothricins or Streptozocin) ) OR AB ( (Aminoglycosides or Anthracyclines or Aclarubicin or Daunorubicin or Plicamycin or Butirosin Sulfate or Sisomicin or Hygromycin B or Kanamycin or Dibekacin or Nebramycin or Metrizamide or Neomycin or Framycetin or Paromomycin or Ribostamycin or Puromycin or Spectinomycin or Streptomycin or Dihydrostreptomycin Sulfate or Streptothricins or Streptozocin) ) 	1,269
S31 	(MH ‘Aminoglycosides+’) 	6,215
S30 	TI ( ((chinolone n1 derivative) or fluoroquinolones or (haloquinolone n1 derivative) or ketoquinolines or oxoquinolines or quinolinones or quinolones) ) OR AB ( ((chinolone n1 derivative) or fluoroquinolones or (haloquinolone n1 derivative) or ketoquinolines or oxoquinolines or quinolinones or quinolones) ) 	834
S29 	(MH ‘Quinolines+’) OR (MH ‘Antiinfective Agents, Quinolone+’) 	4,842
S28 	TI ( (tigecycline or (tbg n1 mino) or tygacil or gar 936 or gar936 or (tert n1 butylglycinamido*)) ) OR AB ( (tigecycline or (tbg n1 mino) or tygacil or gar 936 or gar936 or (tert n1 butylglycinamido*)) ) 	208
S27 	TI ( ((brl n1 ‘17421’) or brl17421 or (thiophenemalonamic n1 acid) or negaban or temocillin or temopen) ) OR AB ( ((brl n1 ‘17421’) or brl17421 or (thiophenemalonamic n1 acid) or negaban or temocillin or temopen) ) 	10
S26 	TI ( (aclam or aktil or ambilan or amocla or amoclan or amoclav or amoksiklav or amolanic or amometin or (amox n1 clav) or amox-clav or (amoxi n1 plus) or (amoxNear/3clavulan*) or amoxiclav or amoxiclav-bid or amoxiclav-teva or amoxsiklav or amoxxlin or (amoxycillin-clavulanic n1 acid) or ancla or (auclatin n1 duo) or augamox or augmaxcil or augmentan or augmentin* or augmex or augpen or (augucillin n1 duo) or augurcin or ausclav or auspilic or bactiv or bactoclav or bioclavid or (brl n1 ‘25000’) or brl25000 or brl-25000 or cavumox or ciblor or (clacillin n1 duo) or clamax or clamentin or clamobit or clamonex or clamovid or clamoxin or (clamoxyl n1 duo*) or clarin-duo or clavamox or clavar or clavinex or clavodar or clavoxil or (clavoxilin n1 plus) or clavubactin or clavudale or clavulanate-amoxicillin or clavulin or (clavulox n1 duo) or clavumox or (co n1 amoxiclav) or (co n1 amoxyclav) or coamoxiclav or co-amoxiclav or coamoxyclav or (cramon n1 duo) or (croanan n1 duo) or curam or danoclav or (darzitil n1 plus) or e-moxclav or enhancin or fleming or fugentin or (fullicilina n1 plus) or gumentin or hibiotic or inciclav or klamonex or kmoxilin or lactamox or lansiclav or moxiclav or moxicle or moxyclav or natravox or nufaclav or palentin or quali-mentin or ranclav or spektramox or stacillin or suplentin or synermox or synulox or (velamox n1 cl) or vestaclav or viaclav or vulamox or xiclav or (zami n1 ‘8503’)) ) OR AB ( (aclam or aktil or ambilan or amocla or amoclan or amoclav or amoksiklav or amolanic or amometin or (amox n1 clav) or amox-clav or (amoxi n1 plus) or (amoxNear/3clavulan*) or amoxiclav or amoxiclav-bid or amoxiclav-teva or amoxsiklav or amoxxlin or (amoxycillin-clavulanic n1 acid) or ancla or (auclatin n1 duo) or augamox or augmaxcil or augmentan or augmentin* or augmex or augpen or (augucillin n1 duo) or augurcin or ausclav or auspilic or bactiv or bactoclav or bioclavid or (brl n1 ‘25000’) or brl25000 or brl-25000 or cavumox or ciblor or (clacillin n1 duo) or clamax or clamentin or clamobit or clamonex or clamovid or clamoxin or (clamoxyl n1 duo*) or clarin-duo or clavamox or clavar or clavinex or clavodar or clavoxil or (clavoxilin n1 plus) or clavubactin or clavudale or clavulanate-amoxicillin or clavulin or (clavulox n1 duo) or clavumox or (co n1 amoxiclav) or (co n1 amoxyclav) or coamoxiclav or co-amoxiclav or coamoxyclav or (cramon n1 duo) or (croanan n1 duo) or curam or danoclav or (darzitil n1 plus) or e-moxclav or enhancin or fleming or fugentin or (fullicilina n1 plus) or gumentin or hibiotic or inciclav or klamonex or kmoxilin or lactamox or lansiclav or moxiclav or moxicle or moxyclav or natravox or nufaclav or palentin or quali-mentin or ranclav or spektramox or stacillin or suplentin or synermox or synulox or (velamox n1 cl) or vestaclav or viaclav or vulamox or xiclav or (zami n1 ‘8503’)) ) 	805
S25 	TI ( (cl 307579 or cl298741 or cl307579 or tazabactam or tazobac* or tazocel or tazocillin* or tazocin or tazomax or tazonam or tazopril or yp 14 or yp14 or ytr 830 or ytr 830h or ytr830 or ytr830h or zosyn) ) OR AB ( (cl 307579 or cl298741 or cl307579 or tazabactam or tazobac* or tazocel or tazocillin* or tazocin or tazomax or tazonam or tazopril or yp 14 or yp14 or ytr 830 or ytr 830h or ytr830 or ytr830h or zosyn) ) 	247
S24 	TI ( (acopex or avocin or cl 227,193 or Cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl227,193 or Cl227193 or cl227193 or cl227193 or Cl-227193 or cl-227193 or cypercil or hishiyaclorin or ivacin or pentcillin or pentocillin or picillin* or pipcil or pipera hameln or piperacil or piperacillin* or piperacin or pipera-hameln or pipercillin or piperilline or pipraci* or pipraks or pipril or piprilin or pitamycin or t 1220 or t1220 or t-1220 or taiperacillin) ) OR AB ( (acopex or avocin or cl 227,193 or Cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl227,193 or Cl227193 or cl227193 or cl227193 or Cl-227193 or cl-227193 or cypercil or hishiyaclorin or ivacin or pentcillin or pentocillin or picillin* or pipcil or pipera hameln or piperacil or piperacillin* or piperacin or pipera-hameln or pipercillin or piperilline or pipraci* or pipraks or pipril or piprilin or pitamycin or t 1220 or t1220 or t-1220 or taiperacillin) ) 	296
S23 	TI ( (Carbapenem* or doripenem or ertapenem or Imipemide or Imipenem or Invanoz or Invanz or meropenem or Merrem or ‘MK 0787’ or MK0787 or MK-0787 or N Formimidoylthienamycin or N-Formimidoylthienamycin or Penem or Ronem or S 4661 or S-4661 or SM 7338 or SM-7338 or Thienamycin*) ) OR AB ( (Carbapenem* or doripenem or ertapenem or Imipemide or Imipenem or Invanoz or Invanz or meropenem or Merrem or ‘MK 0787’ or MK0787 or MK-0787 or N Formimidoylthienamycin or N-Formimidoylthienamycin or Penem or Ronem or S 4661 or S-4661 or SM 7338 or SM-7338 or Thienamycin*) ) 	974
S22 	(MH ‘Carbapenems+’) 	559
S21 	S19 OR S20 	14,473
S20 	(MH ‘Drug Resistance, Microbial+’) 	14,182
S19 	TI ( (multiresistant or (multi n1 resistan*)) ) OR AB ( (multiresistant or (multi n1 resistan*)) ) 	604
S18 	S1 OR S2 OR S3 OR S4 OR S5 OR S6 OR S7 OR S8 OR S9 OR S10 OR S11 OR S12 OR S13 OR S14 OR S15 OR S16 OR S17 	7,706
S17 	TI ( ((bacillus n1 morgan*) or (bacterium n1 morgana) or (morganella n1 morgagni*) or (morganella n1 morganii) or (proteus n1 morgagni) or (proteus n1 morgana*) or (salmonella n1 morgana)) ) OR AB ( ((bacillus n1 morgan*) or (bacterium n1 morgana) or (morganella n1 morgagni*) or (morganella n1 morganii) or (proteus n1 morgagni) or (proteus n1 morgana*) or (salmonella n1 morgana)) ) 	20
S16 	TI ( ((Citrobacter n1 freundii) or (bacterium n1 freundii) or (Escherichia n1 freundii)) ) OR AB ( ((Citrobacter n1 freundii) or (bacterium n1 freundii) or (Escherichia n1 freundii)) ) 	32
S15 	(MH ‘Citrobacter’) 	40
S14 	TI Serratia OR AB Serratia 	238
S13 	(MH ‘Serratia’) OR (MH ‘Serratia Infections’) 	174
S12 	TI Proteus OR AB Proteus 	257
S11 	(MH ‘Proteus’) OR (MH ‘Proteus Infections’) 	118
S10 	TI ( (Acinetobacter or mima or mimae or herellea or acinetobacterium) ) OR AB ( (Acinetobacter or mima or mimae or herellea or acinetobacterium) ) 	889
S9 	(MH ‘Acinetobacter Infections’) 	581
S8 	TI ‘p. aeruginosa’ OR AB ‘p. aeruginosa’ 	610
S7 	TI ( ((bacillus n1 pyocyaneus) or (bacterium n1 (aeruginosum or pyocyaneum)) or (blue n1 apus) or (Pseudomonas n1 (aeruginosa or aureofaciens or pyoceaneus or pyocyanea or pyocyaneus))) ) OR AB ( ((bacillus n1 pyocyaneus) or (bacterium n1 (aeruginosum or pyocyaneum)) or (blue n1 apus) or (Pseudomonas n1 (aeruginosa or aureofaciens or pyoceaneus or pyocyanea or pyocyaneus))) ) 	1,855
S6 	TI ( (enterobacter or aerobacter) ) OR AB ( (enterobacter or aerobacter) ) 	370
S5 	TI ( (‘k. pneumoniae’ or ‘b. friedlander’) ) OR AB ( (‘k. pneumoniae’ or ‘b. friedlander’) ) 	200
S4 	TI ( (klebsiella or Calymmatobacterium or (aerobacter n1 aerogenes) or ((bacillus or bacterium) n1 pneumonia) or ((friedlaender or Friedlander) n1 bacillus) or (Hyalococcus n1 pneumonia) or Pneumobacillus) ) OR AB ( (klebsiella or Calymmatobacterium or (aerobacter n1 aerogenes) or ((bacillus or bacterium) n1 pneumonia) or ((friedlaender or Friedlander) n1 bacillus) or (Hyalococcus n1 pneumonia) or Pneumobacillus) ) 	1,039
S3 	(MH ‘Klebsiella’) OR (MH ‘Klebsiella Infections’) 	835
S2 	TI ( (Eaggec or (escherichia n1 coli) or (e n1 coli) or (alkalescens-dispar n1 group) or (bacillus n1 escherichii) or (Coli n1 bacillus) or (Coli n1 bacterium) or colibacillus or (colon n1 bacillus)) ) OR AB ( (Eaggec or (escherichia n1 coli) or (e n1 coli) or (alkalescens-dispar n1 group) or (bacillus n1 escherichii) or (Coli n1 bacillus) or (Coli n1 bacterium) or colibacillus or (colon n1 bacillus)) ) 	2,914
S1 	(MH ‘Escherichia Coli’) OR (MH ‘Escherichia Coli Infections’) 	2,983

Cochrane Library (Issue 11, 2012)
ID	Search	
#1	MeSH descriptor: [Escherichia coli] explode all trees
#2	(Eaggec or (escherichia near/1 coli) or (e near/1 coli) or (alkalescens-dispar near/1 group) or (bacillus near/1 escherichii) or (Coli near/1 bacillus) or (Coli near/1 bacterium) or colibacillus or (colon near/1 bacillus)):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#3	MeSH descriptor: [Klebsiella] explode all trees
#4	(klebsiella or Calymmatobacterium or (aerobacter near/1 aerogenes) or ((bacillus or bacterium) near/1 pneumonia) or ((friedlaender or Friedlander) near/1 bacillus) or (Hyalococcus near/1 pneumonia) or Pneumobacillus):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#5	k. pneumoniae or b. friedlander:ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#6	MeSH descriptor: [Enterobacter] explode all trees
#7	(enterobacter or aerobacter):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#8	MeSH descriptor: [Pseudomonas aeruginosa] explode all trees
#9	((bacillus near/1 pyocyaneus) or (bacterium near/1 (aeruginosum or pyocyaneum)) or (blue near/1 apus) or (Pseudomonas near/1 (aeruginosa or aureofaciens or pyoceaneus or pyocyanea or pyocyaneus))):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#10	p. aeruginosa:ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#11	MeSH descriptor: [Acinetobacter] explode all trees
#12	(Acinetobacter or mima or mimae or herellea or acinetobacterium):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#13	MeSH descriptor: [Proteus] explode all trees
#14	Proteus:ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#15	MeSH descriptor: [Serratia] explode all trees
#16	Serratia:ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#17	MeSH descriptor: [Citrobacter freundii] explode all trees
#18	((Citrobacter near/1 freundii) or (bacterium near/1 freundii) or (Escherichia near/1 freundii)):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#19	MeSH descriptor: [Morganella morganii] explode all trees
#20	((bacillus near/1 morgan$) or (bacterium near/1 morgana) or (morganella near/1 morgagni$) or (morganella near/1 morganii) or (proteus near/1 morgagni) or (proteus near/1 morgana$) or (salmonella near/1 morgana)):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#21	#1 or #2 or #3 or #4 or #5 or #6 or #7 or #8 or #9 or #10 or #11 or #12 or #13 or #14 or #15 or #16 or #17 or #18 or #19 or #20 
#22	(multiresistant or (multi near/1 resistan$)):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#23	MeSH descriptor: [Drug Resistance, Multiple] explode all trees
#24	#22 or #23 
#25	MeSH descriptor: [Colistin] explode all trees
#26	(belcomycin or colicort or colimycin$ or colisitin or colisticin or Colistin or colistine or colomycin or (coly near/1 mycin) or colymicin or colymycin or coly-mycin or multimycin or (Polymyxin near/1 E) or totazina):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#27	MeSH descriptor: [Carbapenems] explode all trees
#28	(Carbapenem$ or doripenem or ertapenem or Imipemide or Imipenem or Invanoz or Invanz or meropenem or Merrem or ‘MK 0787’ or MK0787 or MK-0787 or N Formimidoylthienamycin or N-Formimidoylthienamycin or Penem or Ronem or S 4661 or S-4661 or SM 7338 or SM-7338 or Thienamycin$):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#29	MeSH descriptor: [Piperacillin] explode all trees
#30	(acopex or avocin or cl 227,193 or Cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl227,193 or Cl227193 or cl227193 or cl227193 or Cl-227193 or cl-227193 or cypercil or hishiyaclorin or ivacin or pentcillin or pentocillin or picillin$ or pipcil or pipera hameln or piperacil or piperacillin$ or piperacin or pipera-hameln or pipercillin or piperilline or pipraci$ or pipraks or pipril or piprilin or pitamycin or t 1220 or t1220 or t-1220 or taiperacillin):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#31	(cl 307579 or cl298741 or cl307579 or tazabactam or tazobac$ or tazocel or tazocillin$ or tazocin or tazomax or tazonam or tazopril or yp 14 or yp14 or ytr 830 or ytr 830h or ytr830 or ytr830h or zosyn):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#32	MeSH descriptor: [Amoxicillin-Potassium Clavulanate Combination] explode all trees
#33	(aclam or aktil or ambilan or amocla or amoclan or amoclav or amoksiklav or amolanic or amometin or (amox near/1 clav) or amox-clav or (amoxi near/1 plus) or (amoxNear/3clavulan$) or amoxiclav or amoxiclav-bid or amoxiclav-teva or amoxsiklav or amoxxlin or (amoxycillin-clavulanic near/1 acid) or ancla or (auclatin near/1 duo) or augamox or augmaxcil or augmentan or augmentin$ or augmex or augpen or (augucillin near/1 duo) or augurcin or ausclav or auspilic or bactiv or bactoclav or bioclavid or (brl near/1 ‘25000’) or brl25000 or brl-25000 or cavumox or ciblor or (clacillin near/1 duo) or clamax or clamentin or clamobit or clamonex or clamovid or clamoxin or (clamoxyl near/1 duo$) or clarin-duo or clavamox or clavar or clavinex or clavodar or clavoxil or (clavoxilin near/1 plus) or clavubactin or clavudale or clavulanate-amoxicillin or clavulin or (clavulox near/1 duo) or clavumox or (co near/1 amoxiclav) or (co near/1 amoxyclav) or coamoxiclav or co-amoxiclav or coamoxyclav or (cramon near/1 duo) or (croanan near/1 duo) or curam or danoclav or (darzitil near/1 plus) or e-moxclav or enhancin or fleming or fugentin or (fullicilina near/1 plus) or gumentin or hibiotic or inciclav or klamonex or kmoxilin or lactamox or lansiclav or moxiclav or moxicle or moxyclav or natravox or nufaclav or palentin or quali-mentin or ranclav or spektramox or stacillin or suplentin or synermox or synulox or (velamox near/1 cl) or vestaclav or viaclav or vulamox or xiclav or (zami near/1 ‘8503’)):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#34	((brl near/1 ‘17421’) or brl17421 or (thiophenemalonamic near/1 acid) or negaban or temocillin or temopen):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#35	(tigecycline or (tbg near/1 mino) or tygacil or gar 936 or gar936 or (tert near/1 butylglycinamido$)):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#36	MeSH descriptor: [Quinolones] explode all trees
#37	((chinolone near/1 derivative) or fluoroquinolones or (haloquinolone near/1 derivative) or ketoquinolines or oxoquinolines or quinolinones or quinolones):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#38	MeSH descriptor: [Aminoglycosides] explode all trees
#39	(Aminoglycosides or Anthracyclines or Aclarubicin or Daunorubicin or Plicamycin or Butirosin Sulfate or Sisomicin or Hygromycin B or Kanamycin or Dibekacin or Nebramycin or Metrizamide or Neomycin or Framycetin or Paromomycin or Ribostamycin or Puromycin or Spectinomycin or Streptomycin or Dihydrostreptomycin Sulfate or Streptothricins or Streptozocin):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#40	MeSH descriptor: [Gentamicins] explode all trees
#41	(adelanin or alcomicin or apigent or apogen or apoten or azupel or bactiderm or biogaracin or bristagen or cidomycin or danigen or dermogen or dianfarma or dispagent or duragentam$ or epigent or (frieso near/1 gent) or garabiotic or garalone or garamicin$ or garamycin or garbilocin or gencin or gendril or genoptic or genrex or gensumycin or gentabiotic or gentabiox or gentac or gentacidin or gentacin or gentacor or gentacycol or gentacyl or gentafair or gentagram or gentak or gental or gentaline or gentalline or gentalol or gentalyn or gentamax or gentame$ or gentamicin$ or gentamina or gentamycin$ or gentamyl or gentamytrex or gentaplus or gentarad or gentasil or gentasol or gentasone or gentasporin or gentatrim or gentavet or genticin$ or genticyn or gentiderm or gentimycin or gentocin or gentogram or gentomycin or genum or geomycine or gevramycin or g-mycin or gmyticin or g-myticin or grammicin or hexamycin or jenamicin or konigen or lacromycin or lisagent or martigenta or migenta or miragenta or miramycin or nichogencin or nsc 82261 or nsc82261 or obogen or ocugenta or ocu-mycin or oftagen or ophtagram or opthagen or optigen or opti-genta or ottogenta or pyogenta or refobacin or ribomicin or rigaminol or rocy gen or rovixida or rupegen or sagestam or sch 9724 or sch9724 or sedanazin or servigenta or skinfect or sulmycin or tangyn or u-gencin or versigen or yectamicina):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#42	MeSH descriptor: [Amikacin] explode all trees
#43	(akacin or akicin or amicacina or amicasil or amicin or amiglymide v or amikacin$ or amikafur or amikalem or amikan or amikayect or amikin or amiklin or amikozit or amiktam or amitracin or amixin or amukin or apalin or bb k 8 or bb k8 or bbk 8 or bb-k 8 or bbk8 or bbk-8 or bb-k8 or biclin or biklin or biokacin or briclin or briklin or chemacin or cinmik or fabianol or gamikal or glukamin or kacinth-a or kanbine or kormakin or likacin or lukadin or miacin or mikasome or onikin or oprad or orlobin or pediakin or pierami or riklinak or savox or selaxa or selemycin or sulfate amikacin or tybikin or vs 107 or vs107 or yectamid):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#44	MeSH descriptor: [Fosfomycin] explode all trees
#45	(fosfocil or fosfocin or fosfocina or fosfomicin or fosfomycin or fosfonomycin or ‘mk 0955’ or mk 955 or mk0955 or mk955 or monuril or phosphomycin or phosphonomycin):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#46	MeSH descriptor: [Aztreonam] explode all trees
#47	((az near/1 threonam) or azactam or azenam or azthreonam or aztreonam or (corus near/1 ‘1020’) or dynabiotic or primbactam or SQ 26,776 or sq 26,776 or sq 26776 or SQ-26,776 or sq26776 or sq-26776 or urobactam):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#48	MeSH descriptor: [Nitrofurantoin] explode all trees
#49	(berkfurin or biofurin or chemiofuran or dantafur or f 30 or f30 or fua-med or furaben or furadantin$ or furadantoin or furadina or furadoine or furadonin or furadonine or furalan or furanpur or furantocompren or furantoin$ or furobactina or furofen or furophen or infurin or ituran or ivadantin or macrobid or macrodantin$ or macrofuran or macrofurin or micofurantin$ or mitrofuratoin or nephronex or nierofu or nifurantin or nifuryl or (nitro near/1 macro) or nitrofuracin or nitrofuradantoin or nitrofurantine or nitrofurantoin$ or nitrofurin or novofuran or nsc 2107 or nsc2107 or orafuran or parfuran or phenurin or (potassium near/1 furagin) or ralodantin or trocurine or urantin or (uro near/1 tablinen) or urodil or urodin or urofuran or urolong or urotablinen or uro-tablinen or urotoina or uvamin):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#50	MeSH descriptor: [Cephalosporins] explode all trees
#51	((Cephalosporanic near/1 Acid$) or Cephalosporin$ or Cefamandole or Cefoperazone or Cefazolin or Cefonicid or Cefsulodin or Cephacetrile or Cefotaxime or Cephalothin or Cephapirin or Cephalexin or Cefaclor or Cefadroxil or Cephaloglycin or Cephradine or Cephaloridine or Ceftazidime or Cephamycins or Cefmetazole or Cefotetan or Cefoxitin):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#52	MeSH descriptor: [Amdinocillin Pivoxil] explode all trees
#53	((amdinocillin near/1 pivoxil) or (FL near/1 ‘1039’) or FL1039 or fl1039 or FL-1039 or pivamdinocillin or Pivmecillinam or Selexid or coactabs or (ro near/1 ‘109071’) or (ro10 near/1 ‘9071’) or ro109071):ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)
#54	#25 or #26 or #27 or #28 or #29 or #30 or #31 or #32 or #33 or #34 or #35 or #36 or #37 or #38 or #39 or #40 or #41 or #42 or #43 or #44 or #45 or #46 or #47 or #48 or #49 or #50 or #51 or #52 or #53 
#55	#21 and #24 and #54 (21)

Embase (January 1980 to December 1012)
1 exp Escherichia coli/ (255846)
2 (Eaggec or (escherichia adj coli) or (e adj coli) or (alkalescens-dispar adj group) or (bacillus adj escherichii) or (Coli adj bacillus) or (Coli adj bacterium) or colibacillus or (colon adj bacillus)).ti,ab. (240749)
3 exp Klebsiella/ (30199)
4 (klebsiella or Calymmatobacterium or (aerobacter adj aerogenes) or ((bacillus or bacterium) adj pneumonia) or ((friedlaender or Friedlander) adj bacillus) or (Hyalococcus adj pneumonia) or Pneumobacillus).ti,ab. (22836)
5 (‘k. pneumoniae’ or ‘b. friedlander’).ti,ab. (5513)
6 exp Enterobacter/ (12784)
7 (enterobacter or aerobacter).ti,ab. (9700)
8 exp Pseudomonas aeruginosa/ (55073)
9 ((bacillus adj pyocyaneus) or (bacterium adj (aeruginosum or pyocyaneum)) or (blue adj apus) or (Pseudomonas adj (aeruginosa or aureofaciens or pyoceaneus or pyocyanea or pyocyaneus))).ti,ab. (43474)
10 ‘p. aeruginosa’.ti,ab. (17572)
11 exp Acinetobacter/ (12028)
12 (Acinetobacter or mima or mimae or herellea or acinetobacterium).ti,ab. (10917)
13 exp Proteus/ (14447)
14 Proteus.ti,ab. (10461)
15 exp Serratia/ (9507)
16 Serratia.ti,ab. (7407)
17 exp Citrobacter freundii/ (1778)
18 ((Citrobacter adj freundii) or (bacterium adj freundii) or (Escherichia adj freundii)).ti,ab. (1675)
19 exp Morganella morganii/ (1134)
20 ((bacillus adj morgan$) or (bacterium adj morgana) or (morganella adj morgagni$) or (morganella adj morganii) or (proteus adj morgagni) or (proteus adj morgana$) or (salmonella adj morgana)).ti,ab. (804)
21 or/1-20 (396800)
22 (multiresistant or (multi adj resistan$)).ti,ab. (5599)
23 exp multidrug resistance/ (29629)
24 22 or 23 (33705)
25 exp Colistin/ (8049)
26 (belcomycin or colicort or colimycin$ or colisitin or colisticin or Colistin or colistine or colomycin or (coly adj mycin) or colymicin or colymycin or coly-mycin or multimycin or (Polymyxin adj E) or totazina).ti,ab. (3104)
27 exp Carbapenems/ (4745)
28 (Carbapenem$ or doripenem or ertapenem or Imipemide or Imipenem or Invanoz or Invanz or meropenem or Merrem or ‘MK 0787’ or MK0787 or MK-0787 or N Formimidoylthienamycin or N-Formimidoylthienamycin or Penem or Ronem or S 4661 or S-4661 or SM 7338 or SM-7338 or Thienamycin$).ti,ab. (18086)
29 exp Piperacillin/ (14822)
30 (acopex or avocin or cl 227,193 or Cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl227,193 or Cl227193 or cl227193 or cl227193 or Cl-227193 or cl-227193 or cypercil or hishiyaclorin or ivacin or pentcillin or pentocillin or picillin$ or pipcil or pipera hameln or piperacil or piperacillin$ or piperacin or pipera-hameln or pipercillin or piperilline or pipraci$ or pipraks or pipril or piprilin or pitamycin or t 1220 or t1220 or t-1220 or taiperacillin).ti,ab. (6462)
31 exp Amoxicillin-Potassium Clavulanate Combination/ (23616)
32 (aclam or aktil or ambilan or amocla or amoclan or amoclav or amoksiklav or amolanic or amometin or (amox adj clav) or amox-clav or (amoxi adj plus) or (amox adj3 clavulan$) or amoxiclav or amoxiclav-bid or amoxiclav-teva or amoxsiklav or amoxxlin or (amoxycillin-clavulanic adj acid) or ancla or (auclatin adj duo) or augamox or augmaxcil or augmentan or augmentin$ or augmex or augpen or (augucillin adj duo) or augurcin or ausclav or auspilic or bactiv or bactoclav or bioclavid or (brl adj ‘25000’) or brl25000 or brl-25000 or cavumox or ciblor or (clacillin adj duo) or clamax or clamentin or clamobit or clamonex or clamovid or clamoxin or (clamoxyl adj duo$) or clarin-duo or clavamox or clavar or clavinex or clavodar or clavoxil or (clavoxilin adj plus) or clavubactin or clavudale or clavulanate-amoxicillin or clavulin or (clavulox adj duo) or clavumox or (co adj amoxiclav) or (co adj amoxyclav) or coamoxiclav or co-amoxiclav or coamoxyclav or (cramon adj duo) or (croanan adj duo) or curam or danoclav or (darzitil adj plus) or e-moxclav or enhancin or fleming or fugentin or (fullicilina adj plus) or gumentin or hibiotic or inciclav or klamonex or kmoxilin or lactamox or lansiclav or moxiclav or moxicle or moxyclav or natravox or nufaclav or palentin or quali-mentin or ranclav or spektramox or stacillin or suplentin or synermox or synulox or (velamox adj cl) or vestaclav or viaclav or vulamox or xiclav or (zami adj ‘8503’)).ti,ab. (11598)
33 exp Quinolones/ (101072)
34 ((chinolone adj derivative) or fluoroquinolones or (haloquinolone adj derivative) or ketoquinolines or oxoquinolines or quinolinones or quinolones).ti,ab. (15677)
35 exp Aminoglycosides/ (10599)
36 (Aminoglycosides or Anthracyclines or Aclarubicin or Daunorubicin or Plicamycin or Butirosin Sulfate or Sisomicin or Hygromycin B or Kanamycin or Dibekacin or Nebramycin + or Metrizamide or Neomycin or Framycetin or Paromomycin or Ribostamycin or Puromycin or Spectinomycin or Streptomycin or Dihydrostreptomycin Sulfate or Streptothricins or Streptozocin).ti,ab. (56708)
37 exp Gentamicins/ (70647)
38 (adelanin or alcomicin or apigent or apogen or apoten or azupel or bactiderm or biogaracin or bristagen or cidomycin or danigen or dermogen or dianfarma or dispagent or duragentam$ or epigent or (frieso adj gent) or garabiotic or garalone or garamicin$ or garamycin or garbilocin or gencin or gendril or genoptic or genrex or gensumycin or gentabiotic or gentabiox or gentac or gentacidin or gentacin or gentacor or gentacycol or gentacyl or gentafair or gentagram or gentak or gental or gentaline or gentalline or gentalol or gentalyn or gentamax or gentame$ or gentamicin$ or gentamina or gentamycin$ or gentamyl or gentamytrex or gentaplus or gentarad or gentasil or gentasol or gentasone or gentasporin or gentatrim or gentavet or genticin$ or genticyn or gentiderm or gentimycin or gentocin or gentogram or gentomycin or genum or geomycine or gevramycin or g-mycin or gmyticin or g-myticin or grammicin or hexamycin or jenamicin or konigen or lacromycin or lisagent or martigenta or migenta or miragenta or miramycin or nichogencin or nsc 82261 or nsc82261 or obogen or ocugenta or ocu-mycin or oftagen or ophtagram or opthagen or optigen or opti-genta or ottogenta or pyogenta or refobacin or ribomicin or rigaminol or rocy gen or rovixida or rupegen or sagestam or sch 9724 or sch9724 or sedanazin or servigenta or skinfect or sulmycin or tangyn or u-gencin or versigen or yectamicina).ti,ab. (23700)
39 exp Amikacin/ (28644)
40 (akacin or akicin or amicacina or amicasil or amicin or amiglymide v or amikacin$ or amikafur or amikalem or amikan or amikayect or amikin or amiklin or amikozit or amiktam or amitracin or amixin or amukin or apalin or bb k 8 or bb k8 or bbk 8 or bb-k 8 or bbk8 or bbk-8 or bb-k8 or biclin or biklin or biokacin or briclin or briklin or chemacin or cinmik or fabianol or gamikal or glukamin or kacinth-a or kanbine or kormakin or likacin or lukadin or miacin or mikasome or onikin or oprad or orlobin or pediakin or pierami or riklinak or savox or selaxa or selemycin or sulfate amikacin or tybikin or vs 107 or vs107 or yectamid).ti,ab. (9841)
41 exp Fosfomycin/ (5561)
42 (fosfocil or fosfocin or fosfocina or fosfomicin or fosfomycin or fosfonomycin or ‘mk 0955’ or mk 955 or mk0955 or mk955 or monuril or phosphomycin or phosphonomycin).ti,ab. (2386)
43 exp Aztreonam/ (10567)
44 ((az adj threonam) or azactam or azenam or azthreonam or aztreonam or (corus adj ‘1020’) or dynabiotic or primbactam or SQ 26,776 or sq 26,776 or sq 26776 or SQ-26,776 or sq26776 or sq-26776 or urobactam).ti,ab. (3245)
45 exp Nitrofurantoin/ (9724)
46 (berkfurin or biofurin or chemiofuran or dantafur or f 30 or f30 or fua-med or furaben or furadantin$ or furadantoin or furadina or furadoine or furadonin or furadonine or furalan or furanpur or furantocompren or furantoin$ or furobactina or furofen or furophen or infurin or ituran or ivadantin or macrobid or macrodantin$ or macrofuran or macrofurin or micofurantin$ or mitrofuratoin or nephronex or nierofu or nifurantin or nifuryl or (nitro adj macro) or nitrofuracin or nitrofuradantoin or nitrofurantine or nitrofurantoin$ or nitrofurin or novofuran or nsc 2107 or nsc2107 or orafuran or parfuran or phenurin or (potassium adj furagin) or ralodantin or trocurine or urantin or (uro adj tablinen) or urodil or urodin or urofuran or urolong or urotablinen or uro-tablinen or urotoina or uvamin).ti,ab. (3412)
47 exp Cephalosporins/ (150937)
48 (Axepim$ or bmy 28142 or bmy28142 or BMY-28142 or Cefepim$ or cefepitax or ceficad or cepimax or forzyn beta or maxcef or maxfrom or maxipime or Quadrocef).ti,ab. (2995)
49 exp tazobactam/ (3045)
50 (cl 307579 or cl298741 or cl307579 or tazabactam or tazobac$ or tazocel or tazocillin$ or tazocin or tazomax or tazonam or tazopril or yp 14 or yp14 or ytr 830 or ytr 830h or ytr830 or ytr830h or zosyn).ti,ab. (3809)
51 exp temocillin/ (499)
52 ((brl adj ‘17421’) or brl17421 or (thiophenemalonamic adj acid) or negaban or temocillin or temopen).ti,ab. (236)
53 exp tigecycline/ (3876)
54 (tigecycline or (tbg adj mino) or tygacil or gar 936 or gar936 or (tert adj butylglycinamido$)).ti,ab. (1970)
55 exp cefepime/ (9948)
56 ((Cephalosporanic adj Acid$) or Cephalosporin$ or Cefamandole or Cefoperazone or Cefazolin or Cefonicid or Cefsulodin or Cephacetrile or Cefotaxime or Cephalothin or Cephapirin or Cephalexin or Cefaclor or Cefadroxil or Cephaloglycin or Cephradine or Cephaloridine or Ceftazidime or Cephamycins or Cefmetazole or Cefotetan or Cefoxitin).ti,ab. (45983)
57 exp pivmecillinam/ (685)
58 ((amdinocillin adj pivoxil) or (FL adj ‘1039’) or FL1039 or fl1039 or FL-1039 or pivamdinocillin or Pivmecillinam or Selexid or coactabs or (ro adj ‘109071’) or (ro10 adj ‘9071’) or ro109071).ti,ab. (280)
59 or/25-58 (349366)
60 21 and 24 and 59 (4969)
61 (review or review,tutorial or review, academic).pt. (1901059)
62 (systematic$ adj5 review$).tw,sh. (70959)
63 (systematic$ adj5 overview$).tw,sh. (869)
64 (quantitativ$ adj5 review$).tw,sh. (15516)
65 (quantitativ$ adj5 overview$).tw,sh. (203)
66 (quantitativ$ adj5 synthesis$).tw,sh. (2716)
67 (methodologic$ adj5 review$).tw,sh. (3414)
68 (methodologic$ adj5 overview$).tw,sh. (238)
69 (integrative research review$ or research integration).tw. (94)
70 (meta-analys$ or meta analys$ or metaanalys$).tw,sh. (96394)
71 (meta synthesis or meta synthesis or metasynthesis).tw,sh. (238)
72 (meta-regression or meta regression or metaregression).tw,sh. (2242)
73 (synthes$ adj3 literature).tw. (1448)
74 (synthes$ adj3 evidence).tw. (3583)
75 integrative review.tw. (604)
76 data synthesis.tw. (8747)
77 (research synthesis or narrative synthesis).tw. (547)
78 (systematic study or systematic studies).tw. (7413)
79 systematic comparison$.tw. (1183)
80 comprehensive review$.tw. (6873)
81 critical review.tw. (11216)
82 quantitative review.tw. (488)
83 structured review.tw. (492)
84 realist review.tw. (34)
85 realist synthesis.tw. (12)
86 review.ti. (264011)
87 systematic$ literature review$.tw. (3464)
88 ‘systematic review’/ (55637)
89 ‘systematic review (topic)’/ (2885)
90 meta analysis/ (67746)
91 ‘meta analysis (topic)’/ (5552)
92 (synthes$ adj2 qualitative).tw. (428)
93 (systematic adj2 search$).tw. (7848)
94 systematic$ literature research$.tw. (102)
95 (review adj3 scientific literature).tw. (833)
96 (literature review adj2 side effect$).tw. (10)
97 (literature review adj2 adverse effect$).tw. (2)
98 (literature review adj2 adverse event$).tw. (6)
99 (evidence-based adj2 review).tw. (1915)
100 critical analysis.tw. (5559)





106 104 or 105 (1218093)
107 or/61-103 (2212977)
108 107 not 106 (2200787)
109 (clin$ adj2 trial).mp. (968683)
110 ((singl$ or doubl$ or trebl$ or tripl$) adj (blind$ or mask$)).mp. (190403)
111 (random$ adj5 (assign$ or allocat$)).mp. (101920)
112 randomi$.mp. (613392)
113 crossover.mp. (59181)
114 exp randomized-controlled-trial/ (334017)
115 exp double-blind-procedure/ (112280)
116 exp crossover-procedure/ (35737)
117 exp single-blind-procedure/ (16758)
118 exp randomization/ (60197)
119 or/109-118 (1282139)
120 intervention?.ti. or (intervention? adj6 (clinician? or collaborat$ or community or complex or DESIGN$ or doctor? or educational or family doctor? or family physician? or family practitioner? or financial or GP or general practice? or hospital? or impact? or improv$ or individuali?e? or individuali?ing or interdisciplin$ or multicomponent or multi-component or multidisciplin$ or multi-disciplin$ or multifacet$ or multi-facet$ or multimodal$ or multi-modal$ or personali?e? or personali?ing or pharmacies or pharmacist? or pharmacy or physician? or practitioner? or prescrib$ or prescription? or primary care or professional$ or provider? or regulatory or regulatory or tailor$ or target$ or team$ or usual care)).ab. (175033)
121 (hospital$ or patient?).hw. and (study or studies or care or health$ or practitioner? or provider? or physician? or nurse? or nursing or doctor?).ti,hw. (1363115)
122 demonstration project?.ti,ab. (2081)
123 (pre-post or ‘pre test$’ or pretest$ or posttest$ or ‘post test$’ or (pre adj5 post)).ti,ab. (78013)
124 (pre-workshop or post-workshop or (before adj3 workshop) or (after adj3 workshop)).ti,ab. (673)
125 trial.ti. or ((study adj3 aim?) or ‘our study’).ab. (724065)
126 (before adj10 (after or during)).ti,ab. (394152)
127 (time points adj3 (over or multiple or three or four or five or six or seven or eight or nine or ten or eleven or twelve or month$ or hour? or day? or ‘more than’)).ab. (10006)
128 pilot.ti. (43036)
129 (multicentre or multicenter or multi-centre or multi-center).ti. (34428)
130 random$.ti,ab. or controlled.ti. (819713)
131 review.ti. (264011)
132 *experimental design/ or *pilot study/ or quasi experimental study/ (5205)
133 (‘quasi-experiment$’ or quasiexperiment$ or ‘quasi random$’ or quasirandom$ or ‘quasi control$’ or quasicontrol$ or ((quasi$ or experimental) adj3 (method$ or study or trial or design$))).ti,ab. (105122)
134 or/120-133 (3341084)
135 exp animals/ or exp invertebrate/ or animal experiment/ or animal model/ or animal tissue/ or animal cell/ or nonhuman/ (18985259)
136 human/ or normal human/ or human cell/ (14037258)
137 135 and 136 (14004971)
138 135 not 137 (4980288)
139 (‘time series’ adj2 interrupt$).ti,ab. (922)
140 134 not (138 or 139) (2996658)
141 108 or 119 or 140 (5157863)
142 60 and 141 (1860)

16.1	Medline (January 1946 to December 2012)

1 exp Escherichia coli/ (224545)
2 (Eaggec or (escherichia adj coli) or (e adj coli) or (alkalescens-dispar adj group) or (bacillus adj escherichii) or (Coli adj bacillus) or (Coli adj bacterium) or colibacillus or (colon adj bacillus)).ti,ab. (226847)
3 exp Klebsiella/ (13720)
4 (klebsiella or Calymmatobacterium or (aerobacter adj aerogenes) or ((bacillus or bacterium) adj pneumonia) or ((friedlaender or Friedlander) adj bacillus) or (Hyalococcus adj pneumonia) or Pneumobacillus).ti,ab. (18345)
5 (‘k. pneumoniae’ or ‘b. friedlander’).ti,ab. (3902)
6 exp Enterobacter/ (5504)
7 (enterobacter or aerobacter).ti,ab. (8130)
8 exp Pseudomonas aeruginosa/ (30232)
9 ((bacillus adj pyocyaneus) or (bacterium adj (aeruginosum or pyocyaneum)) or (blue adj apus) or (Pseudomonas adj (aeruginosa or aureofaciens or pyoceaneus or pyocyanea or pyocyaneus))).ti,ab. (35984)
10 ‘p. aeruginosa’.ti,ab. (14103)
11 exp Acinetobacter/ (5262)
12 (Acinetobacter or mima or mimae or herellea or acinetobacterium).ti,ab. (8005)
13 exp Proteus/ (8091)
14 Proteus.ti,ab. (9496)
15 exp Serratia/ (5505)
16 Serratia.ti,ab. (6720)
17 exp Citrobacter freundii/ (438)
18 ((Citrobacter adj freundii) or (bacterium adj freundii) or (Escherichia adj freundii)).ti,ab. (1361)
19 exp Morganella morganii/ (133)
20 ((bacillus adj morgan$) or (bacterium adj morgana) or (morganella adj morgagni$) or (morganella adj morganii) or (proteus adj morgagni) or (proteus adj morgana$) or (salmonella adj morgana)).ti,ab. (601)
21 or/1-20 (360253)
22 (multiresistant or (multi adj resistan$)).ti,ab. (3949)
23 exp drug resistance, multiple/ (21763)
24 22 or 23 (24405)
25 exp Colistin/ (2107)
26 (belcomycin or colicort or colimycin$ or colisitin or colisticin or Colistin or colistine or colomycin or (coly adj mycin) or colymicin or colymycin or coly-mycin or multimycin or (Polymyxin adj E) or totazina).ti,ab. (2346)
27 exp Carbapenems/ (6668)
28 (Carbapenem$ or doripenem or ertapenem or Imipemide or Imipenem or Invanoz or Invanz or meropenem or Merrem or ‘MK 0787’ or MK0787 or MK-0787 or N Formimidoylthienamycin or N-Formimidoylthienamycin or Penem or Ronem or S 4661 or S-4661 or SM 7338 or SM-7338 or Thienamycin$).ti,ab. (11771)
29 exp Piperacillin/ (2035)
30 (acopex or avocin or cl 227,193 or Cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl 227193 or cl227,193 or Cl227193 or cl227193 or cl227193 or Cl-227193 or cl-227193 or cypercil or hishiyaclorin or ivacin or pentcillin or pentocillin or picillin$ or pipcil or pipera hameln or piperacil or piperacillin$ or piperacin or pipera-hameln or pipercillin or piperilline or pipraci$ or pipraks or pipril or piprilin or pitamycin or t 1220 or t1220 or t-1220 or taiperacillin).ti,ab. (4319)
31 (cl 307579 or cl298741 or cl307579 or tazabactam or tazobac$ or tazocel or tazocillin$ or tazocin or tazomax or tazonam or tazopril or yp 14 or yp14 or ytr 830 or ytr 830h or ytr830 or ytr830h or zosyn).ti,ab. (2217)
32 exp Amoxicillin-Potassium Clavulanate Combination/ (1914)
33 (aclam or aktil or ambilan or amocla or amoclan or amoclav or amoksiklav or amolanic or amometin or (amox adj clav) or amox-clav or (amoxi adj plus) or (amox adj3 clavulan$) or amoxiclav or amoxiclav-bid or amoxiclav-teva or amoxsiklav or amoxxlin or (amoxycillin-clavulanic adj acid) or ancla or (auclatin adj duo) or augamox or augmaxcil or augmentan or augmentin$ or augmex or augpen or (augucillin adj duo) or augurcin or ausclav or auspilic or bactiv or bactoclav or bioclavid or (brl adj ‘25000’) or brl25000 or brl-25000 or cavumox or ciblor or (clacillin adj duo) or clamax or clamentin or clamobit or clamonex or clamovid or clamoxin or (clamoxyl adj duo$) or clarin-duo or clavamox or clavar or clavinex or clavodar or clavoxil or (clavoxilin adj plus) or clavubactin or clavudale or clavulanate-amoxicillin or clavulin or (clavulox adj duo) or clavumox or (co adj amoxiclav) or (co adj amoxyclav) or coamoxiclav or co-amoxiclav or coamoxyclav or (cramon adj duo) or (croanan adj duo) or curam or danoclav or (darzitil adj plus) or e-moxclav or enhancin or fleming or fugentin or (fullicilina adj plus) or gumentin or hibiotic or inciclav or klamonex or kmoxilin or lactamox or lansiclav or moxiclav or moxicle or moxyclav or natravox or nufaclav or palentin or quali-mentin or ranclav or spektramox or stacillin or suplentin or synermox or synulox or (velamox adj cl) or vestaclav or viaclav or vulamox or xiclav or (zami adj ‘8503’)).ti,ab. (9184)
34 ((brl adj ‘17421’) or brl17421 or (thiophenemalonamic adj acid) or negaban or temocillin or temopen).ti,ab. (179)
35 (tigecycline or (tbg adj mino) or tygacil or gar 936 or gar936 or (tert adj butylglycinamido$)).ab,ti. (1161)
36 exp Quinolones/ (33277)
37 ((chinolone adj derivative) or fluoroquinolones or (haloquinolone adj derivative) or ketoquinolines or oxoquinolines or quinolinones or quinolones).ti,ab. (11055)
38 exp Aminoglycosides/ (122582)
39 (Aminoglycosides or Anthracyclines or Aclarubicin or Daunorubicin or Plicamycin or Butirosin Sulfate or Sisomicin or Hygromycin B or Kanamycin or Dibekacin or Nebramycin + or Metrizamide or Neomycin or Framycetin or Paromomycin or Ribostamycin or Puromycin or Spectinomycin or Streptomycin or Dihydrostreptomycin Sulfate or Streptothricins or Streptozocin).ti,ab. (52288)
40 exp Gentamicins/ (16678)
41 (adelanin or alcomicin or apigent or apogen or apoten or azupel or bactiderm or biogaracin or bristagen or cidomycin or danigen or dermogen or dianfarma or dispagent or duragentam$ or epigent or (frieso adj gent) or garabiotic or garalone or garamicin$ or garamycin or garbilocin or gencin or gendril or genoptic or genrex or gensumycin or gentabiotic or gentabiox or gentac or gentacidin or gentacin or gentacor or gentacycol or gentacyl or gentafair or gentagram or gentak or gental or gentaline or gentalline or gentalol or gentalyn or gentamax or gentame$ or gentamicin$ or gentamina or gentamycin$ or gentamyl or gentamytrex or gentaplus or gentarad or gentasil or gentasol or gentasone or gentasporin or gentatrim or gentavet or genticin$ or genticyn or gentiderm or gentimycin or gentocin or gentogram or gentomycin or genum or geomycine or gevramycin or g-mycin or gmyticin or g-myticin or grammicin or hexamycin or jenamicin or konigen or lacromycin or lisagent or martigenta or migenta or miragenta or miramycin or nichogencin or nsc 82261 or nsc82261 or obogen or ocugenta or ocu-mycin or oftagen or ophtagram or opthagen or optigen or opti-genta or ottogenta or pyogenta or refobacin or ribomicin or rigaminol or rocy gen or rovixida or rupegen or sagestam or sch 9724 or sch9724 or sedanazin or servigenta or skinfect or sulmycin or tangyn or u-gencin or versigen or yectamicina).ti,ab. (19829)
42 exp Amikacin/ (3372)
43 (akacin or akicin or amicacina or amicasil or amicin or amiglymide v or amikacin$ or amikafur or amikalem or amikan or amikayect or amikin or amiklin or amikozit or amiktam or amitracin or amixin or amukin or apalin or bb k 8 or bb k8 or bbk 8 or bb-k 8 or bbk8 or bbk-8 or bb-k8 or biclin or biklin or biokacin or briclin or briklin or chemacin or cinmik or fabianol or gamikal or glukamin or kacinth-a or kanbine or kormakin or likacin or lukadin or miacin or mikasome or onikin or oprad or orlobin or pediakin or pierami or riklinak or savox or selaxa or selemycin or sulfate amikacin or tybikin or vs 107 or vs107 or yectamid).ti,ab. (7140)
44 exp Fosfomycin/ (1378)
45 (fosfocil or fosfocin or fosfocina or fosfomicin or fosfomycin or fosfonomycin or ‘mk 0955’ or mk 955 or mk0955 or mk955 or monuril or phosphomycin or phosphonomycin).ti,ab. (1779)
46 exp Aztreonam/ (1233)
47 ((az adj threonam) or azactam or azenam or azthreonam or aztreonam or (corus adj ‘1020’) or dynabiotic or primbactam or SQ 26,776 or sq 26,776 or sq 26776 or SQ-26,776 or sq26776 or sq-26776 or urobactam).ti,ab. (2333)
48 exp Nitrofurantoin/ (2253)
49 (berkfurin or biofurin or chemiofuran or dantafur or f 30 or f30 or fua-med or furaben or furadantin$ or furadantoin or furadina or furadoine or furadonin or furadonine or furalan or furanpur or furantocompren or furantoin$ or furobactina or furofen or furophen or infurin or ituran or ivadantin or macrobid or macrodantin$ or macrofuran or macrofurin or micofurantin$ or mitrofuratoin or nephronex or nierofu or nifurantin or nifuryl or (nitro adj macro) or nitrofuracin or nitrofuradantoin or nitrofurantine or nitrofurantoin$ or nitrofurin or novofuran or nsc 2107 or nsc2107 or orafuran or parfuran or phenurin or (potassium adj furagin) or ralodantin or trocurine or urantin or (uro adj tablinen) or urodil or urodin or urofuran or urolong or urotablinen or uro-tablinen or urotoina or uvamin).ti,ab. (2721)
50 exp Cephalosporins/ (35352)
51 (Axepim$ or bmy 28142 or bmy28142 or BMY-28142 or Cefepim$ or cefepitax or ceficad or cepimax or forzyn beta or maxcef or maxfrom or maxipime or Quadrocef).ti,ab. (1916)
52 ((Cephalosporanic adj Acid$) or Cephalosporin$ or Cefamandole or Cefoperazone or Cefazolin or Cefonicid or Cefsulodin or Cephacetrile or Cefotaxime or Cephalothin or Cephapirin or Cephalexin or Cefaclor or Cefadroxil or Cephaloglycin or Cephradine or Cephaloridine or Ceftazidime or Cephamycins or Cefmetazole or Cefotetan or Cefoxitin).ti,ab. (35099)
53 exp Amdinocillin Pivoxil/ (199)
54 ((amdinocillin adj pivoxil) or (FL adj ‘1039’) or FL1039 or fl1039 or FL-1039 or pivamdinocillin or Pivmecillinam or Selexid or coactabs or (ro adj ‘109071’) or (ro10 adj ‘9071’) or ro109071).ti,ab. (237)
55 or/25-54 (246506)
56 21 and 24 and 55 (3195)
57 exp clinical trial/ (706293)
58 exp randomized controlled trials/ (85563)
59 exp double-blind method/ (118498)
60 exp single-blind method/ (17086)
61 exp cross-over studies/ (30990)
62 randomized controlled trial.pt. (342334)
63 clinical trial.pt. (476450)
64 controlled clinical trial.pt. (85694)
65 (clinic$ adj2 trial).mp. (552367)
66 (random$ adj5 control$ adj5 trial$).mp. (443104)
67 (crossover or cross-over).mp. (59003)
68 ((singl$ or double$ or trebl$ or tripl$) adj (blind$ or mask$)).mp. (162179)
69 randomi$.mp. (509202)
70 (random$ adj5 (assign$ or allocat$ or assort$ or reciev$)).mp. (150717)
71 or/57-70 (968331)
72 (review or review,tutorial or review, academic).pt. (1758734)
73 (systematic$ adj5 review$).tw,sh. (40365)
74 (systematic$ adj5 overview$).tw,sh. (663)
75 (quantitativ$ adj5 review$).tw,sh. (3684)
76 (quantitativ$ adj5 overview$).tw,sh. (153)
77 (quantitativ$ adj5 synthesis$).tw,sh. (1107)
78 (methodologic$ adj5 review$).tw,sh. (2696)
79 (methodologic$ adj5 overview$).tw,sh. (180)
80 (integrative research review$ or research integration).tw. (78)
81 meta-analysis as topic/ (12608)
82 (meta-analys$ or meta analys$ or metaanalys$).tw,sh. (62359)
83 (meta synthesis or meta synthesis or metasynthesis).tw,sh. (215)
84 (meta-regression or meta regression or metaregression).tw,sh. (1650)
85 meta-analysis.pt. (37918)
86 (synthes$ adj3 literature).tw. (1070)
87 (synthes$ adj3 evidence).tw. (2956)
88 integrative review.tw. (583)
89 data synthesis.tw. (6328)
90 (research synthesis or narrative synthesis).tw. (463)
91 (systematic study or systematic studies).tw. (5679)
92 systematic comparison$.tw. (953)
93 systematic comparison$.tw. (953)
94 evidence based review.tw. (965)
95 comprehensive review$.tw. (5290)
96 critical review.tw. (9227)
97 quantitative review.tw. (382)
98 structured review.tw. (376)
99 realist review.tw. (24)
100 realist synthesis.tw. (11)
101 review.ti. (212126)







109 108 not 107 (1860495)
110 intervention?.ti. or (intervention? adj6 (clinician? or collaborat$ or community or complex or DESIGN$ or doctor? or educational or family doctor? or family physician? or family practitioner? or financial or GP or general practice? or hospital? or impact? or improv$ or individuali?e? or individuali?ing or interdisciplin$ or multicomponent or multi-component or multidisciplin$ or multi-disciplin$ or multifacet$ or multi-facet$ or multimodal$ or multi-modal$ or personali?e? or personali?ing or pharmacies or pharmacist? or pharmacy or physician? or practitioner? or prescrib$ or prescription? or primary care or professional$ or provider? or regulatory or regulatory or tailor$ or target$ or team$ or usual care)).ab. (128957)
111 (pre-intervention? or preintervention? or ‘pre intervention?’ or post-intervention? or postintervention? or ‘post intervention?’).ti,ab. (7451)
112 demonstration project?.ti,ab. (1742)
113 (pre-post or ‘pre test$’ or pretest$ or posttest$ or ‘post test$’ or (pre adj5 post)).ti,ab. (52427)
114 (pre-workshop or post-workshop or (before adj3 workshop) or (after adj3 workshop)).ti,ab. (472)
115 trial.ti. or ((study adj3 aim?) or ‘our study’).ab. (500725)
116 (before adj10 (after or during)).ti,ab. (314768)
117 (‘quasi-experiment$’ or quasiexperiment$ or ‘quasi random$’ or quasirandom$ or ‘quasi control$’ or quasicontrol$ or ((quasi$ or experimental) adj3 (method$ or study or trial or design$))).ti,ab,hw. (84783)
118 (‘time series’ adj2 interrupt$).ti,ab,hw. (744)
119 (time points adj3 (over or multiple or three or four or five or six or seven or eight or nine or ten or eleven or twelve or month$ or hour? or day? or ‘more than’)).ab. (7043)
120 pilot.ti. (32084)
121 Pilot projects/ (74648)
122 (clinical trial or controlled clinical trial or multicenter study).pt. (595489)
123 (multicentre or multicenter or multi-centre or multi-center).ti. (24301)
124 random$.ti,ab. or controlled.ti. (624993)
125 (control adj3 (area or cohort? or compare? or condition or design or group? or intervention? or participant? or study)).ab. not (controlled clinical trial or randomized controlled trial).pt. (342332)
126 ‘comment on’.cm. or review.ti,pt. or randomized controlled trial.pt. (2652864)
127 (rat or rats or cow or cows or chicken? or horse or horses or mice or mouse or bovine or animal?).ti. (1254855)
128 exp animals/ not humans.sh. (3812817)
129 (or/110-126) not (or/127-128) (3811646)
130 71 or 109 or 129 (4107075)
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